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This paper studies the impact of gender on frequency of use of influence strategies, amount of power and authoritarianism, using a sample of 109 managers from two organizations in India. Seven downward influence strategies (assertiveness, bargaining, coalition, friendliness, higher authority, reason, and sanctions) and five power bases (reward, referent, legitimate, expert, and coercive) were included in the study. Analysis of variance does not show any difference across gender in any variable studied, and analysis of covariance does not reveal any impact of gender on influence and power after controlling for authoritarianism. Results, however, suggest that gender moderates the impact of authoritarianism on influence and power. Authoritarianism is related positively to assertiveness, bargaining, friendliness and legitimate power for men, negatively to coercive power for men, negatively to friendliness for women, and positively to expert power for both men and women. There is a significant interaction effect of authoritarianism and gender on friendliness.

This essay studies disconnections between the macrolevel societal problems of a state and more microlevel political alignments.

Using a dataset composed of macrolevel measures of state problems and microlevel responses to a 2008 election survey, this essay applies multilevel statistical models to explain the state-to-state variance between the states on anti-abortion and pro-gun sentiments. This analysis uncovers the macro- and microlevel factors that disconnect a state’s neglect-of-children indicators from its citizens’ sentiments about abortion, and the factors that disconnect a state’s crime indicators from its citizens’ sentiments about guns.

The initial associations between a state’s indicators of neglect of children and anti-abortion sentiments are explained by the state’s lower human development (HD) and social attributes, especially religious beliefs, which predict social conservatism. The initial associations between a state’s indicators of crime and incarcerations are also explained by a state’s lower HD and the social attributes, especially religious beliefs, which predict social conservatism. Considering both abortion and guns as key indicators of social conservatism, the voters’ political choices exhibit a moralistic axiological rationality rather than a more pragmatic instrumental rationality.

The moral absolutism associated with sentiments about abortion and guns suggests that social conservatism and authoritarianism are intertwined but separate conceptions, which have similar consequences and determinants. Both may be influenced by the same changes in social and educational policies, especially the quality of education.

Proponents of paternalistic leadership argue that a paternalistic leader is authoritative and at the same time, a benevolent and moral individual, and this style is effective in non-Western societies. However, past empirical studies consistently found that authoritarianism related negatively to benevolence, morality and job outcomes. The authors posit that the original proposed style probably did not exist, or at least not being a dominant style, in modern Chinese business organizations.

The authors collected supervisor–subordinate dyadic data from three independent Chinese sample in Taiwan (N = 305), Hubei (N = 350) and Jiangsu (N = 270) and utilized the latent profile analysis method to test the hypotheses.

First, authoritarianism ratings are much lower than ratings of benevolence and morality. Second, none of the identified profiles is high on authoritarianism, benevolence and morality at the same time. Third, leadership style with low authoritarianism, but high on benevolence and morality leads to the best employee outcomes.

Conceptually, the authors clarify the typical leadership styles that compose of the independent dimensions proposed by paternalistic leadership researchers. Methodologically, the authors showed that using person-centered latent profile analysis method can examine combinations of various leadership dimensions or constructs to examine a leader as a whole person. Practically, understanding a leadership style that composes of different levels of various leadership constructs may better inform managers and leaders how they could effectively influence subordinates.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of paternalistic leadership on innovation.

This paper conceptualizes an integrated model that combines the dual‐core model and ambidextrous model of innovation. Using a sample of 159 Chinese high‐tech enterprises, some hypotheses are tested.

The results show: authoritarianism has a directly negative effect on exploitative innovation and positively moderates the effectiveness of exploitative innovation; benevolence has a directly positive effect both on exploratory innovation and exploitative innovation; benevolence negatively moderates the effectiveness of exploratory innovation and positively moderates the effectiveness of exploitative innovation.

This paper adopts the cross‐sectional study design, while innovation and formation of the implementation are relatively long‐term, dynamic processes. Thus, longitudinal design is a direction worth trying in follow‐up studies. Besides, using random samples affects to some extent the conclusion's generalizability.

Proper patriarchal leadership behavior (authoritarianism/benevolence) should be employed in the face of different types of innovation activities (exploratory innovation/exploitative innovation) and at the different stages of innovative activities (innovation ideas emerging stage/innovation behavior implementation stage). If properly used, patriarchal leadership with both authoritarianism and benevolence will effectively enhance innovation performance. Conversely, it may produce negative effects.

