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Conventional wisdom tells us that mediation without ripeness is a fool’s errand (Zartman and Touval, 1985). What, then, is Türkiye’s motivation for mediating the war in Ukraine in lieu of ripeness – and what can its behavior as a mediator tell us about that motivation? In pursuit of this question, this paper inductively analyzes Turkish mediation in the Ukraine war to unpack the relationship between a contextual (ripeness) and actor-level (motivation) variable. Of particular interest is the decision-making and behavior of third parties (like Türkiye in Ukraine) who elect to mediate highly complex conflicts in which ripeness is indiscernible. The purpose of this research is not to propose or test a causal relationship between obscured ripeness and mediation, but rather to examine mediation behavior in situations where ripeness is obscured.

The impact of weaponized information on ripeness and third-party mediation is evaluated through an original, systematic and inductive case study analysis of Turkish mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war. As an intense theater of operations for information warfare for well over a decade, the war in Ukraine serves as an especially apt choice for an analysis of “obscured ripeness.” Likewise, Türkiye’s anomalous position as the only substantive source of mediation in the conflict lends significance to an empirical examination of its motivation and behavior as a mediator.

This research reveals that the pervasive use of weaponized information in the Russia–Ukraine war has distorted and disordered the information environment, thereby obscuring the ability of third parties to determine if the conflict is or could be ripe for mediation. However, the condition of obscured ripeness that prevails in the conflict has not proven a deterrent for mediation by Türkiye, which, as the only mediator in the conflict, has used a transactional approach to mediation motivated by self-regarding interests and animated by a manipulative mediation strategy. In sum, this inductive analysis of Turkish mediation in Ukraine reveals that the use of weaponized information in a conflict indirectly selects on transactional mediation (and mediators). The significance of this finding is magnified by the widespread use of weaponized information in contemporary conflicts as well as the declining frequency of third-party mediation.

There have been few, if any, systematic assessments in Turkish mediation of the Russia–Ukraine war, and none specifically concerned with the effects of weaponized information. Additionally, the paper proposes a typology of mediator motivation that is used to structure that assessment, while also introducing a new concept (“obscured ripeness”) and linking that concept both to the existing literature on ripeness and to the use of weaponized information in contemporary armed conflicts. As such, this manuscript represents an important contribution both to the empirical and theoretical landscape with respect to the study of mediation and international conflict management.

Considering the importance of Russia and Ukraine in agriculture, the authors quantify the potential impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on food output, trade, prices and food security for the world.

The authors mainly use the quantitative and structural multi-country and multi-sector general equilibrium trade model to analyze the potential impacts of the conflict on the global food trade pattern and security.

First, the authors found that the conflict would lead to soaring agricultural prices, decreasing trade volume and severe food insecurity especially for countries that rely heavily on grain imports from Ukraine and Russia, such as Egypt and Turkey. Second, major production countries such as the United States and Canada may even benefit from the conflict. Third, restrictions on upstream energy and fertilizer will amplify the negative effects of food insecurity.

This study analyzed the effect of Russia–Ukraine conflict on global food security based on sector linkages and the quantitative general equilibrium trade framework. With a clearer demonstration of the influence about the inherent mechanism based on fewer parameters compared with traditional Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) models, the authors showed integrated impacts of the conflict on food output, trade, prices and welfare across sectors and countries.

While the world is yet to fully recuperate from the social and economic repercussions of COVID-19, the Russia–Ukraine conflict poses another major threat causing a humanitarian crisis and economic shock. Although the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and its pledge to “leave no one behind” is a universal commitment to protect the livelihoods of vulnerable groups, the Russia–Ukraine ongoing conflict is causing immense suffering and a gloomy future for the 2030 Agenda. The purpose of this study is to provide a holistic understanding of the ramifications of the Russia–Ukraine war in SDGs progress around the world. Further, the authors shed light on how stakeholders can help engage in support of SDGs in such a challenging time.

This study is qualitative in nature and relies on secondary sources. The motive behind this study is to allow social and economic policy researchers and practitioners to learn from the Russia–Ukraine dispute. The authors conduct a preliminary factual analysis to determine patterns of how the conflict affects the SDGs Agenda. On this basis, the authors propose some recommendations.

