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Little success had been recorded on concession-based public private partnership contracts in Nigeria for reasons attributable in part to poor assessment of the socio-cultural and economic factors that contribute to the parties’ costs while preparing contract packages. The purpose of this paper is to assess the factors which significantly influence the private party’s obligations and costs in a concession-based contract thereby enhancing the robust assessment of contract packages when bidding by private investors.

The assessment was based on primary data obtained through questionnaire survey. Structured questionnaire was administered on professionals comprising architects, estate surveyors, quantity surveyors, engineers and builders, accountants/bankers/economists and lawyers who had been involved in concession-based contracts in the Southwestern Nigeria, selected using respondent-driven sampling approach. Factors evaluated were those identified through in-depth literature review and brainstorming of those pertinent to concession transaction in Nigeria. Data collected were analysed using descriptive statistics including mean, relative significance index, impact weighting and factor analysis.

Significant factors that influence private party’s cost were found to be political interference, delay in land acquisition, variation to the contract and non-availability of supportive infrastructure.

Findings provided information for structuring concession contract for effective management of country-specific characteristics in concession contract. The understanding of the factors that affect private party’s obligations and costs would guide effective assessment of concession contract in developing economies by foreign investors. Moreover, the study provided implication for the understating of country-specific factors affecting concession contract in Nigeria which would contribute to robust assessment of contract packages when bidding by private investors.

Demand–supply matrices with adverse consequences has occasioned government response to concession initiatives in infrastructure in Nigeria. However, concession-based projects have been trailed by administrative and legal controversies. While this scenario has negatively impacted the acceptability of a concession contract, there is, nevertheless, a paucity of research effort aimed at developing a sustainable framework. The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework for the evaluation and allocation of obligations of parties, thereby enhancing the synergy and cooperation between the public and private sector organization.

Data were obtained through a questionnaire administered to professionals in concession-based contracts in southwestern Nigeria, which included architects, estate surveyors, quantity surveyors, engineers and builders, accountants/bankers/economists and lawyers. The respondents were selected using random and respondent driven sampling approaches. The questions were structured to ensure that the respondents have appropriate experience in concession-based projects and hold appropriate positions as decision-makers so as to give credence to the collected data.

The study identified 47 contractual obligations in the specific context of developing countries. Based on “half-adjusting principle”, 13 of the obligations notably cost of land acquisition and cost of social disturbances were allocated to the public party; 18 of the obligations notably project design and cost of feasibility study were allocated to the private party; and 16 of the obligations including preparation of terms of a contract and relocation of third party facilities were shared by the parties.

The framework benchmarked the categorization of public and private parties’ obligations in concession-based public–private partnership (PPP) contracts. The study has the implication for the evaluation and allocation of obligations of parties, which could mitigate the risk of failure of PPP projects in relation to the specific context of developing countries.

The purpose of this paper is to develop compensation mechanisms against risks factors that impact private party’s costs in concession-based projects as a basis for minimizing failure rate of concession contracts.

The study extended earlier work on the factors that impact private party’s costs in concession-based projects by developing compensation mechanisms against the risks factors. It commenced with semi-structured face-to-face interviews which were launched with different stakeholders organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the Southwestern Nigeria. Responses from the interview were analyzed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti6/7. The mechanisms identified from literature review were assessed through structured questionnaire which were administered on professionals selected from governmental-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks among others, using the respondent-driven sampling technique. The robustness of the quantitative data was achieved by including the initial respondents to the interview in the questionnaire survey. The quantitative data were analyzed using percentile for better understanding of the flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms. The criterion for the selection of appropriate mechanism(s) for the factors was based on minimum average of 20.0 percent (the ratio of maximum percentage (100 percent) of the respondents to total number of variables) suggesting the five identified mechanisms. The results in both cases of qualitative and quantitative assessments were compared. Based on the convergences of the findings, preferred compensation mechanisms were developed against concession contract risk factors.

Options of mechanisms were developed against specific investment risks that are consequent to the defaults of the public party in PPP contracts. The findings indicate that the mechanisms in extant literature with respect to administration of traditional models are relevant for PPPs. The study, however, identified new concepts, including “compensative” “zero compensation,” “equitable sharing” and “adjustment of concession period,” which are suitable in specific cases of PPP contracts.

The study contributes to the body of knowledge on mechanisms for improving PPP project performance. Moreover, insights were provided on mechanisms that satisfy private investor in case of specific risk factors investigated. The findings are therefore expected to guide private party in the preparation of concession contract package that minimizes investments risks and thereby attracting more private investors both from local and international environments. The findings of the study would also contribute to the body of information for documenting standard conditions of concession contract in Nigeria.

