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An empirical analysis of coercive means of enforcing compliance in public procurement

Frederick A. Mwakibinga (Public Procurement Policy, Ministry of Finance, Tanzania)
Arnt Buvik (Faculty of Economics, Informatics and Social Sciences, Molde University College, Norway)

Journal of Public Procurement

ISSN: 1535-0118

Article publication date: 1 March 2013

216

Abstract

Compliance enforcement is central in issues involving cooperation and delegation of authority. In fact, many proposed mechanisms seek to enhance adherence to the contracted agreements. Generally, monitoring and sanction arrangements constitute one of the widely applied tools to ensure compliance. Notwithstanding the prevailing mixed opinions on the usefulness of such coercive measures, in public procurement, such seemingly drastic measures are also commonly applied to enhance the purchasersʼ adherence to the established procurement frameworks. This study investigated the effectiveness of the monitoring and sanction arrangements in enhancing procurement rule compliance in the Tanzania context. Using data generated from a cross-sectional survey conducted between December 2006 and May 2007, this study established that the effectiveness of such enforcement means in the public sector is situational contingent and has to take into account other context-specific factors, which tend to influence the outcome.

Citation

Mwakibinga, F.A. and Buvik, A. (2013), "An empirical analysis of coercive means of enforcing compliance in public procurement", Journal of Public Procurement, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 243-273. https://doi.org/10.1108/JOPP-13-02-2013-B004

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2013 by PrAcademics Press

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