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Capacity building in fragile and post‐conflict situations is specially challenging for policy makers in that it represents a situation that needs to be carefully managed. Understanding the dynamic link between capacity building and conflict requires understanding the nature and determinants of conflicts, their duration, intensity and the modalities for their cessation and post‐conflict reconstruction. This study attempted to do that from systemic or theoretical perspective. A major common theme that runs across the literature is that post‐conflict recovery and sustainable development and the associated capacity building exercise in Africa need to have the following four feature: (1) first a broad development planning framework with a fairly long‐time horizon and an overarching objective of poverty reduction; (2) second, social policy‐making in such countries is expected to be distinct from non‐conflict countries. This signals the need to articulate country specific policies and (3) third, intervention in such states requires a high volume of aid flows and (4) forth it need to be preceded by deeper understanding of African societies by donors. This study by outlining such basic issues from theoretical perspective resorted to an outline of three core areas of capacity building that are needed in post‐conflict and fragile states: capacity building to address immediate needs of post‐conflict states, capacity building to address the core economic and political causes of conflict, as well as, capacity building to address issues of finance and financial sector reconstruction. Each of these aspects is discussed in detail in the study. The study underscores the need to view and understand capacity building exercise as part and parcel of a broad developmental problem which requires broader developmental solutions.

This chapter focuses on the Maoist insurgency in the 75 districts of Nepal and tries to analyze the insurgency in a comparative perspective. We compare the 75 districts with the aim to address the following questions: Why does an insurgency emerge in certain areas? How is it linked to economic, social, or political factors? Why does an insurgency show a robust presence in some districts but fail to do likewise in others? We attempt to answer these questions by conducting multivariate regressions using longitudinal data to test our primary hypothesis that the onset of an insurgency and the continuation are functions of the same factors. We examine insurgency within one country, Nepal, and test our model in Nepal's 75 districts, in a single country context, using available data on the 10-year-long insurgency. We break down the Nepalese insurgency into two parts: the onset and the continuation. Our findings indicate that regions predominantly polarized by caste are more prone to the onset of insurgency than any other factor. Higher literacy rate, a proxy for government efficacy, renders insurgency less feasible, and difficult terrain has no impact whatsoever. However, after the onset, many of the explanatory variables are no longer significant for the continuation of the insurgency and grievances alone tend to be meaningless.

While climatic conditions are believed to have some influence on triggering conflicts, the existing empirical results on the nature and statistical significance of their explanatory role are not conclusive. We construct a dataset for a sample of 139 countries which records the occurrence of an armed conflict, the annual average temperature and precipitation levels, as well as the relevant socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic measures over the 1961–2011 period. Using this dataset and controlling for the effect of relevant nonclimate variables, our comprehensive econometric analyses support the influencing role of climatic factors. Our results are robust and consistent with the hypothesis that climate warming is instrumental in raising the probability of onset of internal armed conflicts and suggests that, along with regulating population size and promoting political stability, controlling climate change is an effective factor for inducing peace by way of curtailing the onset of armed conflicts.

Post-conflict economies are characterized by high, and often growing, levels of debt. At the same time, peace is particularly fragile in the aftermath of a conflict. This chapter studies how debt affects the risk of war in the 10 years that follow the end of a previous conflict. After controlling for per-capita income and other economic, political, and geographical factors, external debt is found to increase the risk of war. Conversely, the effect of domestic debt is negligible. The policy implication for the international community is clear: debt relief helps stabilize peace in war-torn economies.

Fragile states (FS) are often neglected and categorized as “aid orphans”. In extreme circumstances, they are loaded with aid beyond their absorptive capacity. However, whether they receive little or too much, there is a compelling imperative to coordinate aid aimed at capacity development effectively. In an ever shrinking pot of funds from donors mainly due to the current global economic downturn, it is extremely important to coordinate and harmonise aid delivery. FS cannot afford to waste any money trapped under rubble of multi‐donor aid bureaucracy. Due to the multidimensional nature of fragility, we draw on case studies and interdisciplinary insights from Authority‐Legitimacy‐Capacity (ALC), Country Development Framework (CDF) and other models and frameworks of donor coordination. A number of asymmetries (e.g. technical, cultural and, financial) between donors and recipients need to be addressed. Donors can harmonise their respective Africa strategies reports and give priority to infrastructure instead of focusing exclusively on the social agenda as in the past. FS should fight the local culture of corruption, avoid fungibility, protect vulnerable groups in society, focus on reintegration as well as demobilizing ex‐combatants with employment provisions. Donors should not give mixed signals to recipients and need to be flexible in their operational procedures. Finally, we discuss the implications of key emerging issues that threaten or facilitate sustainable reconstruction, development and poverty reduction in post‐conflict environments.