Studies on critical performance factors on PPP were extended by developing compensation mechanisms against the investment risks that impact private party’s cost.

Notwithstanding the remarkable market potential of the Nigerian economy for private investment, the current sociopolitical characteristics had necessitated a careful assessment to inform decisions in long-term investments. The purpose of this paper is therefore to evaluate the success factors that have a specific influence on private party’s performance in concession contracts in Nigeria.

Respondents involved in the study were participants in concession-based contracts in Southwestern Nigeria that included architects, estate surveyors, quantity surveyors, engineers and builders, accountants/bankers/economists and lawyers. These were selected using random and respondent-driven sampling (RDS) approaches. The research instrument adopted was a questionnaire that enlisted questions which were structured to ensure that the respondents have appropriate experience in concession-based projects and hold appropriate positions as decision-makers so as to give credence to collected data. The highest significant factors were identified through the relative significance index (RSI). By exploring factor analysis, the factors were condensed for discussion under appropriate component headings. The value of Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO, 0.755) measure of sampling adequacy tests carried out showed that the data collected were adequate for the factor analysis, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ² = 1,799.339; df = 630; p < 0.001) was highly significant.

Factors influencing private party performance clustered under eight components, namely, technical, market maturity, political, legal, finance, procurement, incentive and regulation. However, component items including level of understanding of public–private alliance transactions, stability of exchange rate and provisions for reversion of policies were found to be highly significant. On the other hand, status of domestication and implementation of international laws/codes, predictability in legal regime and enforcement and extent of jurisdictional definition of land usage were least significant.

Findings would guide private investors in the preparation of robust investment packages that reduce risks and seemingly unavoidable opportunistic tendencies associated with public–private partnership projects in developing economies.

Unlike other project delivery options, a much larger proportion of risks is borne by the private partner in public‐private partnerships, since a large amount of equity is needed to finance the scheme. As a result, it is of paramount importance for the franchisee to analyse the possible project outcomes with due reference to potential risks affecting cash inflow and outflow. The purpose of this paper is to address the shortcomings of deterministic estimations by developing a proposal for a simulation model that aims to unveil the probability distributions of the equity amount and return on equity.

In this paper, a simulation model is developed to establish the probability distributions of these two indicators under the influence of risks. A simple case study is also presented to illustrate the concept and application of this model.

The simulation model can generate the probability distributions related to the net present value of the equity component as well as the rate of return on equity.

The method proposed in this paper should help the private investors analyse the amount of equity to be injected to the project and its corresponding return rate.

By referring to the probability distribution, an equity investor can establish whether they can recover their investment and gain a desired return rate. Based upon the risk attitude of the investor, decision‐makers can then decide whether the scheme should be pursued or not.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate critical factors that impact public sector organizations’ (PSOs) performance in PPP contracts with a view to improving their capabilities toward efficient project delivery and attracting more private sector investments.

The research methodology is a quantitative approach which commenced with an in-depth literature review that provided the basis for identification of the variables that were evaluated through a structured questionnaire. Respondents were professionals from stakeholders’ organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the Southwestern region of Nigeria selected using respondent driven sampling technique. These include industrial practitioners from governmental-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, and banks, among others. Data collected were analyzed using mean, relative significance index) and factor analysis.

The critical performance factors of PSOs in concession contracts clustered under nine components. These were technical, legal, political, finance, market maturity, economic, procurement process, performance guarantee and degree of regulation. PSOs’ capability development measure in countries newly experimenting with concession model is expected to focus on these factors for improved project delivery.

The study provided implications for capabilities improvement, legislation and policy making with respect to PPP transactions in countries newly experimenting with PPP contracts. This is highly significant to improving the capabilities of PSOs and attraction of more private sector partnership in infrastructure delivery through the concession model.

The study provided implication for capabilities improvement, legislation and policing with respect to PPP transactions in countries newly experimenting with PPP contracts. This is highly significant to improving the capabilities of PSOs and attraction of more private sector partnership in infrastructure delivery through concession model.

Previous studies on PPP performance had either focused on the projects or generalized the performance assessment to PSOs and private investors. This study extended the researches on PPP performance by revealing factors specific to the public sector stakeholders.

The purpose of this paper is to devise a simple but practical model to assist decision makers in evaluating the tariff stability of concession schemes.

To develop such a model necessitates the identification of parameters that could contribute to an increase or decline in investment return. With that a Monte‐Carlo‐based simulation model is devised to determine the probability that the tariff regime remains unchanged even when the identified risks do occur at the operational stage. Sensitivity analysis is performed to identify the most influential factors to investment return and tariff stability.

