Search results

Demand–supply matrices with adverse consequences has occasioned government response to concession initiatives in infrastructure in Nigeria. However, concession-based projects have been trailed by administrative and legal controversies. While this scenario has negatively impacted the acceptability of a concession contract, there is, nevertheless, a paucity of research effort aimed at developing a sustainable framework. The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework for the evaluation and allocation of obligations of parties, thereby enhancing the synergy and cooperation between the public and private sector organization.

Data were obtained through a questionnaire administered to professionals in concession-based contracts in southwestern Nigeria, which included architects, estate surveyors, quantity surveyors, engineers and builders, accountants/bankers/economists and lawyers. The respondents were selected using random and respondent driven sampling approaches. The questions were structured to ensure that the respondents have appropriate experience in concession-based projects and hold appropriate positions as decision-makers so as to give credence to the collected data.

The study identified 47 contractual obligations in the specific context of developing countries. Based on “half-adjusting principle”, 13 of the obligations notably cost of land acquisition and cost of social disturbances were allocated to the public party; 18 of the obligations notably project design and cost of feasibility study were allocated to the private party; and 16 of the obligations including preparation of terms of a contract and relocation of third party facilities were shared by the parties.

The framework benchmarked the categorization of public and private parties’ obligations in concession-based public–private partnership (PPP) contracts. The study has the implication for the evaluation and allocation of obligations of parties, which could mitigate the risk of failure of PPP projects in relation to the specific context of developing countries.

Little success had been recorded on concession-based public private partnership contracts in Nigeria for reasons attributable in part to poor assessment of the socio-cultural and economic factors that contribute to the parties’ costs while preparing contract packages. The purpose of this paper is to assess the factors which significantly influence the private party’s obligations and costs in a concession-based contract thereby enhancing the robust assessment of contract packages when bidding by private investors.

The assessment was based on primary data obtained through questionnaire survey. Structured questionnaire was administered on professionals comprising architects, estate surveyors, quantity surveyors, engineers and builders, accountants/bankers/economists and lawyers who had been involved in concession-based contracts in the Southwestern Nigeria, selected using respondent-driven sampling approach. Factors evaluated were those identified through in-depth literature review and brainstorming of those pertinent to concession transaction in Nigeria. Data collected were analysed using descriptive statistics including mean, relative significance index, impact weighting and factor analysis.

Significant factors that influence private party’s cost were found to be political interference, delay in land acquisition, variation to the contract and non-availability of supportive infrastructure.

Findings provided information for structuring concession contract for effective management of country-specific characteristics in concession contract. The understanding of the factors that affect private party’s obligations and costs would guide effective assessment of concession contract in developing economies by foreign investors. Moreover, the study provided implication for the understating of country-specific factors affecting concession contract in Nigeria which would contribute to robust assessment of contract packages when bidding by private investors.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

The purpose of this paper is to develop compensation mechanisms against risks factors that impact private party’s costs in concession-based projects as a basis for minimizing failure rate of concession contracts.

The study extended earlier work on the factors that impact private party’s costs in concession-based projects by developing compensation mechanisms against the risks factors. It commenced with semi-structured face-to-face interviews which were launched with different stakeholders organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the Southwestern Nigeria. Responses from the interview were analyzed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti6/7. The mechanisms identified from literature review were assessed through structured questionnaire which were administered on professionals selected from governmental-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks among others, using the respondent-driven sampling technique. The robustness of the quantitative data was achieved by including the initial respondents to the interview in the questionnaire survey. The quantitative data were analyzed using percentile for better understanding of the flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms. The criterion for the selection of appropriate mechanism(s) for the factors was based on minimum average of 20.0 percent (the ratio of maximum percentage (100 percent) of the respondents to total number of variables) suggesting the five identified mechanisms. The results in both cases of qualitative and quantitative assessments were compared. Based on the convergences of the findings, preferred compensation mechanisms were developed against concession contract risk factors.

Options of mechanisms were developed against specific investment risks that are consequent to the defaults of the public party in PPP contracts. The findings indicate that the mechanisms in extant literature with respect to administration of traditional models are relevant for PPPs. The study, however, identified new concepts, including “compensative” “zero compensation,” “equitable sharing” and “adjustment of concession period,” which are suitable in specific cases of PPP contracts.

The study contributes to the body of knowledge on mechanisms for improving PPP project performance. Moreover, insights were provided on mechanisms that satisfy private investor in case of specific risk factors investigated. The findings are therefore expected to guide private party in the preparation of concession contract package that minimizes investments risks and thereby attracting more private investors both from local and international environments. The findings of the study would also contribute to the body of information for documenting standard conditions of concession contract in Nigeria.

Studies on critical performance factors on PPP were extended by developing compensation mechanisms against the investment risks that impact private party’s cost.

The purpose of this study is to develop penalty measures against concessionaires’ defaults as a mechanism for protecting the interests of parties (public and private) in public–private partnership (PPP) contracts for enhancing project delivery.

The research methodology is a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. This study commenced with an in-depth literature review, which provided the basis for identification of penalty measures in construction contract management. The qualitative assessment was based on semi-structured face-to-face interviews, which were aimed at identifying the underlying pattern of the penalty measures, and the quantitative assessment was based on a structured questionnaire. In both cases, respondents were stakeholders’ organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the southwestern region of Nigeria. These include industrial practitioners from government-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks, etc. The sample size was selected using a respondent-driven sampling approach, as the comprehensive lists of the participants in PPP contracts are not readily available in the Nigerian construction industry. Responses from the interview were analysed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti7. The quantitative data were analysed using percentile for flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms.

