The United States of America is on the verge of a possible revolution in civil-military relations in an era marked by increased defensive alertness stemming from the…
The United States of America is on the verge of a possible revolution in civil-military relations in an era marked by increased defensive alertness stemming from the attacks of 11 September 2001. As we anticipate the normalization of terror as a way of life, we are witnessing a paradigmatic shift from the use of violence towards some political end to the use of violence as an end in itself (Jenkins, 2001). 1 It is tempting to frame our analysis in terms of the broader notion of asymmetric warfare, since the arguments we make in this paper may be applied to a wide range of settings, including those in which vastly unequal forces are pitted against one another and one side may make use of irregular fighters employing unconventional tactics. However, this would serve only to shift the emphasis away from our central argument. Terrorism may be a form of asymmetric warfare, but what distinguishes it is the fact that it intentionally targets civilians, and that among civilians, it is indiscriminate in the devastation it wreaks. Terrorism is important because of the way in which it socializes danger, breaking down the barriers between combatant and noncombatant and subjecting all to the worst of harrowing and potentially lethal attacks. It is this socialization of danger produced by terrorism, in turn, that is critical in assessing whether and how civilian and military authorities elect to treat its use against their own societies not as a crime, but as an act of war. Bioterrorism in turn, as we argue below, has unique attributes that distinguish it from other forms of terrorism.1 And where, for most nations, homeland defense is the primary mission of the armed forces, the United States had to establish a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security due to the primarily expeditionary nature of American armed forces for the past half-century. The military has been a unique institution in modern societies. It has acted as the agent for the state’s possession of a monopoly on the means of large-scale organized violence and war-making. The establishment of a second executive agency responsible for homeland security makes the equation more complex. As a result, ever greater attention must be given to the balance of civil-military relations in American society.
Purpose: National business groups in conflict countries may mitigate the civil war or do the converse. When the economy is mainly point-sourced, which means it mainly…
Purpose: National business groups in conflict countries may mitigate the civil war or do the converse. When the economy is mainly point-sourced, which means it mainly exports mineral-based products and/or narcotics, the business community (apart from small-businesses associated with services) is likely to be more pro-war, particularly, if the other side may gain control of the lootable commodities, as in secessionist wars. This tendency will be reinforced the closer are business and political ties, shorter the time horizons are and more difficult it is to make credible commitments to peace. If the economy exports mainly agricultural products excluding those mentioned above or manufactures (diffuse or manufacturing) the commercial case for peace is stronger because of the diffused nature of the core business activity. Even so, there will be some groups who profit from war contracts and arms deals. The peace lobby is likely to dominate in societies where business and political actors are more sharply separated, as well as in countries that have longer time horizons and better institutions of commitment. The pro-peace business lobby may have a stronger case in secessionist wars compared to rebellions, as the former are more likely to be longer and more intractable to purely military solutions.
Purpose – This chapter aims to explore the causes of civil war in West Africa, including the perspectives of those directly involved, both those involved voluntarily and…
Purpose – This chapter aims to explore the causes of civil war in West Africa, including the perspectives of those directly involved, both those involved voluntarily and those involved against their will. To this end, we examine the three contiguous war – afflicted coastal countries of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast and as a counterweight, Ghana which has escaped civil war.
Methodology – Brief country case studies are used to explore the motivations of leaders and followers which often diverge. This chapter examines four West African countries:•Sierra Leone and Liberia, which have suffered classic brutal, ‘third war’ civil wars (Holsti, K. (Ed.). (1996). Wars of the third kind. In: The state, war and the state of war. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).•Ivory Coast, once seen as the West African ‘beacon of stability’ (Royce, E. (2003). Testimony. US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, 2nd February, p. 12) but now suffering a seventh year of civil conflict.•Ghana, the counter case, which has so far survived multiple military coups without descending into national conflagration.
To demonstrate the basic features these countries share in common and to suggest some areas where they diverge, we present core socio-economic data in Table 1.