The results of the scenario indicate that the internal rate of return could be profoundly influenced by the risk factors which reaffirm the needs for a more comprehensive model for tariff stability evaluation.

Through the simulation model, a tariff stability indicator is derived and when integrated with the results of sensitivity analysis this could generate a weighted indicator for alternative tariff regimes for use in decision support systems.

With the aid of simulation techniques, decision makers can predict the impact of a range of possible market conditions and/or levels of demand on the investment return and hence the stability of the tariff regime.

The model could be extended to other types of public‐private partnerships schemes upon suitable adjustment

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) model is fast becoming a sustainable tool for remedying the deficiencies of public financing of hostel facilities in Nigeria. Being a new concept in Nigeria, this study aims to assess clients’ organizations perspective of risk factors associated with BOT model with a view to providing information for their effective management.

Quantitative descriptive analysis was used, which was based on primary data obtained through questionnaire survey. The respondents included architects, engineers (structural/civil/mechanical/electrical), builders and quantity surveyors who were officials in the physical planning development and works departments of five sampled universities in the southwestern Nigeria who executed at least one BOT hostel project. A total number of 45 copies of questionnaire were administered, out of which 35 copies representing a response rate of 77.8 per cent were retrieved. Data analysis was undertaken using descriptive statistics: percentages, mean item score and relative importance index.

Severity of the risk factors specific to BOT model for hostel development was revealed. Besides, conceptual allocations and mitigation measures were suggested against each risk factor.

Private sector investor would find the results of this research useful in preparing robust BOT contract packages through the understanding of the nature of risk factors associated with the procurement model.

With limited evaluation of BOT in hostel facilities procurement, this study developed a simplified approach to management of risk factors associated with BOT model in the education sector.

The clarity of requisite roles of public sector organizations (PSOs) for successful procurement of public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure in Nigeria is not well-established as the country is portrayed with the rising statistics on the haphazard pattern of operation of PPP model for infrastructure procurement. This has greatly beset the expected performance of a number of PPP projects which were intended to bridge the infrastructural deficit in the country. This study therefore examined roles the performed by PSOs in PPP infrastructure procurement with a view to delineate PSOs obligations and consequently improve project success.

The study was based on structured questionnaire survey of professionals in PSOs who have been involved in PPP infrastructure procurement in Southwestern Nigeria. The sampled professionals were drawn from a build-up of network through a referral chain by the adoption of respondent-driven sampling (RDS) method. The data collected were subjected to mean score analysis and Kruskal–Wallis test.

The study found that roles pertaining to management of variation, apportionment of penalties and abatements, select preferred bidders, establish management approaches for PPP risks are infrequently performed by PSOs in Nigeria. Whereas these roles are critical to successful procurement of PPP infrastructure as they are prerequisites for PPP infrastructural project success.

The study provides information that would be useful for developing countries with evolving PPP markets for enhanced project delivery.

The purpose of this study is to develop penalty measures against concessionaires’ defaults as a mechanism for protecting the interests of parties (public and private) in public–private partnership (PPP) contracts for enhancing project delivery.

The research methodology is a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. This study commenced with an in-depth literature review, which provided the basis for identification of penalty measures in construction contract management. The qualitative assessment was based on semi-structured face-to-face interviews, which were aimed at identifying the underlying pattern of the penalty measures, and the quantitative assessment was based on a structured questionnaire. In both cases, respondents were stakeholders’ organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the southwestern region of Nigeria. These include industrial practitioners from government-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks, etc. The sample size was selected using a respondent-driven sampling approach, as the comprehensive lists of the participants in PPP contracts are not readily available in the Nigerian construction industry. Responses from the interview were analysed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti7. The quantitative data were analysed using percentile for flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms.

This study developed mechanisms that defined the rights of the public party to redress underperformance of PPP contracts consequent to the defaults of the private party. “Step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts” were preferred against specific cases of “delayed execution”, “abandonment of the project”, “bankruptcy of the concessionaire” and “non-compliance with design and specifications”. With respect to “shortfall in performance against established dates”, the results converged on “monetary fine” and diverged on “step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts”.

The study contributes to literature on mechanisms for enforcing PPP project performance. Besides, defining rights and obligations of the parties in specific events of underperformance of the concessionaires in PPP contracts is a significant step towards the development of standard conditions of contract for managing PPP projects in which the model is being newly adopted.

Project management studies on PPP were extended by defining the liabilities that are consequent to the defaults of the private party and the mechanisms for their enforcement.