A growing literature links oil to conflict, particularly civil war. Greed/opportunity, grievance, and weak state arguments have been advanced to explain this relationship. This chapter builds on the literature on oil and conflict in two important ways. First, I examine a novel dependent variable, domestic terrorism. Much is known about the effect of oil on the onset, duration, and intensity of civil war, though we know surprisingly little about the potential influence of oil on smaller, more frequent forms of violence. Second, I treat oil ownership as a variable, not a constant, coding oil rents based on ownership structure. This is contrary to other related studies that assume oil is necessarily owned by the state. Using a large, cross-national sample of states from 1971 to 2007, several key findings emerge. Notably, publicly owned oil exhibits a positive effect on domestic terrorism. This positive effect dissipates, however, when political performance and state terror are controlled for. Privately owned oil, on the other hand, does not correlate with increased incidences of terror. This suggests that oil is not a curse, per se.

Audit committees have become more important and prevalent in recent years but there is a relative paucity of empirical research concerning their value. This paper contributes to this research by reporting an analysis of the relationship between the size of the audit fee and the existence of an audit committee. The analysis builds on previous research in this area in several ways. First, it uses more recent data than previous research which may have been influenced by transitional problems. The data in this paper were collected from financial reports for the years ending in 1994 and 1995. Second, it investigates the effect on audit fees of audit committee adherence to the Cadbury Committee Report recommendations of 1992. Finally, the analysis is set within a theoretical framework developed from agency theory. The results suggest that audit committees have been through a transitional phase comprising changes to the general audit environment and a learning phase for the establishment and operation of committees. By 1995 there is no evidence that audit committees, whether adhering to the Cadbury Code or not, have any overall effect on audit fees. The only effect found was a reduction in fees due to improved internal controls in the presence of auditee complexity. There was evidence that size was the main determinant of the presence of an audit committee.

In order to shed light on the implications of the business intelligence (BI) for management accounting (MA) and decision making, this study investigates as to how the use of the BI affects the production, transmission, and reception of performance measures (PM).

To investigate the issue at hand, a case study of an Italian company is carried out. The case study method is deemed suitable to explore the complex, penetrating, and unpredictable relationship between BI and PM.

The case analysis shows that the use of the BI can affect the production of PM by leading the organization to frame PM into an indicator setting. Moreover, the BI can affect the transmission by introducing a new, “visual” approach for presenting PM to decision makers, which is also relevant in the reception as a mobilizing factor.

This study contributes to improving the understanding of BI implications for MA and decision making, which is still limited in the accounting academia. Additionally, this research adds to extant knowledge about the relationship between measurement and management; more specifically, it contributes to understanding the “fate” of PM.

Furthermore, the findings illustrated in this chapter can be relevant from a practical point of view: by showing the role that BI solutions can play in producing and transmitting PM, the study shows the potential contribution of the use of the BI in managing and overcoming problems arising in these phases, favoring the use of these measures.

Presence of refugees in our world is very common and historically admitted also. Refugees are heterogeneous as a group, many asylum seekers are relatively young, the vast majority is of working age, and increasingly more people come from countries considered crisis accumulated or unsafe. Refugee crisis is recently hindering the developmental paths of several emerging economies across the globe and therefore generates curiosity among both economists and political scientists. Under such a backdrop, findings of any substantive plausible economic reasons behind such hitherto commonly ascribed issue become crucial from the angle of policy making. Broadly speaking, here we want to examine the major cause of refugee formation and how it will affect the size of the so-called potential refugees owing to eco-political instability. To perform this, here we have used a hybrid model which entails the flavours of both dynamic game theory and rational expectations theory of macroeconomics. From such a setup and under the presence of rational expectations, we have shown that a movement from a regime of REPE to non-REPE may lead to an increase in the level of nuisance or uncertainty in the South, which in turn raises the cost of life associated with high-quality quality-differentiated product of the South and thereby increases the number of potential refugees.