While it is still early to measure the full impact of the war on crises worldwide, it is clear that the repercussions will be multi-dimensional. The authors argue that the conflict in Ukraine is severely threatening the achievement of the SDGs. As such, the authors identify patterns of this crisis that have halted progress on SDGs worldwide. Of all SDGs, the authors argue that SDG16 (i.e. peace and justice) is an absolute pre-requisite to sustaining other goals. Further, refugees should be economically empowered, resilient and sustainable food systems need to be put in place and renewable energy transition is required.

This study serves as a springboard for future research by identifying patterns of war crises that have halted progress in achieving sustainable development worldwide. Empirical evidence needs to be conducted on the impact of this ongoing conflict on sustainable development and the 2030 Agenda.

This study could provide guidance to leaders and stakeholders across the globe on patterns for the impact of the Ukraine–Russia conflict on undermining global sustainable development while highlighting the need for major additional efforts to achieve the relevant SDGs.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to analyse the threats the Russia–Ukraine dispute presents to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for SDGs.

The purpose of this paper was identification and empirical assessment of the differentiation of consumers' attitudes in Ukraine and Poland to Russian brands and other brands offered on the Russian market after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

The main research methods include a systematic literature review and the authors' own surveys conducted in November 2022. The research sample comprised 950 consumers – 67% of them were Poles, 30% – Ukrainians and 3% from other countries.

A respondents' country (Poland and Ukraine) does not impact attitudes to brands offered on the Russian market after Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Moreover, it does not affect and differentiate emotional engagement in the conflict and assistance to war victims. Cluster analysis resulted in identifying two groups on the basis of consumers' declared emotional reactions to the war. The first group was smaller (N = 353, 37.2%), referred to as “indifferent consumers”, and was characterized by a greater inclination to purchase brands offered in Russia. The other cluster, referred to as “sensitive consumers” (N = 597, 62.8%), comprises those engaged in offering assistance to war victims, showing strong emotions in connection with the aggression and military activities and characterized by a clearly negative attitude to Russian and other offered brands and an inclination to boycott these brands.

A short time horizon, the study confined to two countries, difficulties in reaching Ukrainian respondents due to power failures in Ukraine in the period of conducting the survey (November 2022), a non-representative research sample – overrepresentation of people aged 18–25 years.

The research study contributes to the knowledge about consumer brand attitudes and preferences under unique social, economic and market conditions. These conditions were created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as well as the international and global character of the war in Ukraine. The significant implications of the study refer to brand communication policies and companies' CSR-related declarations. A number of consumers' errors were recorded, resulting from wrong brand retrieval, which were rectified at a later stage as a result of international restrictions imposed on Russia, harsh media criticism and social international embargoes imposed on brands offered in Russia. The marketing communication of contemporary global brands should give consideration to the informative function of CSR activities, and the communication process should be continuous. Critical attitudes and an inclination to boycott brands point to the possible consequences faced by inconsistent and ethically doubtful brand policies. This implication is clearly confirmed by the results of the study.

The authors also wish to highlight the implications for practice and society. As mentioned earlier, Polish consumers involved in providing aid to victims of the war also expressed their opposition to the war by boycotting Russian products and international brands remaining in Russia. Popularization of the research results obtained by the authors can be a form of sensitizing the public to the need for long-term relief, awakening global awareness of the essence and importance of sanctions imposed on Russia, as well as the possibility of expressing opposition through individual purchasing decisions and boycotting brands still present in Russia.

The study allowed for identifying consumers' differentiated brand attitudes in two countries: a country inflicted by war (Ukraine) and a front-line country, strongly supporting Ukraine (Poland). The research contributes to consumer behavior theories and studies of consumer attitudes and preferences from the perspective of international corporations' CSR activities under the unique conditions of war. Also, it contributes to the knowledge of the mechanism of forming attitudes to Russian and international brands offered in Russia among CEE consumers.

