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Democratic renewal in Sri Lanka as well as a cross the Global South depends on strengthening democratic social movements within varieties of patrimonial capitalism. Patrimonial capitalism, emphasising patron–client relations, coincide with weakening democratic institutional cultures and practices. The dominant corruption/anti-corruption narrative is bracketed with elite class strategies aimed at negotiating a ‘managed corruption’. The realm of representative politics creating consent for patrimonial capitalism is shaped by: ethnic and class relations; the weakening of working-class parties; patriarchal cultures within parties; links with criminal networks; opaque finances and the integration of mainstream media with party patronage.

Democratising the realm of representative politics points towards democratic social movements. The internal dynamics of social movements, their relationships with political parties and collective learning are significant factors that shapes the strategic orientation of social movements. State repression of social movements highlights the need for demilitarisation and the abolition of prisons. The global sense of this local struggle relates to transforming financial markets and platform economies towards notions of financial and digital commons. The integration of different realms of politics, such as representative, movement, life and emancipatory politics, is vital for reinforcing solidarity as the basis for counter-hegemonic struggles.

This study examines the roles of the Internet and other types of media use in explaining the support for direct democracy and further investigates the mediation of political trust in the relationship between media use and the attitude toward direct democracy.

Using data drawn from Taiwan Social Change Survey 2014 and the approach of structural equation model framework, this study identifies the indirect effects of the Internet and other types of media use on the attitude toward referendums.

The results of this study show that the frustration resulting from the process of representative politics dominated by political elites is associated with the support for direct democracy as an effective alternative to generate political influences in the formation of public policies.

The advances in the Internet and information technology have expanded the possible platforms of obtaining political information and enabled people to rapidly access political information at lower costs. It is expected that Internet use has altered the relationships among citizens, political parties and the government, potentially influencing citizens' political trust and their attitude toward direct democracy.

The popular uprising, the Aragalaya, was a response to a debt crisis as well as a catharsis of accumulated public discontent, which overlapped with the pandemic. A key lesson from the pandemic was the need to strengthen state social provisioning capacities to protect the health status of citizens. In addition, enhancing local economies and sustainable livelihoods is central to avoiding the vulnerabilities of international migrant labour and tourism. The limitations of representative politics highlight the need to strengthen democratic social movement politics. Along with cross cultural alliances, building multi-class alliances is central for strengthening politics of redistribution. In a context of integration of party politics with criminal networks, demilitarisation as well as the abolition of prisons is indispensable for democratisation. In a global scale, democratising financial markets and platform economies suggests regulation and regional experiments not simply by the state but also multiple publics. In demanding participation in representative institutions, the Aragalaya combined a protest movement with a sense of commons. In turn, it pointed towards the possibilities of a public-driven economy based on the democratisation of the state as well as markets. In framing this movement as a ‘struggle of love’, it revitalised the realm of life politics and alternative pleasures of life.

The peoples’ movement was a movement to deepen citizenship and democracy by demanding actual participation in representative politics. It was a non-violent democratic movement based on independence from political parties, collective informal leadership and multi-level horizontal networking and coordination. It was strengthened by the activists from the student movement, trade unions and working-class parties. It foregrounded issues related to debt and development, Global North–South dynamics, narrowing of representative politics and the role of democratic social movements. The peoples’ movement, ‘Aragalaya’, illustrated that solidarity, cultivated across multiple cultural, economic and political differences, while engaging locally with a global sense, can influence authoritarian militarised governments. In effect, the struggle for democracy and citizenship aimed at transforming representative politics also accompanied alternative notions of well-being and pleasures involving ‘living well together with others’ in harmony with nature.

This chapter discusses differences and similarities between democracy and populism with regards to their definitions, main goals, types of actors, structures, and main constituencies. Special focus is devoted to the functions democracy and populism play in the politics of sovereign countries. As the chapter argues, democracy calls for the implementation of political freedoms, rights, and political inclusiveness. In contrast, the spontaneous actions of populism appeal to popular agendas and often use disfranchised populations to achieve political goals.