The respondent data on which much of the analysis is based was collected by Dele Ogunmola from individual interviews, and focus group discussions. In the case of Ivory Coast, there was also an e-interview with a medical missionary who experienced the early stages of the war. Given the tense nature of the situation, for both the individual interviews and the focus groups the selection of participants was purposive. People were selected who were willing to talk about their involvement and could represent a range of different roles and experiences. Thus, for example, the Makeni focus group quoted was recruited at Sumbaya village, which was virtually razed by the rebels. Minor warlords were interviewed but not, regrettably, randomly selected. We also refer to the interviews of ex-rebels conducted in 2009 by John-Idriss Lahai, a former member of the Sierra Leonian Civil Defence Forces and current PhD Student at the University of New England.
Findings – Interviewing in these countries still requires courage on both sides, and while we accept that respondents (especially those at risk of prosecution) may well prevaricate, the overall impression is one of the striking frankness. Most argued that the war was messy and the participants had mixed motivations. The findings confirm that, while grievances play a significant role in providing the fuel for West African civil wars, the greed of both national and international players serves to prolong them. Though Sierra Leone and Liberia experienced opportunistic wars, the Ivory Coast is torn apart over the definition of citizenship. Ghana has survived due to leadership which facilitated economic growth, curbed corruption and prioritised provision of basic services.
Limitations – This is not the place to detail the multitude of coups, wars and treaty negotiations that make up the troubled history of the region (see Adebajo, A. (2002). Building peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Parallel timelines for each country would demonstrate many interactions across the region, such as the spread of subaltern coups, but at the cost of presenting a long and confusing history. It is enough to stress that these colonially defined countries are linked across borders that are porous to ideas, rebels, refugees and diamonds alike.
Describes the Spanish Civil War collection in the General Research Division of the New York Public Library. Lists some of the more than 2,500 entries on the Spanish Civil War and attempts an ideological balance between by providing a broad range of sources — Lists items in both English and Spanish.
The authors suggest that there has been a militarisation of the Third World since the Second World War. This militarisation and consequent hostilities are a representation…
The authors suggest that there has been a militarisation of the Third World since the Second World War. This militarisation and consequent hostilities are a representation of the power structure of the present world system. While there may be a reduction in the direct hostilities between the superpowers this is made up for and played out in regional conflicts between Third World nations. Such conflicts are provisioned by military supplies from the west.
A growing literature links oil to conflict, particularly civil war. Greed/opportunity, grievance, and weak state arguments have been advanced to explain this relationship. This chapter builds on the literature on oil and conflict in two important ways. First, I examine a novel dependent variable, domestic terrorism. Much is known about the effect of oil on the onset, duration, and intensity of civil war, though we know surprisingly little about the potential influence of oil on smaller, more frequent forms of violence. Second, I treat oil ownership as a variable, not a constant, coding oil rents based on ownership structure. This is contrary to other related studies that assume oil is necessarily owned by the state. Using a large, cross-national sample of states from 1971 to 2007, several key findings emerge. Notably, publicly owned oil exhibits a positive effect on domestic terrorism. This positive effect dissipates, however, when political performance and state terror are controlled for. Privately owned oil, on the other hand, does not correlate with increased incidences of terror. This suggests that oil is not a curse, per se.
Moore (1966) once argued that the American Civil War was a fundamentally “bourgeois” revolution. As such, Moore's account falls in line with much of the larger literature…
Moore (1966) once argued that the American Civil War was a fundamentally “bourgeois” revolution. As such, Moore's account falls in line with much of the larger literature on democratization, which emphasizes the class dimensions of democratic expansions and transitions, but is largely silent on how party politics are implicated in those processes. Such approaches miss a great deal of the party, inter-elite and discursive dynamics that are crucial to understanding the origins and consequences of democratic change. This chapter seeks to discern the impact of mass party formation and political discourse on modern routes to democracy through an examination of mid-19th-century Chicago politics. It holds to Moore's conclusion that the American Civil War was indeed a bourgeois revolution, while demonstrating that the trajectory of party politics before, during and after the war challenges Moore's interpretation of how class forces were mobilized in the American case. Partisan shifts, for example, worked at turns to weaken and strengthen the rhetorical and organizational basis of working-class mobilization, suggesting that democratization and the class coalitions that give rise to it are shaped and re-shaped by the context of partisan struggle.