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The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act was enacted on 3rd December, 1999, as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. The Kingpin Act calls for the imposition of a series of US economic and financial sanctions — with a worldwide reach — on ‘foreign narcotics traffickers’, their related ‘organisations’, and those ‘foreign persons’ who support their activities, enforced by penalties ranging up to fines of $10m and imprisonment for ten years. In passing this legislation, Congress specifically looked to the example provided by an earlier set of economic sanctions that prohibited dealings with Colombian narco‐traffickers or entities which they controlled, established by the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC). The controls established by the Kingpin Act, and the associated Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations (FNKSR), accordingly, are neither a unique nor an isolated programme. Rather, they represent the latest step in the evolution of a series of distinct, but related, economic sanctions programmes administered by OFAC.

The proliferation of sanctions programmes over time, each with its own set of regulations and its own peculiar blacklist, makes it more difficult for OFAC to administer the controls in a smooth, consistent and efficient manner. Additionally, unlike other agencies involved in international trade — such as the Commerce Department's BXA, or the State Department's DTC — OFAC has been slow to develop a cooperative relationship with those who must comply with its regulations. While OFAC's singular focus on economic and financial sanctions has enabled it to avoid some of the problems the Commerce Department sometimes experiences as a result of its dual missions of both promoting and controlling trade, it has also fostered a more adversarial relationship with the trading community. As OFAC has focused on each sanctions programme individually, rather than as part of a comprehensive system of controls, it has tended to be insensitive to the needs of those who must integrate its diverse regulatory requirements into an overall business compliance process.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

The use of economic sanctions has grown dramatically in recent decades. Nevertheless, many arguments are presented in the public policy space regarding their effects on target populations. The author presents the first systematic analysis of the effects of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey and assessment of the literature on the effects of economic sanctions on living standards in target countries. The author identifies 31 studies that apply quantitative econometric or calibration methods to cross-country and national data to assess the impact of economic sanctions on indicators of human and economic development. The author provides in-depth discussions of three sanctions episodes—Iran, Afghanistan and Venezuela—that illustrate the channels through which sanctions affect living conditions in target countries.

Of the 31 studies, 30 find that sanctions have negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality and human rights. The author provides new results showing that 54 countries—27% of all countries and 29% of the world economy— are sanctioned today, up from only 4% of countries in the 1960s. In the three cases discussed, sanctions that restricted the access of governments to foreign exchange limited the ability of states to provide essential public goods and services and generated substantial negative spillovers on private sector and nongovernmental actors.

This is the first literature survey that systematically assesses the quantitative evidence on the effect of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

The purpose of this paper is to use two recent US prosecutions of Turkish nationals for sanctions evasion, the Zarrab and Atilla cases, as case studies of recent developments in US sanctions law and law enforcement.

This paper uses primary sources (pleadings and other court documents) to articulate the key facts and arguments in the Zarrab and Atilla cases and to explain the sanctions evasion methodologies used by the group. This paper then draws out the lessons of these cases for the practice of financial crime compliance in banking institutions.

This paper highlights the expanding scope of US sanctions laws and the challenges for banks in complying with them. In particular, it shows the similarities between sanctions evasion and other financial crime methodologies, arguing that banks need to become more interdisciplinary in their operational approach to financial crime.

The Zarrab and Atilla cases are of international significance in sanction law. This paper is the first in-depth case study of these cases from a legal and compliance perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce econo-political risks (EPRs) to supply chains (SCs). Based on case data from an automotive SC, this research identifies the mechanisms through which a subset of EPRs influences SC operations and outcomes.

An exploratory case study method is employed for theory development. Interviews with SC professionals of three case companies were the primary data source. Company documents, archival records, and direct observation provided further insights into how EPRs are perceived, how they impact a SC, how SC actors react to them, and what the overall performance results are.

The research identifies EPRs in terms of scope (flow of material, money, and knowledge) and time, and provides concrete examples, along with the channels through which their impact unfolds, and the responses available to SC actors. The authors find secondary impacts of EPRs through economic and regulatory channels to be significant, and bankruptcy, strategic reorientation, and single sourcing are common outcomes. By elaborating on the mechanisms through which sanctions impact upon SCs, and the feasible response trajectories, this research can assist SC actors with more effective management of EPRs.

This paper is novel for three reasons: first, it introduces EPRs to research into supply chain risk management (SCRM); second, it addresses SC risks in a developing country, a topic largely missing from the literature; and finally, this research focuses on post-event SC risks, whereas the bulk of SCRM literature focuses on the pre-event phase.

Compliance enforcement is central in issues involving cooperation and delegation of authority. In fact, many proposed mechanisms seek to enhance adherence to the contracted agreements. Generally, monitoring and sanction arrangements constitute one of the widely applied tools to ensure compliance. Notwithstanding the prevailing mixed opinions on the usefulness of such coercive measures, in public procurement, such seemingly drastic measures are also commonly applied to enhance the purchasersʼ adherence to the established procurement frameworks. This study investigated the effectiveness of the monitoring and sanction arrangements in enhancing procurement rule compliance in the Tanzania context. Using data generated from a cross-sectional survey conducted between December 2006 and May 2007, this study established that the effectiveness of such enforcement means in the public sector is situational contingent and has to take into account other context-specific factors, which tend to influence the outcome.

The probability of sanctions’ effectiveness increases not only due to their severity for the target country’s economy but is also a function of adherence to their principles by enterprises from senders’ countries. Sanctions avoidance and increasing investments in the target country (the observed behavior of many companies facing the European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia which were imposed in 2014) mitigate the impact of these restrictive measures. In this chapter we show (by analyzing adaptation strategies of EU enterprises affected by sanctions imposed on Russia by EU) how particular types of strategies affect the effectiveness of sanctions and what factors determine the choice of their respective behavior. We draw our conclusions from the online survey of more than 1,000 responses from British, French, German, Italian, and Polish enterprises. We find that while administrative burdens make conformance to sanctions more likely, market dependency and non-tangible assets in the target country induce strategies that challenge sanction policies. We conclude that the EU–Russian sanctions dispute incentivizes European companies to increase their engagement in Russia. These so-called defiance strategies diminish the real economic effect of the sanctions and generate a new equilibrium which outlasts the lifting of these restrictive measures and has negative long-term political implications.

US sanctions have been a major feature of US Iran policy since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, but the imposition of UN and worldwide bilateral sanctions on Iran that began in 2006 and increased dramatically as of 2010 is recent by comparison. The objectives of US sanctions have evolved over time. Broad international sanctions imposed on Iran harmed Iran’s economy and contributed to Iran’s acceptance of agreements that exchange constraints on its nuclear program for sanctions relief. The subject of this study is important because both Iran and the international communities are demanding for information about the effect of sanctions on Iran. In an international and regional perspective, it seems that sanctions have a negative impact on economic, social and even political status of Iran. Therefore, this paper aims to examine the impact of Iran Central Bank sanction on Tehran Stock Exchange as on December 31, 2011.

Variables of model are consisted by exchange rate, oil prices and Tehran Stock Exchange Price Index (TEPIX) from October 2, 2011 to March 29, 2012, which is offered daily. To analyze the model, the authors used Johansen–Juselius and Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) methods.

The results indicate that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between selected variables as oil prices, and exchange rates have a positive effect on the TEPIX. In other words, the results of the econometric estimation show the positive effect of the Iran Central Bank sanction on the TEPIX. Thus, because of economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries, Tehran Stock Exchange has been growing.

No empirical research exists that examines the impact of sanctions on stock price in developing countries. This study fills this gap by examining the links between sanctions and stock price in Iran.