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Conventional wisdom tells us that mediation without ripeness is a fool’s errand (Zartman and Touval, 1985). What, then, is Türkiye’s motivation for mediating the war in Ukraine in lieu of ripeness – and what can its behavior as a mediator tell us about that motivation? In pursuit of this question, this paper inductively analyzes Turkish mediation in the Ukraine war to unpack the relationship between a contextual (ripeness) and actor-level (motivation) variable. Of particular interest is the decision-making and behavior of third parties (like Türkiye in Ukraine) who elect to mediate highly complex conflicts in which ripeness is indiscernible. The purpose of this research is not to propose or test a causal relationship between obscured ripeness and mediation, but rather to examine mediation behavior in situations where ripeness is obscured.

The impact of weaponized information on ripeness and third-party mediation is evaluated through an original, systematic and inductive case study analysis of Turkish mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war. As an intense theater of operations for information warfare for well over a decade, the war in Ukraine serves as an especially apt choice for an analysis of “obscured ripeness.” Likewise, Türkiye’s anomalous position as the only substantive source of mediation in the conflict lends significance to an empirical examination of its motivation and behavior as a mediator.

This research reveals that the pervasive use of weaponized information in the Russia–Ukraine war has distorted and disordered the information environment, thereby obscuring the ability of third parties to determine if the conflict is or could be ripe for mediation. However, the condition of obscured ripeness that prevails in the conflict has not proven a deterrent for mediation by Türkiye, which, as the only mediator in the conflict, has used a transactional approach to mediation motivated by self-regarding interests and animated by a manipulative mediation strategy. In sum, this inductive analysis of Turkish mediation in Ukraine reveals that the use of weaponized information in a conflict indirectly selects on transactional mediation (and mediators). The significance of this finding is magnified by the widespread use of weaponized information in contemporary conflicts as well as the declining frequency of third-party mediation.

There have been few, if any, systematic assessments in Turkish mediation of the Russia–Ukraine war, and none specifically concerned with the effects of weaponized information. Additionally, the paper proposes a typology of mediator motivation that is used to structure that assessment, while also introducing a new concept (“obscured ripeness”) and linking that concept both to the existing literature on ripeness and to the use of weaponized information in contemporary armed conflicts. As such, this manuscript represents an important contribution both to the empirical and theoretical landscape with respect to the study of mediation and international conflict management.

Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies and Autonomous Unmanned Vehicles are shaping our daily lives, society, and will continue to transform how we will fight future wars. Advances in AI technologies have fueled an explosion of interest in the military and political domain. As AI technologies evolve, there will be increased reliance on these systems to maintain global security. For the individual and society, AI presents challenges related to surveillance, personal freedom, and privacy. For the military, we will need to exploit advances in AI technologies to support the warfighter and ensure global security. The integration of AI technologies in the battlespace presents advantages, costs, and risks in the future battlespace. This chapter will examine the issues related to advances in AI technologies, as we examine the benefits, costs, and risks associated with integrating AI and autonomous systems in society and in the future battlespace.

The objective of this chapter is to outline the problem of information security in Russia and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries since 2000. It demonstrates the specifics of Russian propaganda in the CEE, which visibly poses a security threat to those countries. To address this issue, the authors present the evolution of Russian information policy, propaganda, its tools and instruments (traditional and social media), and examine the mechanisms of exerting social influence used in practice in the CEE countries. The authors discuss the implications of Russia’s information war with the West and for the CEE states’ domestic problems, which provide vast opportunities for Russian activity in the region. Changes in information policy and information management are bound to a revision of Russian foreign policy. The authors assumed that the information war in the CEE is not directed toward the countries of this region but rather aims to weaken the West, especially the European Union. Moreover, there is a need to speak out about the rise of populism and extremist movements exploited through Russian media influence to undermine regional stability and weaken state authorities. Additionally, it is suggested more attention should be paid to education and public awareness. The lack of new media literacy skills, together with the combination of populism and pro-Russia business links in the CEE states, will increase their vulnerabilities to more risks than information security.

Misinformation is a significant phenomenon in today's world: the purpose of this paper is to explore the motivations behind the creation and use of misinformation.

A literature review was undertaken, covering the English and Russian language sources. Content analysis was used to identify the different kinds of motivation relating to the stages of creating and communicating misinformation. The authors applied Schutz's analysis of motivational types.

The main types of motivation for creating and facilitating misinformation were identified as “in-order-to motivations”, i.e. seeking to bring about some desired state, whereas the motivations for using and, to a significant extent, sharing misinformation were “because” motivations, i.e. rooted in the individual's personal history.