This paper has studied the influence of paternalistic leadership on exploratory and exploitative innovation. Different from the existing literature, this paper based on Daft's dual‐core model and Duncan's ambidextrous model and builds an integrated model.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationships between moral disengagement, individual differences (i.e. need for cognition (NFC), faith in intuition, legal authoritarianism) and responses to vigilantism.

US university students were surveyed.

NFC reduced support for vigilante justice while legal authoritarianism increased support for vigilante justice. Both relationships are mediated by moral disengagement, which also increases support for vigilante justice.

The present study provides a starting point for further research on individual differences and responses to vigilantism.

Results expand on the understanding of the function of individual differences in a morally charged decision-making task. Content has implications for academics and legal practitioners.

Vigilante justice is embedded within American culture. However, vigilantism is currently illegal, and recent instances of what might be considered vigilante justice (e.g. George Zimmerman, David Barajas) have highlighted the controversy surrounding such extralegal violence. Little research has focussed on the moral quandary posed by vigilantism.

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between policy benchmarking, democracy and authoritarianism.

The paper uses theoretical investigation of different methodological perspectives of policy benchmarking and their relationship with principles of democracy and authoritarianism and analysis of the case of the European Union (EU) on the basis of empirical data.

Identifies two methodological perspectives of policy benchmarking: the first, grounded on the principle of learning and the bottom‐up approach, is close to democracy; the second, based on the principle of copying and the top‐down approach, is close to authoritarianism. The application of policy benchmarking in the EU so far appears to include elements of both democracy and authoritarianism.

The paper is not exhaustive as regards methodological approaches to policy benchmarking and theories of democracy and authoritarianism.

Crucial methodological and ethico‐political implications for the use of benchmarking in the enlarged EU of 25.

This original piece of work provides clear answer to the question of relationship between policy benchmarking, democracy and authoritarianism. The paper contributes to academic debate of public policy, offering, at the same time, practical methodological help to policy‐makers.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between major personality dimensions and attitudes towards peace and war.

Three samples – two consisting of British psychology students (n=64 and 121) and one of Israeli students (n=80), responded to measures of some or all of: five-factor inventory, SYMLOG trait form, general survey including authoritarianism; attitudes towards peace and war; specific attitudes towards peace and war policy.

The general attitude measures were associated with the specific attitudes. Both were associated with authoritarianism but not consistently with other personality dimensions.

Descriptive findings might not generalize and need contextualization. Authoritarianism should be measured in any studies of attitudes related to peace, war, conflict, and structural violence.

Practitioners of peace education may first need to address high authoritarianism and low integrative complexity. Also, countering structural violence related, for instance, to poverty or prejudice/discrimination may require a comprehensive approach including collaborative work with clinical psychologists applying both implicit and explicit assessment tools.

Documenting links (and lack of them) among personality variables and attitudes towards peace and war has practical and theoretical value – and may contribute to organizational schemes shaped by personality structure and bearing implications for negotiations. In terms of a paradigm by Morton Deutsch, our results show individual differences in, and associations among, variables relating to the remediable likelihood of parties being differentially likely to find themselves in negatively vs. positively interdependent situations; and carrying out effective instead of “bungling” actions.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to explore how China uses a social credit system as part of its “data-driven authoritarianism” policy; and second, to investigate how datafication, which is a method to legitimize data collection, and dataveillance, which is continuous surveillance through the use of data, offer the Chinese state a legitimate method of monitoring, surveilling and controlling citizens, businesses and society. Taken together, China’s social credit system is analyzed as an integrated tool for datafication, dataveillance and data-driven authoritarianism.

This study combines the personal narratives of 22 Chinese citizens with policy analyses, online discussions and media reports. The stories were collected using a scenario-based story completion method to understand the participants’ perceptions of the recently introduced social credit system in China.

China’s new social credit system, which turns both online and offline behaviors into a credit score through smartphone apps, creates a “new normal” way of life for Chinese citizens. This data-driven authoritarianism uses data and technology to enhance citizen surveillance. Interactions between individuals, technologies and information emerge from understanding the system as one that provides social goods, using technologies, and raising concerns of privacy, security and collectivity. An integrated critical perspective that incorporates the concepts of datafication and dataveillance enhances a general understanding of how data-driven authoritarianism develops through the social credit system.