This study developed mechanisms that defined the rights of the public party to redress underperformance of PPP contracts consequent to the defaults of the private party. “Step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts” were preferred against specific cases of “delayed execution”, “abandonment of the project”, “bankruptcy of the concessionaire” and “non-compliance with design and specifications”. With respect to “shortfall in performance against established dates”, the results converged on “monetary fine” and diverged on “step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts”.

The study contributes to literature on mechanisms for enforcing PPP project performance. Besides, defining rights and obligations of the parties in specific events of underperformance of the concessionaires in PPP contracts is a significant step towards the development of standard conditions of contract for managing PPP projects in which the model is being newly adopted.

Project management studies on PPP were extended by defining the liabilities that are consequent to the defaults of the private party and the mechanisms for their enforcement.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the tasks and responsibilities of public and private parties in the building control systems of the 27 European Union (EU) countries.

To gather the necessary information, a questionnaire on building regulatory systems was distributed to experts in each country, and the major legal documents in each jurisdiction were reviewed. The information was organized into thematic tables that describe all the countries studied. The themes within the tables are: regulatory framework, application, plan approval, site inspection, completion, and supervision.

The paper finds that there are many similarities between the building control systems of the various EU countries. Public parties in all countries set the regulatory framework, check planning applications, issue building permits, conduct final inspections, grant completion certificates, and supervise the operation of the system. The main difference between them concerns the nature of the involvement of private parties in checking technical requirements, and in site inspections. Three basic types of building control systems are identified: public, mixed, and dual. The majority of the countries have mixed systems. Although several variations are found among the mixed systems, the most common situation is for public parties to check the technical requirements and private parties to be involved in site inspections.

The analysis provides a global picture of the building control systems of all EU countries. The results can be useful for situating the systems of each country within the European panorama, assessing the main trends and developments and guiding strategic choices on possible improvements in each country.

With an increasing number of Chinese private firms establishing primary level CPC Party committees, it is important to study the role of Party organizations in these firms. Using a nationwide survey of private firms in 2006, we empirically study the firm-level CCP committee's effect on workers' benefits and firm performance.

To overcome the potential endogeneity, we employ the regression discontinuity approach by utilizing the following rule from the Constitution of the CCP: Primary party committees should be established in any basic work unit with more than 3 full party members.

Our empirical results show that party committees in private firms have positive and statistically significant effects on many types of workers' benefits, including pension, unemployment insurance and workplace safety.

This paper highlights CCP committees as an important alternative mechanism in coordinating labor relationships in China when formal labor protecting institutions are weak.

Canada's institutions, by comparison with America's, have created a unique normative regime. When it comes to conflict of interest, the main problem in Canada has not been that private interests encumber governmental judgment, but that government itself, and in particular the publicly sourced emoluments controlled by the prime minister, can encumber the judgment of ministers and legislators. When it comes to campaign finance law, the problem is that parties are treated as if they are self-interested entities, while interest groups have often been treated as if they are parties. I explore the institutional causes and regulatory consequences of Canada's unique normative approach.

Allocating risk in public–private partnership (PPP) projects based on public–private parties’ risk management (RM) capabilities is a condition for success of these projects. In practice, however, risks are allocated to these parties beyond their respective RM capabilities. Too much risk is often assigned to the private or public party, resulting in poor RM and costly contract renegotiations and terminations. This chapter proposes a methodology based on fuzzy set theory (FST) in which decision makers (DMs) use linguistic variables to assess and calculate RM capability values of public–private parties for risk events and to arrive at risk allocation (RA) decisions. The proposed methodology is based on integrating RA decision criteria, the Delphi method and the fuzzy synthetic evaluation (FSE) technique. The application of FSE allows for the introduction of linguistic variables that express DMs’ evaluations of RM capabilities. This provides a means to deal with the problems of qualitative, multi-criteria analysis, subjectivity and uncertainty that characterise decision-making in the construction domain. The methodology is outlined and demonstrated based on empirical data collected through a three-round Delphi survey. The public–private parties’ RM capability values for land acquisition risk are calculated using the proposed methodology. The methodology is helpful for performing fuzzy-based analysis in PPP projects, even in the event of limited or no data. This chapter makes the contribution of presenting a RA decision-making methodology that is easy to understand and use in PPP contracting and that enables DMs to track calculations of RM capability values.

Notwithstanding the remarkable market potential of the Nigerian economy for private investment, the current sociopolitical characteristics had necessitated a careful assessment to inform decisions in long-term investments. The purpose of this paper is therefore to evaluate the success factors that have a specific influence on private party’s performance in concession contracts in Nigeria.

Respondents involved in the study were participants in concession-based contracts in Southwestern Nigeria that included architects, estate surveyors, quantity surveyors, engineers and builders, accountants/bankers/economists and lawyers. These were selected using random and respondent-driven sampling (RDS) approaches. The research instrument adopted was a questionnaire that enlisted questions which were structured to ensure that the respondents have appropriate experience in concession-based projects and hold appropriate positions as decision-makers so as to give credence to collected data. The highest significant factors were identified through the relative significance index (RSI). By exploring factor analysis, the factors were condensed for discussion under appropriate component headings. The value of Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO, 0.755) measure of sampling adequacy tests carried out showed that the data collected were adequate for the factor analysis, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ² = 1,799.339; df = 630; p < 0.001) was highly significant.

Factors influencing private party performance clustered under eight components, namely, technical, market maturity, political, legal, finance, procurement, incentive and regulation. However, component items including level of understanding of public–private alliance transactions, stability of exchange rate and provisions for reversion of policies were found to be highly significant. On the other hand, status of domestication and implementation of international laws/codes, predictability in legal regime and enforcement and extent of jurisdictional definition of land usage were least significant.

Findings would guide private investors in the preparation of robust investment packages that reduce risks and seemingly unavoidable opportunistic tendencies associated with public–private partnership projects in developing economies.