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Concessionaires(shops‐within‐shops) have long been a feature of the department store and more recently of the “superstore”. This article examines the use by two major retailers, Tesco and Debenhams, of concessionaires as a strategic option, to create “breathing space” for themselves whilst they either restructure or reposition their retail interests. It also looks at some of the recent developments in concessionaire operations and anticipates future areas where retailers may seek to use concessionaires.

The purpose of this study is to develop penalty measures against concessionaires’ defaults as a mechanism for protecting the interests of parties (public and private) in public–private partnership (PPP) contracts for enhancing project delivery.

The research methodology is a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. This study commenced with an in-depth literature review, which provided the basis for identification of penalty measures in construction contract management. The qualitative assessment was based on semi-structured face-to-face interviews, which were aimed at identifying the underlying pattern of the penalty measures, and the quantitative assessment was based on a structured questionnaire. In both cases, respondents were stakeholders’ organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the southwestern region of Nigeria. These include industrial practitioners from government-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks, etc. The sample size was selected using a respondent-driven sampling approach, as the comprehensive lists of the participants in PPP contracts are not readily available in the Nigerian construction industry. Responses from the interview were analysed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti7. The quantitative data were analysed using percentile for flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms.

This study developed mechanisms that defined the rights of the public party to redress underperformance of PPP contracts consequent to the defaults of the private party. “Step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts” were preferred against specific cases of “delayed execution”, “abandonment of the project”, “bankruptcy of the concessionaire” and “non-compliance with design and specifications”. With respect to “shortfall in performance against established dates”, the results converged on “monetary fine” and diverged on “step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts”.

The study contributes to literature on mechanisms for enforcing PPP project performance. Besides, defining rights and obligations of the parties in specific events of underperformance of the concessionaires in PPP contracts is a significant step towards the development of standard conditions of contract for managing PPP projects in which the model is being newly adopted.

Project management studies on PPP were extended by defining the liabilities that are consequent to the defaults of the private party and the mechanisms for their enforcement.

In RDM November/December 1984 (p 15), Steve Worthington examined the use that major retailers make of concessionaires. This article reverses the process and asks — what do the concessionaires get out of it? Why do they seek to become concessionaires and what are the pros and cons of operating under the roof of a host retailer?

To recognize and investigate the hypotheses that opportunistic behaviour of project participants in infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) changes over the project’s life cycle. Case study methodology is adopted. The first Indian highway PPP project, awarded with negative grant, is used as the case context. Opportunistic behaviour is a continuous game played by the project stakeholders. Its manifestation depends on the vulnerability of the other party at that point in time in the project life cycle and the past display of opportunism. Because the study is limited to a highway project in an emerging economy, the findings may lack generalizability for which further research is recommended. PPP is increasingly popular. Stakeholders recognize that the existing ex-ante contractual arrangements that seek to mitigate opportunism are not enough for project success. This study addresses this difficulty by providing a closer understanding of how opportunistic behaviours evolve over projects’ life cycle and what steps are necessary to negotiate. Failure to address the antecedents of opportunistic behaviour in time leads to a competition to be more opportunistic, in which the common public gets short changed. This study is an attempt to advance understanding of stakeholders’ behaviour outside the ambit of contract. The extant literature is largely silent on the timing and vulnerability of opportunistic behaviour, viewing it as a static concept. The study demonstrates the changing nature of opportunism that manifests in different forms over the projects life cycle.

This case provides an opportunity to discuss the design and implementation of a Public Private Partnership project. It describes the Delhi Airport Metro Express Line project from conception to completion, and the subsequent dispute between the Public and Private partners leading to the Concession Agreement going into arbitration. Students discuss the reasons for failure and come up with suggestions for another metro rail project currently in the design stage.

The aim of this paper is to present a model of a university–industry partnership in gaming education and research. It analyzes the interactions and knowledge transfer between the two parties in Macao.

This paper adopts a qualitative case study approach to share experiences of a university based in Macao as a single case to present its informal partnership with the industry in the area of gaming education and research.

This paper has shown that the partnership has provided clear benefits to both parties and the government is an influential power that can enhance collaboration. Although the informal partnership involves considerable time and efforts, it is flexible in comparison to the formal approach. Despite this, the knowledge transfer tends to focus on general issues to avoid being appropriated by competitors.

This demonstrates how a public university in Macao has achieved an informal industry–university partnership, which requires the commitment and understanding of both parties for the bi-directional exchange of knowledge. Such knowledge needs to be value-enhancing for the industry to keep the partnership grow and prosper.

This study puts forward an original approach to an informal industry–university partnership in the area of gaming education and research.

Concessionaires (shops within shops) have long been a feature of the department store; more recently they have emerged as having a role to play within the superstore retailing concept. In this article Steve Worthington examines the use by two major retailers, Tesco and Debenhams, of concessionaires as a strategic option, to create breathing space for themselves whilst they either restructure or reposition their retail interests.

The build‐operate‐transfer (BOT) arrangement is becoming one of the prevailing ways for infrastructure development in China to meet the needs of China's future economic growth and development. Despite tremendous opportunities, the undertaking of infrastructure business in China involves many risks and problems which are mainly caused by China's embryonic legal structure and immature economic market. Further strategies in risk allocation and management are especially important for successful investments in China. Choosing the right path for a BOT project investment is crucial since each project involves different legal rights, different obligations and different risk implications. The present paper describes the structuring and risk allocation, as well as the Government guarantees in a China BOT transport project, the Shanghai Yan'an Donglu Second Tunnel (YD2nd Tunnel). It is also the first BOT project implemented in Shanghai. The project features and the guarantees provided by the Government are described in the present paper.

Unilever‐Sagit is the main Italian competitor in the Italian frozen food market. The company has very recently innovated its distribution channel by creating a private Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) network. Examines the effects generated by the implementation of EDI technology on supply chain management. Discusses the theoretical aspects of the impact of EDI on strategic management of logistics and examines the Unilever‐Sagit EDI network in detail.

The purpose of this study is to compare revenue guarantee programs in a build-operation-transfer project (BOT). Two types of revenue guarantee programs are formulated: a payment-based annual revenue guarantee program and a period-extension-based cumulative revenue guarantee program.

Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the real option approach. This method is applied to a toll road project in the Philippines wherein the expected payoffs of the government and the concessionaire are simulated over an evaluation period that includes the concession period. The condition under which the expected government return in one program is equal to that in the other program is shown. These programs are then evaluated by incorporating a project risk factor into the project return.

The results show that the cumulative revenue guarantee program is preferred to the annual revenue guarantee program. However, the optimal solution depends on the government's return-risk preference.

The simulation was implemented with limited cases of discrete input with respect to the cost-sharing parameter, the annual guarantee rate, and the guaranteed cumulative revenue. A simulation with more input values should be performed to achieve results that are more general and sophisticated.

It is indicated that the simple reduction of risk does not necessarily mean that government expected payoff will increase.

It is expected that this method contributes to the proper decisions made by the governments with respect to the choice of a revenue guarantee mechanism in BOT projects.