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Many companies use competition for either monetary or non-monetary rewards to induce employee effort. Pitting employees against each other in a competition could come at a thus far insufficiently considered cost of leading to lower employee cooperation. The authors examine how competition for monetary rewards in the form of tournament incentives or non-monetary rewards in the form of standing in uncompensated public rankings affects employee cooperation with former competitors in a subsequent task where the extent of the cooperation does not affect the welfare or social standing of the person deciding to cooperate. The authors hypothesize that competition in the first task negatively affects cooperation in the second task. The authors further predict that competition leads to psychological pressure, which mediates differences in cooperation. The results support the authors’ hypotheses. In addition, the authors find that the decrease in cooperation results from the behavior of low performers, whereas cooperation by high performers is not affected. The findings are important because they show that inducing effort in one dimension leads to an unintended cost in the form of lower cooperation in another dimension. This cost occurs for both types of competition – competition for monetary payoffs and for non-monetary rewards. Ultimately, the size of this cost depends on the marginal benefit from any cooperation of low performers.

There has been a call for additional managerial accounting research that examines the effect of non-pecuniary preferences (such as those for honesty and fairness) on managerial reporting decisions.

Drawing from trait theory, agency theory, and psychological contracts theory, Kidder (2005) suggests that personality traits and perceived unfairness in the workplace both help predict detrimental workplace behaviors, with perceived fairness affecting the honesty in reporting of some individuals but not others. We test Kidder’s (2005) theory in an experimental setting where participants have opportunity and incentive to report dishonestly.

Participants’ honesty preferences and ethical values (idealism and relativism) were measured, and the fairness of the participants’ employment contracts was manipulated. As predicted, higher preferences for honesty are significantly associated with honesty in reporting, suggesting that participants make trade-offs between increasing their own wealth and acting honestly. Additionally, the perceived fairness of compensation interacted with honesty preferences and relativism to affect honesty in reporting.

The implication for practice is that while a small number of employees are likely to consistently behave in honest or self-interested ways, firms may be able to positively influence the behavior of the majority of employees by enacting policies and procedures that contribute to perceptions that compensation is fair.

These findings contribute to our understanding of non-pecuniary preferences on managerial reporting decisions.

Tucked in the back of Venkataraman’s 1997 work on the distinctive domain of entrepreneurship (DDE) lies a pointer to a question each individual must face when choosing to start a new venture; “is entrepreneurship worth it?” Inventorying costs associated with risk, uncertainty, and illiquidity against surpluses from financial and psychological factors unique to entrepreneurship, Venkataraman tempts readers to tally entrepreneurial returns. The authors summarize and integrate an academic study of these various cost and return components over the past 20 years using Venkataraman’s original framework. The authors find the answer to the question of “is entrepreneurship worth it?” varies with time. Researcher’s answer to the question has shifted from an early view that entrepreneurs sacrifice financial gain in exchange for soft psychological benefits to a more positive view that entrepreneurs are rewarded both financially and psychologically for the unique costs borne in the DDE. But the rewards are not immediate. In entrepreneur time, break-even emerges by gradually overcoming an initial deficit. As surpluses accrue, returns to entrepreneurs likely eventually exceed those of their wage-earning peers.

We develop a conceptual model, based on person-environment fit theory, which explains how employee age affects occupational strain and well-being. We begin by explaining how age directly affects different dimensions of objective and subjective P-E fit. Next, we illustrate how age can moderate the relationship between objective P-E fit and subjective P-E fit. Third, we discuss how age can moderate the relationships between P-E fit, on one hand, and occupational strain and well-being on the other. Fourth, we explain how age can impact occupational strain and well-being directly independent of P-E fit. The chapter concludes with implications for future research and practice.

A customer of Xtrip (name disguised) booked an airline ticket online but was told that the ticket was invalid while boarding from a foreign airport. The solution provided by the customer service representative did not work, and the customer was nearly arrested by the local police as a suspected fraud. On his return, the customer demanded a written apology from Xtrip to restore his reputation. What should the company do?

This chapter examines how emotional intelligence may influence the performance of groups. I first address relevant issues concerning emotional intelligence at the individual level of analysis. I then describe the range of composition models by which group emotional intelligence constructs can be created, from the emotional intelligence of the members of the group, articulate mechanisms by which each construct may be related to performance, and use Steiner's (1972) typology of group tasks to identify when each construct may best predict performance. I also use the mechanisms of multiplication and compensation to consider how group emotional intelligence may combine with other group constructs to predict performance. I end this chapter with a discussion of research implications.

Social psychological perspectives on educational stratification offer explanations that bridge the macro and micro social worlds. However, while ethnoracial disparities in academic achievement are evident during the earliest grade levels, most social psychological research in this area has examined high school or college student samples and has used a black–white binary to operationalize race.

We use longitudinal structural equation models to examine links between academic self-efficacy beliefs and school performance among a national sample of diverse third- through eighth-grade students in the United States.

Contrary to hypotheses derived from the student identity literature, we find no evidence that elementary and middle school students from different ethnoracial backgrounds vary in the degree to which they selectively discount evaluative feedback in their academic self-efficacy construction, nor in the extent to which they demonstrate disrupted links between academic self-efficacy and subsequent academic performance.

The study examines the extent to which race-linked social psychological processes may be driving academic achievement inequalities during the primary schooling years.

Human resources management (HRM) has evolved from primarily focusing on monetary incentives toward incorporating other nonmonetary aspects for managing professionals’ motivation. However, in health care organizations, paying professionals for performance persists although evidence for its return on investment is scant. This raises the question whether monetary incentives are, in fact, the (only) motivator for health care professionals or whether other incentives could substitute or complement them in the future. This chapter reviews the basic ideas of pay for performance (P4P) and its current challenges. Taking into account HRM's experience (and evolution) in other industries, I discuss the interdependence and the impact of extrinsic and intrinsic motivators in health care. On the basis of the health care market's standing as a knowledge-intensive industry in which multiple actors contribute their knowledge to multiple tasks, I will offer suggestions how to manage motivation based on individuals’ intrinsic needs instead of relying solely on extrinsic motivators.

Engagement, motivation, and persistence are usually associated with positive outcomes. However, too much of it can overtax our psychophysiological system and put it at risk. On the basis of a neuro-dynamic personality and self-regulation model, we explain the neurobehavioral mechanisms presumably underlying engagement and how engagement, when overtaxing the individual, becomes automatically inhibited for reasons of protection. We explain how different intensities and patterns of engagement may relate to personality traits such as Self-directedness, Conscientiousness, Drive for Reward, and Absorption, which we conceive of as functions or strategies of adaptive neurobehavioral systems. We describe how protective inhibitions and personality traits contribute to phenomena such as disengagement and increased effort-sense in chronic fatigue conditions, which often affect professions involving high socio-emotional interactions. By doing so we adduce evidence on hemispheric asymmetry of motivation, neuromodulation by dopamine, self-determination, task engagement, and physiological disengagement. Not least, we discuss educational implications of our model.