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This chapter focuses on the Maoist insurgency in the 75 districts of Nepal and tries to analyze the insurgency in a comparative perspective. We compare the 75 districts with the aim to address the following questions: Why does an insurgency emerge in certain areas? How is it linked to economic, social, or political factors? Why does an insurgency show a robust presence in some districts but fail to do likewise in others? We attempt to answer these questions by conducting multivariate regressions using longitudinal data to test our primary hypothesis that the onset of an insurgency and the continuation are functions of the same factors. We examine insurgency within one country, Nepal, and test our model in Nepal's 75 districts, in a single country context, using available data on the 10-year-long insurgency. We break down the Nepalese insurgency into two parts: the onset and the continuation. Our findings indicate that regions predominantly polarized by caste are more prone to the onset of insurgency than any other factor. Higher literacy rate, a proxy for government efficacy, renders insurgency less feasible, and difficult terrain has no impact whatsoever. However, after the onset, many of the explanatory variables are no longer significant for the continuation of the insurgency and grievances alone tend to be meaningless.

In this paper, the author develops a game theoretical model to understand why Union Government of India, as a third party, has used different schemes at different times in history to assist the State Governments in fighting the Naxalite insurgency. Comparing across schemes, it was found that though Matching Security Grants scheme was preferred in general, during asymmetric information scenario it led to an emergency situation wherein the Union Government had to provide the less preferred Bulk Security Grants. Later, it became difficult to withdraw these grants as the State Governments free rode by reducing own security contribution. The author finds that instead, in this scenario, Matching Development Grants are more suitable, as they incentivize the State Governments to reveal private information and help the Union Government exit its third-party role. For a practitioner involved in conflict resolution, these conclusions imply that as the desirability of policies can change diametrically overtime, Union Government must spend resources only on those heads of expenditure that provide both security and development benefits provided they aid in preventing flow of resources to Naxalites. Further, to end its assistance, the Union Government’s expenditures should also complement the capabilities of the State Government rather than substituting them. These results can also guide policy in other protracted civil wars with substantial third-party intervention, which are common these days.

The paper is an historical analysis of strategies used by Union and State Governments and Naxalites. The analysis is based on game theoretic tools supported with examples.

The Union Government must provide matching grants instead of bulk grants such as Central Armed Police Forces, and the grants should be aimed at building complementarities with the state governments’ security contributions. Under asymmetric information scenario, the Union and State Governments reduce their expenses incurred to fight the Naxalites. A Matching Development Grants scheme would have done better. Union Government must spend resources on heads of expenditure that provides both Development and Security benefits, to curb flow of resources to Naxalites, besides complementing the Security Contributions of the State Government.

The research is limited by disaggregated data to test the hypotheses. It is also limited by the data on hidden variables like the contribution of the Naxalites to fighting. The research is also limited to the extent that individual groups in the war like police commanders, politicians and Naxalite commanders are not incorporated. Multiple asymmetric parties are also not considered; that may generalize the model to other theaters of insurgency.

Certain heads of expenditure such as roads, mobile communication, improving quality of investigation, preventing human rights violations by the security forces, etc. are both security and development enhancing. The Union Government's expenditures must be directed toward this end. Therefore, from a practitioner's perspective, the debate between greed and grievances exists not as a limitation but as a guide. The relevant articles of Constitution of India must be redrafted on these principles. Third-party interventions in other insurgencies may be revisited under these conclusions.

Security and Development policies are tools for controlling Naxalite insurgency, which can also be used to prevent flow of resources to Naxalites. Security and development policies to resolving insurgencies are useful at different information scenarios. Therefore, information neutral policies should be preferred.

This paper has contributed theoretically in modeling continuing conflicts like Naxalite insurgency, explicitly. The author also shows that though the field of civil wars may have evolved along the Greed vs Grievance debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), for a practitioner, the lines blur when it comes to solutions, as many heads of expenditures have features of both security and development. This paper also shows that when the Union Government faced asymmetric information scenario, the policy of matching development grants would be beneficial in long run though of limited value in short run. This is an important conclusion as the most intense period of violence was preceded by the asymmetric information scenario. Besides, it has relevance for the other civil wars with third-party intervention, such as NATO in Afghanistan.

This chapter examines the dynamics of the Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria and its effects on higher education in Nigeria. Insurgency has affected all the nook and crannies of northern Nigeria and has gone unabated, owing particularly to the institutional framework adopted to manage peace and resolve the conflict with severe implication on higher education in the region. Insurgency has caused catastrophic humanitarian crises through widespread infrastructural devastation, and massive dislocations and losses of human life. The incidence of insurrections, insurgencies, and counter insurgency activities in each of the conflict clusters in the northeast geo-political zone of Nigeria has been associated with widespread human insecurity and displacement of populations. Using both primary and secondary methods of data collection, the chapter examines how the role of government and policies has become central to educational development in the country. It also shows the extent to which the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency have affected students’ school enrolment and performance in northeastern Nigeria. The chapter further examines internally displaced persons (IDPs) and access to education in northeastern Nigeria and interrogates the role of the Nigerian state and agencies responsible for the management of IDPs in meeting their education needs in camps. It also examines the extent to which stakeholders in the management of IDPs have gone in initiating policies and programs that promotes access to education in IDP camps in northeast Nigeria. It concludes that the number of schools available in the conflict spots has reportedly been reduced because of the fact they are now occupied by IDPs. Most of the students in high school as well as universities in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states have had their opportunities for higher education severely constrained. The chapter recommends among others that protection of staff, students, and education workers working in the northeast region is imperative. In order to do so successfully, changes must be effected in the provisions contained in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that relate to the management of IDPs.

Existing literature on the post-war agency of women combatants focuses on macro-level political and economic processes as measures of their agency in the post-war society. I try to present a more complicated and complete picture of women ex-combatants' experiences of post-war agency by including socio-cognitive process to understand their post-war experiences. After categorising the extant research into four categories – post-war as regression; structural forces shaping post-war regression; situated agency of women ex-combatants; and micro-politics of post-war – I introduce the concept of ‘strategic silence’. This concept indicates the capacity of female ex-combatants to consciously stay silent and to highlight the collective gains and empowerment for women while sacrificing the self. Secondly, I introduce the concept of ‘epistemic resistance’ which captures their ability to resist dominant narratives of social transformation by the Maoists in Nepal. I focus specifically on narratives around marriage during the insurgency. I conducted 39 extensive interviews during my fieldwork in Nepal (2017–2018) involving female ex-combatants, their leaders (male and female) and experts. This chapter makes an important intervention in feminist security studies and feminist international relations through a specific focus on gender in post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding.

The Government of Iraq (GoI) and the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq have used microfinance institutions (MFIs) as part of their counterinsurgency campaign. This raises several questions. What role can MFIs play in counterinsurgency? Are the economic or civilian and military motivations for supporting microfinance convergent or divergent? What constraints does conflict impose on microfinance borrowers, lenders, and institutions and how can an MFI ameliorate these constraints? Analyzing these issues is the core of this chapter.