The Ukraine crisis, which began with Russia's military intervention, has violently jolted the modern world. The egregious Russian invasion of Ukraine, on the other hand, has arguably altered the trajectory of the world order. This whiff of war does not exclude any state because all states in the world system are economically, politically, and socially interconnected and dependent on one another. Bangladesh is also feeling the effects of the Ukraine crisis. The crisis has highlighted some challenging aspects of Bangladesh's foreign policy, testing the robustness and independence of its decision-making process regarding United Nations resolutions. Myanmar, like Bangladesh, has appeared befuddled in its response to the crisis. This paper examines how Bangladesh and Myanmar's foreign policy anticipated an unwanted labyrinth by the crisis, which made its moral credibility critical to some extent. Furthermore, the paper discusses how these two countries’ foreign policy trajectories became entangled at a difficult crossroads. We used secondary data sources backed up by scholarly works on Bangladesh and Myanmar foreign policy, relevant books, recent reports, and writings on the subject for this article. This paper also sheds light on Bangladesh's U-Turn in supporting and speaking out in support of the UN resolution on Ukraine's humanitarian crisis.

This study examined the impact of war/conflict-related news on the Russian and Ukrainian stock markets in the build-up and beginning of the war that sparked in the year 2022.

In order to examine the impact of war-related news on stock returns, data were gathered from the United States (US) and Russian stock indices, oil price and volatile index (VIX) from Yahoo.finance; Ukrainian stock values from pfts.ua website and daily related news retrieved from nexis.com were analysed. The data were gathered from January 1, 2022 to February 24, 2022. Seeming unrealated regressions (SUR) and exponential generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (EGARCH) models were carried out to determine the formulated correlations. This study controlled the oil price, US stock returns, Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) VIX and difference in stock returns of Russia and Ukraine.

The results are presented two-fold: first, war-related news between the two countries enhanced volatility and caused a significant decline in the stock market indices for both countries. Second, the Russian stock market faced a steeper decline in the build-up and the actual beginning of the war than the Ukrainian stock market. Notably, the Russian markets feared the adverse economic consequences that stemmed from the sanctions the US and the Western world imposed.

As this study was based on early evidence, future studies with a longer window may provide better insights. This present study is restricted to the stock returns of the countries directly involved in the build-up towards war. Studies focusing on the impact of other asset classes, currencies, commodities and global stock markets might offer holistic insights.

The study outcomes suggest that global portfolio investors should stay away from stock markets of the war-raged countries and equity markets in general, but instead look for safe-haven assets.

The paper evaluates stock markets' performance during the pre-war period, considering the context of this historical war between the neighbours. It is important to understand this issue as this war is subject to sanctions by the US and leads to a global supply chain crisis.

India is not geographically close to either Russia or Ukraine. However, India's trade relations with them make it vulnerable to the consequences of the war between these countries. Thus, the present study aims to examine the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on various sectoral indices of the Indian economy.

Event study methodology has been used in this study for analysis. The date of the war announcement is the event day. The sample studied includes ten sectors of the Indian economy listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE). Results correspond to the period of −167 days to +20 days of the announcement of the war, i.e. from June 25, 2021, to March 28, 2022.

Almost all the sample sectors earned significantly positive abnormal returns in the post-event period. The metal industry has led this group by showcasing the highest abnormal returns. Though Indian sectors made overall positive returns, the market soon corrected itself and abnormal returns were wiped out.

These results can benefit portfolio managers, analysts, investors and policymakers in hedging risks and selecting suitable investments during increased global uncertainty. The study's conclusions help policymakers establish an institutional and supervisory framework that will make it easier to spot systematic risks and reduce them by putting countercyclical measures in place.

India has no geographical proximity or trade relations with Russia or Ukraine, as strong as any other European country. However, Russia has remained a strong ally to India in the trade of defense equipment. Similar is the case with Ukraine, a significant global partner for India. Thus, the impact of conflict between these two countries has not been limited to Europe only but has also engulfed related economies. Hence, the present study is one of the first attempts to examine the burns sustained by the Indian economy due to this war.

This study investigates how the conflict between Russia and Ukraine impacts global inflation.

The study uses monthly consumer price index (CPI) data from 60 countries for 30 months, from January 2020 to June 2022. An event study methodology has been employed to check abnormal variation in the CPI, after classifying country-specific monthly data into nine groups.

The outcome revealed that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered inflation globally. However, the severity of inflation in the sample countries is determined by their geographical proximity and trading activity with the countries in conflict. A significant rise in inflation was observed among major European economies during the invasion. As the war continues, the increase in the price of essential commodities is evident worldwide.