The general model of the motivations underlying misinformation is original as is the application of Schutz's typification of motivations to the different stages in the creation, dissemination and use of misinformation.

The purpose of this study is to examine the new normal within a continuum of three types of disruption, each of varying duration. References to the new normal draw attention to the periodic and rising importance of different levels, types, and consequences of game-changing disruption for those in governance roles.

In this conceptual research, given the discussion of a return to normalcy near the expected end of the COVID-19 pandemic, the authors organize the literature on disruption in governance into a disruption continuum – emergency, crisis and super crisis – to demonstrate the differences in each type of disruption to establish a distinct view of the new normal.

Within the three types of disruption, the first two suit the rational authority model in which disruption is turned over to those in governance roles. However, the rational authority model comes under attack in the super crisis and is increasingly associated with the post-truth era.

In Type 3 disruptions or super crises, the failure of those in control to set the parameters of the new normal raises concerns that the center no longer holds, and as a result, the assumption of an attentive public splinter into multiple contending publics, each with its version of data, facts and images.

The new normal is typically treated after the result of a black swan or rare and surprising long-lived disruption. In this work, the formulation of the recurrence, ubiquity and controversy engendered by super crises suggests that it is one of the features attenuating and giving rise to fractious incivility in the post-truth era.

Big data are indispensable in scientific endeavours ranging from nuclear research to climate studies. However, there is a growing misperception that congeries of data can be easily reconstructed into competitive business insights. Such notions have been encouraged by a plethora of mainstream techno-utopian forecasts.

This paper investigated such claims and related big data developments, including its “systems-first” and oligopolistic orientations. Due to the paucity of current scholarship on an admittedly pessimistic topic, the paper studied contrarian developments in the industry by relying on secondary data. The study of experts and scholars; industrial trends; and discrepancies and critical gaps in the mainstream data narrative were sourced to prognosticate the likely trajectory of many data giants.

A key finding was that the big data industry faces an untenable market bubble worth trillions of dollars. This will have severe consequences for common digital access and social stability worldwide. Evidence presented also suggests that the data industrial complex may undergo a function creep by facilitating a transition from surveillance capitalism to surveillance society.

Primary data for a study of this nature may take years to materialize. This is a “first-pass” study that seeks to illuminate latent dangers facing the big data/AI sector. There is a paucity of scholarly study that even remotely touches on this topic. Therefore, supporting arguments was sourced from contemporary reports and expert study (secondary data).

As control of data may have geostrategic implications, balkanization of the wired ecosystem may be underway with Russia and China leading the way. Future superpowers may be defined by the way they handle data. The concentration of data in fewer hands may also affect citizen innovation.

A break-down of the data industrial complex may lead to social mayhem as the monetization of presently free software, blogs and social media platforms may be unfeasible.

This topic has hardly been explored due to the novelty of big data, its applications and the daily hype over its potentials. This paper boldly describes dark countercurrents in the industry.

Cost and schedule overruns are rife in dam projects. Normative evidence espouses overruns as though they are inimical to development and prosperity aspirations of stakeholders. This study examines the causal relationship between project financing and overruns.

Causative data were extracted from completion reports of 28 major dam projects in Africa. Each of the projects was financed jointly by up to 10 international development lenders. Relationships between causes of overruns and project outcomes were analysed.

Analyses elicit indicators of remarkable correlations between finance procedures and project outcomes. Lenders’ disposition to risk attenuation was the main debacles to project success. Interests had mounted, whilst release of fund was erratic and ill-timed. Finance objectives and mechanisms were grossly inadequate for projects’ intense bifurcations. Projects had slowed or stalled because lenders’ risks attenuation processes were purposed to favour lenders’ objectives, and not projects’ interests. In addition, findings also show project owners’ own funds and the number of lenders to a single project correlate with overruns.

Findings imply commercial complexities around major projects. They also show transactions are shaped by subtle (mis)trust behaviours in project finance procedures. Thus, scholarly solutions to project performance issues should consider behavioural issues of stakeholding parties more broadly, beyond contractors and project owners. Project finance ecosystems are vulnerable to major actors’ self-interests, opportunism and predatory conducts. Borrowers would manage this by developing and improving their capacity to build resilience and trust. Evidence shows intense borrower nations in Africa have limited capacity and acuity for these.

This study contextualises megaprojects in complexity rather than cost. Its additionality is in how finance steers absolute control of project environment away from project owners and how finance administration triggers risks and overrun.