This study builds upon an ongoing debate and an emerging body of literature on datafication, dataveillance and digital sociology while filling empirical gaps in the study of the global South. The Chinese social credit system has growing recognition and importance as both a governing tool and a part of everyday datafication and dataveillance processes. Thus, these phenomena necessitate discussion of its consequences for, and applications by, the Chinese state and businesses, as well as affected individuals’ efforts to adapt to the system.

The purpose of this study was to examine associations between fear of terrorism and several predictors (gender and nationality) and outcomes (moral disengagement, authoritarianism, aggression and social anxiety) in the USA and South Korean young adults. Of particular interest were the potential moderating and mediating roles of moral disengagement between fear of terrorism and the other outcomes.

Samples of 251 college students from the USA and 211 college students from South Korea completed survey packets including measures of fear of terrorism, moral disengagement, authoritarianism, aggression and social anxiety.

US participants expressed greater concern about a terrorist threat to their country, while South Koreans worried more about terrorist threats to their family or themselves. Females in both countries reported greater fear of terrorism and social anxiety. In both countries, fear of terrorism was associated with aggression, social anxiety and moral disengagement. Mediation analyses showed that fear of terrorism exerted a significant direct effect and an indirect effect via moral disengagement on aggression and authoritarianism in the US sample. Moderation analyses revealed that moral disengagement moderated the relationship between fear of terrorism and social anxiety in the Korean sample.

This study has the common limitations of cross-sectional studies; i.e. it cannot prove causal relationships.

The findings support Albert Bandura’s view that efforts to address the excesses of counterterrorism and other negative outcomes of fear of terrorism, attending to issues of moral disengagement may be helpful.

The authors findings provide support for the view that fear of terrorism is associated with negative psychological and social outcomes and that moral disengagement can play an important role in those negative outcomes. Moreover, it adds to evidence that the negative role of moral disengagement shows considerable generalizability across gender and two very different cultures.

The chapter attempts to evaluate the utility of applying multi-level governance outside of the EU, and also outside of the group of democratic states, to states that have defied the third wave of democratization and that are characterized by a so-called new authoritarianism. The case is the People’s Republic of China, and the focus falls on policy-making and implementation in the field of hydropower with special attention to the issue area of environmental protection.

The chapter draws on the notion of scales and indigenous Chinese governance concepts and brings these into a conversation with the concept of multi-level governance. Case studies on hydropower decision-making in China contribute empirical data in order to investigate the utility of multi-level governance in the Chinese governance context.

The chapter argues that if multi-level governance is to have utility in other cultural contexts it needs to move away from a consideration of pre-given scales as locus of authority and consider indigenous governance concepts and notions of scale, and it crucially needs to map power relationships in the making and implementation of policies in order to reach analytical depth.

The case of China shows that authoritarian regimes can be analysed in terms of multiple levels as authoritarianism no longer automatically implies strict top-down entities. Instead, autocracies can be highly fragmented and subject to complex decision-making processes that can arise during processes of administrative reform. This can lead to vibrant and reflexive systems of governance that exhibit adaptive skills necessary to ensure regime survival amidst a continuously diversifying society and changing external circumstances. As a consequence, a research programme looking at the new authoritarianism from a multi-level governance perspective has the capacity to uncover and describe new forms of governance, by bringing the concept into a conversation with indigenous governance concepts.

In China, informal networks between the energy bureaucracy and hydropower developers determine the hydropower decision-making process. This is particularly detrimental at a time when the Chinese government emphasizes the importance of the rule of law and social stability. Informal networks in which key government agencies are involved actively thwart the attempt of creating reliable institutions and more transparent and accountable processes of decision-making within the authoritarian governance framework.

The findings show the dominance of informal networks versus the formal decision-making process. This sidelines the environmental bureaucracy and fails to fully realize the importance of public input into the decision-making process as one potential element of institutionalized conflict resolution.

The chapter builds on existing multi-level governance approaches and fuses them with notions of scales and indigenous Chinese governance concepts in order to enable the applicability of the concept of multi-level governance outside of its area of origin. This advances the explanatory depth and theoretical reach of multi-level governance.