The war literature till now has concentrated on stock markets, energy markets, exchange rates and precious metals. Since no previous research has attempted to quantify the abnormal effect of the war on domestic and global inflation, the current study will shed much-needed light on the subject.

This study aims to attempt to investigate the time-varying causality and price spillover effects between crude oil and exchange rate markets in G7 economies during the COVID-19 and Russia–Ukraine crises.

This study uses time-varying Granger causality test and spillover index.

This study finds a time-varying causality between exchange rate returns and oil prices, implying that crude oil prices have the predictive power of the foreign exchange rate markets in G7 economies in their domain. Furthermore, the total spillover index is estimated to fall significantly around COVID-19 and war events. However, this index is relatively high – more than 57% during the first wave of COVID-19 and decreasing slightly during the Russia–Ukraine conflict.

This outcome supports the hypothesis that the majority of the time-varying interaction between exchange rates and oil prices takes place in the short term. As a result, the time-varying characteristics provide straightforward insight for investors and policymakers to fully understand the intercorrelation between oil prices and the G7 exchange rate markets.

First, this study has reexamined the oil–exchange rate nexus to highlight new evidence using novel time-varying Granger causality model recently proposed by Shi et al. (2018) and the spillover index proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). These approaches allow the author to improve understanding of time-varying causal associations and return transmission between exchange rates and oil prices. Second, compared to past papers, this paper has used data from December 31, 2019, to October 31, 2022, to offer a fresh and accurate structure between the markets, which indicates the unique experience of the COVID-19 outbreak and Russia–Ukraine war episodes. Third, this study analyzes a data set of seven advanced economies (G7) exhibiting significant variations in their economic situations and responding to global stress times.

In this study, the authors analyze the impact of geopolitics risk on Sukuk, Islamic and composite stocks, oil and gold markets and portfolio diversification implications during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict period.

The study used a mix of wavelet-based approaches, including continuous wavelet transformation and discrete wavelet transformation. The analysis used data from the Geopolitical Risk index (GP{R), Dow Jones Sukuk index (SUKUK), Dow Jones Islamic index (DJII), Dow Jones composite index (DJCI), one of the top crude oil benchmarks which is based on the Europe (BRENT) (oil fields in the North Sea between the Shetland Island and Norway), and Global Gold Price Index (gold) from May 31, 2012, to June 13, 2022.

The results of the study indicate that during the COVID-19 and Russia–Ukraine conflict period geopolitical risk (GPR) was in the leading position, where BRENT confirmed the lagging relationship. On the other hand, during the COVID-19 pandemic period, SUKUK, DJII and DJCI are in the leading position, where GPR confirms the lagging position.

The present study is unique in three respects. First, the authors revisit the influence of GPR on global asset markets such as Islamic stocks, Islamic bonds, conventional stocks, oil and gold. Second, the authors use the wavelet power spectrum and coherence analysis to determine the level of reliance based on time and frequency features. Third, the authors conduct an empirical study that includes recent endogenous shocks generated by health crises such as the COVID-19 epidemic, as well as shocks caused by the geopolitical danger of a war between Russia and Ukraine.

1. We analyze the impact of geopolitics risk on Sukuk, Islamic and composite stocks, oil and gold markets and portfolio diversification implications during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict period.

2. The results of the wavelet-based approach show that Dow Jones composite and Islamic indexes have observed the highest mean return during the study period.

3. GPR and BRENT are estimated to have the highest amount of risk throughout the observation period.

4. Dow Jones Sukuk, Islamic and composite stock show similar trend of volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic period and comparatively gold observes lower variance during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict.

We analyze the impact of geopolitics risk on Sukuk, Islamic and composite stocks, oil and gold markets and portfolio diversification implications during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict period.

The results of the wavelet-based approach show that Dow Jones composite and Islamic indexes have observed the highest mean return during the study period.

GPR and BRENT are estimated to have the highest amount of risk throughout the observation period.

Dow Jones Sukuk, Islamic and composite stock show similar trend of volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic period and comparatively gold observes lower variance during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict.