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Political Science in the United States has focused too much on variable-oriented, quantitative methods and thus lost its ability to ask “big questions.” Stein Rokkan (d. 1979) was an eminent comparativist who asked big questions and provided such qualitative tools as conceptual maps, grids, and clustered comparisons. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), arguably the first social scientist, also asked big questions and provided a universal explanation about the dialectical relationship between nomads and sedentary people. This article analyzes to what extent Ibn Khaldun's concepts of asabiyya and sedentary culture help understand the rise and fall of the Muslim civilization. It also explores my alternative, class-based perspective in Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment. Moreover, the article explores how Rokkan's analysis of cultural, geographical, economic, and religio-political variations within Western European states can provide insights to the examination of such variations in the Muslim world.

This study aims to investigate the implications of natural gas rents and institutions as co-drivers of economic growth, focusing on the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) with panel data between 2001 and 2021.

This research paper uses a specialised two stage estimator, the panel instrumental variable technique (panel IV), which takes care of the potential endogeneity issues in the model.

The findings show that natural gas rent significantly impacts the economic growth of the GECF. On average, natural gas rent increases the sample’s growth rate by about 2.634% percentage points in the short run. The result indicates that the qualities of institutions (political and economic) have a significant positive long-term effect on the economies of the GECF. In addition, the study’s energy price volatility positively correlates with the countries’ growth.

There might be a need to investigate the effects of natural gas rents and institutions as co-growth drivers in each country within the GECF. The likelihood exists that the impact of natural gas rents and institutions on economic growth at the country’s level may differ from the outcome of such an experiment on the group level. Because of space and time limitations, this study could not carry out the specific country’s investigation of natural gas rents and institutions as a co-growth driver. That limitation may constitute further study to advance this study to a new height.

With good institutions, natural gas rent is likely to be an alternative growth driver for some economies that rely on fossil fuels like oil as a growth driver. By extension, the GECF has the potential to rival Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the global energy market, particularly in achieving Sustainable Development Goal number seven. In essence, evidence in this study suggests that natural gas rent has long-term positive effects on the growth of the GECF, conditioned on good institutions. Moreover, the drive of global energy consumption towards sustainable energy usage is an economic blessing for the GECF. By extension, the demand for natural gas would continue to rise, creating opportunities to improve natural gas rents. By implication, the GECF would continue to benefit from the pursuit of sustainability as the world shifts towards energy consumption with less CO₂.

Firstly, this study models the qualities of institutions for the GECF. Secondly, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first attempt to examine natural gas rents and the qualities of institutions as co-determinants of economic growth among the GECF (a potential cartel).

The popular uprising, the Aragalaya, was a response to a debt crisis as well as a catharsis of accumulated public discontent, which overlapped with the pandemic. A key lesson from the pandemic was the need to strengthen state social provisioning capacities to protect the health status of citizens. In addition, enhancing local economies and sustainable livelihoods is central to avoiding the vulnerabilities of international migrant labour and tourism. The limitations of representative politics highlight the need to strengthen democratic social movement politics. Along with cross cultural alliances, building multi-class alliances is central for strengthening politics of redistribution. In a context of integration of party politics with criminal networks, demilitarisation as well as the abolition of prisons is indispensable for democratisation. In a global scale, democratising financial markets and platform economies suggests regulation and regional experiments not simply by the state but also multiple publics. In demanding participation in representative institutions, the Aragalaya combined a protest movement with a sense of commons. In turn, it pointed towards the possibilities of a public-driven economy based on the democratisation of the state as well as markets. In framing this movement as a ‘struggle of love’, it revitalised the realm of life politics and alternative pleasures of life.

While most West European nations were formed around pre-existing entities that could be called “countries” before the modern age, this was not the case in the Middle East. Some entities, like Egypt, did have a clear political and cultural identity before colonialism, others, like Algeria, did not. This chapter discusses the four states of the Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, through the perspective of “country creation” going into and coming out of colonial rule. We can see here two “models” of fairly similar types of historical development, one showing a gradual process through a protectorate period to relatively stable modern nations, another through violent conquest and direct colonization ending in violent liberation and military and wealthy but fragile states. The article asks whether these models for the history of country creation and the presence or absence of pre-colonial identities can help explain the modern history and nature of these states in the Arab Spring and the years thereafter. Then, a more tentative attempt is made to apply these models to two countries of the Arab east, Syria and Iraq. While local variations ensure that no model can be transferred directly, it can show the importance of studying the historical factors that go into the transition from geographical region to a country with people that can form the basis of a nation.

This chapter offers a Marxist analysis of forms of value in capitalist economies, and their implications for accumulation, (in)stability, and economic policy. The study focuses on seven key categories: money, capital, credit, interest-bearing capital, fictitious capital, the domestic public debt, and macroeconomic management through monetary and fiscal policy. It argues, first, that there is an intrinsic tendency toward the growing complexity of value forms in capitalism. Its examination helps to locate the contradictions of accumulation at increasingly complex levels, and the emergence of specifically financial forms of instability. Second, state management of accumulation through fiscal and monetary policy and the domestic public debt are essential for the stabilization of the economy, but their effectiveness remains limited. Third, monetary and financial structures, their relationship with production, and capacity to stretch, transform, and (de)stabilize accumulation are historically and institutionally specific. Fourth, public policy can influence the level and composition of output and employment, and the distributional and other outcomes of accumulation. Examination of the capital relation from this angle can shed light upon the drivers and modalities of accumulation of real and financial assets, and the imperatives, forms, and limitations of state regulation of accumulation.

In contrast to Ahmet Kuru's argument that a critical juncture occurred in the 11th century when a repressive anti-intellectual state-ulema alliance appeared, which destroyed the creative spirit of the previous centuries in Islam, this review argues that the critical juncture must be sought in the modern era with the development of citizenship in the Middle East.

Gas flaring is a crucial issue in the energy transition era, as it is a major source of carbon emissions in the gas production chain. The reduction of flaring could potentially contribute to eliminating energy poverty, as the amount of gas currently flared each year could power the entirety of Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite Iran's zero-clearing target, the country ranks third in gas flaring globally, with 12% share. This case study examines the reasons behind gas flaring in Iran within the Sustainable Development Goals framework. The study reveals that while technological and economic difficulties were the primary obstacles in early years, policy malfunctioning has demonstrated the wicked nature of a sustainability problem in recent years. The traditional top-down institutional structure has led to interference from public agencies and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) companies, complicating decision-making. The lack of precise criteria for finding best solutions, as well as the absence of appropriate control and monitoring mechanisms, has further paralyzed efforts to reduce flaring. The intensification of conflict between interest groups has added complexity to the situation. The issue has been further complicated at higher levels due to economic sanctions. This study offers practical solutions for reducing flaring in Iran based on global experiences and policies and programs of some selected countries. These suggestions address the policy, technological, and institutional aspects of the problem and aim to pave the way for sustainable and responsible energy transition. By reducing gas flaring, Iran can contribute to global efforts to mitigate climate change and create a more equitable and sustainable energy future.

This study aims to examine the relationship between the diffusion of technology-enabled innovation in financial services (i.e. financial technology [FinTech]) and the financial performance, i.e. profitability and market value of the banks listed in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

An extensive review of the literature was carried out, and a diffusion index of 73 items including was adopted to measure the level of FinTech usage or diffusion for the banks that are listed on the GCC stock exchanges. The study used return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (TQ) as proxies to measure profitability and market value, respectively.

The findings of the empirical results indicate that there is a positive relationship between FinTech implementation and market performance (TQ) in the GCC banks. The results also showed that the highest level of FinTech implementation was 79.7% by United Arab Emirates banks followed by Bahraini banks at 76.7% based on the index developed for this study.

This study, hence, recommends that policymakers and governments implement supportive policies and initiatives, allowing consumers to embrace technology as part of their way of life. This encourages banks and other organizations to formulate strategies that integrate technology into operations.

This paper offers new contributions to the GCC literature regarding financial technology and provides recommendations to the GCC financial institutions, financial markets, policymakers and governments.

This study aims to revisit the empirical debate about the asymmetric relationship between oil prices, energy consumption, CO₂ emissions and economic growth in a panel of 184 countries from 1981 to 2020.

A relatively new research method, the PVAR system GMM, is applied.

The outcome of the PVAR system GMM model at the group level in the study suggests that oil prices exert a positive but statistically insignificant effect on economic growth. Energy consumption is inversely related to economic growth but statistically significant, and the correlation between CO₂ emissions and economic growth is negative but statistically insignificant. The Granger causality test indicates that oil prices, CO₂ emissions, oil rents, energy consumption and savings jointly Granger-cause economic growth. A unidirectional causality runs from energy consumption, savings and economic growth to oil prices. At countries’ income grouping levels, oil prices, oil rent, CO₂ emissions, energy consumption and savings jointly Granger-cause economic growth for the high-income and upper-middle-income countries groups only, while those variables did not jointly Granger-cause economic growth for the low-income and lower-middle-income countries groups. The modulus emanating from the eigenvalue stability condition with the roots of the companion matrix indicates that the model is stable. The results support the asymmetric impacts of oil prices on economic growth and aid policy formulation, particularly the cross-country disparities regarding the nexus between oil prices and growth.

From a methodological perspective, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the study is the first attempt to use the PVAR system GMM and such a large sample group of 184 economies in the post-COVID-19 era to examine the impacts of oil prices on countries’ growth while controlling for other crucial variables, which is noteworthy. Two, using the World Bank categorisation of countries according to income groups, the study adds another layer of contribution to the literature by decomposing the 184 sample economies into four income groups: high-income, low-income, upper-middle-income and lower-middle-income groups to investigate the potential for asymmetric effects of oil prices on growth, the first of its kind in the post-COVID-19 period.

The purpose of this study is to examine the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative’s (NEITI) ineffectiveness in delivering public accountability to Nigerian citizens. Although this failure is recognised in prior literature, the authors contend that NEITI’s role is obscured by one-sided links to external factors.

The conceptual framework presented in this study is built around Dillard and Vinnari’s (2019) distinction between different accountability systems and Brown and Dillard’s (2020) complimentary insights on the technologies of hubris and humility. The analytical framework draws from Grant and Keohane’s (2005) modes of accountability, which the authors use to articulate conflicting accountability demands (to-whom and for-what) of NEITI’s operating relationships. Combined, the authors analyse official documents, media, reports and interview responses from members of NEITI’s National Stakeholders Working Group.

This study surfaces a variety of intersecting interests across NEITI’s operational relationships. Some of these interests are mutually beneficial like that of Donors and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Others run counter to each other, such as NEITI’s relationship to the Presidency which illustrates a key source of NEITI’s ineffectiveness. In discussing these interests, the authors articulate their connection to NEITI’s design as an accountability system and its embedded limitations.

The authors provide incremental understanding of prior insight regarding NEITI’s ineffectiveness by drawing attention to its fundamental design as an accountability system and its failure to deliver public accountability. To illuminate these failures, the authors also map NEITI’s competing accountability demands – the nexus of accountability – to demonstrate the complex socio-political reality within which NEITI is expected to operate. The authors posit that NEITI’s ineffectiveness has as much to do with NEITI itself, as it does with external factors like the quality of information disclosed and the unique Nigerian context.