The rebirth of populist agenda echoes at the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century is the birth of populist unrest in democratic and in authoritarian regimes alike – in Europe, the Middle East, America, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Regardless of many faces and appeals to diverse constituencies, as well as clearly established trends, a current escalation in the rapid and widespread development of populist insurgency is an outcome of two factors. One is the weakness of representative politics and the party system in many states across the globe. The other is the global economic recession or crisis that has led to an increase in economic disparity between social classes and impoverishment of the poorer and middle social strata combined with the establishment of global economic, multinational giants.

The purpose of this paper is to find the most important factors to the Index that explains gender gaps in education, health, politics, and economic outcomes worldwide.

World Economic Forum (WEF) data are analyzed using hedonic regression analysis to estimate which factors affect a country’s Global Gender Gap Index. Standardized β coefficients reveal the top five factors influencing the Index, just as key components of the US Consumer Price Index are teased out using this method.

Women in public sector management, administration, and politics explain a substantial portion of gender inequality. Policies to increase women’s representation in parliaments, as heads of state, in ministerial positions, and in public sector management mitigate inequality as gauged by the Gender Gap Index. Economic indicators are also among the leading components of the Gender Gap Index.

Although comprehensive and drawn from several sources including the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization, and the United Nations Development Programme, WEF data do not capture the full experience of women worldwide. Subsequent qualitative research is recommended.

This analysis reveals policy recommendations for advocates working to close gender gaps, particularly in politics and economic outcomes. Increasing proportions of women in public sector management can mitigate inequality. This supports electoral quotas and human resource management initiatives to diversify management ranks.

Increasing women’s share of public sector managerial positions fosters gender equity, as does increasing women’s share of elected and appointed positions.

This study provides quantitative evidence of the important role of women’s representation to guide subsequent fieldwork. This evidence supports efforts to increase women in elective office and public sector management.

Much analysis considering the putative political challenges of the European Union (EU) has focussed on the (lack of) participation and identifications of European citizens. But what about the bureaucrats working on their behalf? This contribution will address the issue of representative bureaucracy and identification in the EU, specifically in the European Commission. While the literature on representativeness of public administration has focussed on issues of social class, ethnicity and gender, it is also important to consider geographical representativeness. This is particularly important when region (in this case of the EU nations) is relevant. As the authors point out, this question is all the more relevant given the assumption that individuals who join the Commission will identify with Europe more than their home country. Yet, at a time of ongoing discussions about a crisis of the EU and in the midst of populist governments, such an assumption is at least questionable. While it is difficult to assess the extent to which decision-making may be influenced by nationality, at least understanding patterns of representation can be important for understanding how passive – if not active – representation functions. The formal emphasis on representative bureaucracy within the EU raises several potential conflicts with other important principles of public management. It also creates a conflict with the fundamental commitment to creating transnational personnel who eschew strong attachments to nation states.

Much potential has been ascribed to the emergence and possibilities of a “global civil society,” one that takes the concept of civil society and civic activism and involvement beyond the traditional confines of the nation-state, and moves it instead into a globalized and increasingly politically integrated context. In general, the concept of global civil society has been treated as a positive development, with considerable attention being paid to the emancipatory and participatory opportunities that it presents. This essay explores the other side of the equation, i.e., the marginalization of national and European-level civil society and these participatory and emancipatory benefits in Central and Eastern Europe during a process of globalization and EU integration. Drawing from the emerging literatures on global civil society, this paper compares the normative and empirical emphases of that literature with the experiences and opinions of Central and Eastern European environmental NGOs. It examines how Central and Eastern European environmental movements have moved toward becoming more interconnected both in Europe and worldwide, yet are marginalized in favor of a style of environmental policy-making emerging from Brussels that emphasizes technocracy, scientific over public knowledge, and a top-down approach to the policy-making process. As a result, many of the democratic elements of civil society found at the national level have became neglected at the European and the global levels, replacing democratic politics (at least in the form of social movements) with the emergence of supranational technocratic institutions.

In this chapter, I examine the populism of the Northern League and Berlusconi. I attempt to provide an institutional explanation as to why Italy, more so than other Western European democracies, has experienced such diverse forms of populism. Stated in full, the thesis advanced is that the rise and persistence populism in Western European democracies, such as Italy, is an indication of an institutional crisis of representation.