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Abstract

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The Political Economy of Antitrust
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44453-093-6

Abstract

Details

The Political Economy of Antitrust
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44453-093-6

Content available
Book part
Publication date: 1 April 2007

Abstract

Details

The Political Economy of Antitrust
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44453-093-6

Book part
Publication date: 28 February 2022

Gregory DeAngelo, Michael D. Makowsky and Bryan McCannon

Law enforcement agents enforce rules that they might transgress in their private lives. Building from a theory of “hypocrisy aversion” where agents incur psychological…

Abstract

Law enforcement agents enforce rules that they might transgress in their private lives. Building from a theory of “hypocrisy aversion” where agents incur psychological costs from imposing a sanction on others for rules that they might break, the authors design a two-player game in which players are simultaneously placed in the roles of enforcer and potential transgressor. In this model, discretionary enforcement is endogenous to the size of the sanction. Conditional on rewards to enforcement and punishment that are both sufficiently small in the status quo, the authors demonstrate that price effects can be dominated by second-order hypocrisy effects, leading to rates of transgression that increase with larger sanctions. The authors test the model within a laboratory experiment where individuals can simultaneously gamble at the expense of a third party and punish those they observe gambling. Examining the comparable testable predictions of models of (i) selfish agents, (ii) pro-social agents, and (iii) pro-social agents who are averse to hypocrisy, the authors find evidence of hypocrisy aversion in the rates of gambling, sanctioning, and the changing composition of agent strategies. Our results suggest that increasing sanctions can backfire in the deterrence of common criminal and non-criminal offenses.

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Experimental Law and Economics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-83867-537-0

Keywords

Abstract

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Details

The Law and Economics of Class Actions
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78350-951-5

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Abstract

Details

The Political Economy of Antitrust
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44453-093-6

Article
Publication date: 16 November 2010

James Kirkbride, Steve Letza and Dujuan Yuan

The purpose of this paper is to examine the practical and legal challenges and barriers to the development of a private action in antitrust controls and to project those…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the practical and legal challenges and barriers to the development of a private action in antitrust controls and to project those onto a consideration of the development of such rights of action through a case study of Brazil.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper provides a critical review of both the theoretical and practical barriers to the development of private rights of action, drawing upon the history of development in both the USA and in Europe and the regular considerations of policy and law making, through debate at the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development. This comparative and historical analysis is projected into models of design and delivery for consideration by law makers.

Findings

Despite the different legal traditions and policy considerations of the different jurisdictions, the fundamental design of a common action pan‐jurisdictions and outwith conflict of law principles might be possible. The paper proposes a design framework to facilitate and achieve this. The case‐study of Brazil presents an interesting and recent context, and illustration, of this process.

Practical implications

The paper provides an historical and comparative account of the development of private rights actions in this area and provides, to the law maker, a framework and set of legal principles and practical enforcement and design guidelines. This framework and its guidelines should assist those countries seeking to introduce such rights of action in the policy area of antitrust control.

Originality/value

The historical and comparative approach draws together in one paper a contemporary global position in this area of law development.

Details

International Journal of Law and Management, vol. 52 no. 6
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1754-243X

Keywords

Book part
Publication date: 1 January 2005

Patrick A. Gaughan

Punitive damages is a controversial topic in the legal profession and in the field of economics. This chapter explores the economics of punitive damages as they relates to…

Abstract

Punitive damages is a controversial topic in the legal profession and in the field of economics. This chapter explores the economics of punitive damages as they relates to corporate defendants. The economic difference between large corporations and other potential defendants, such as individuals or smaller closely held companies, causes the effects of a punitive award to be different. In some circumstances, these differences raise significant questions as to the appropriateness of punitive damages when imposed on large corporations.

Details

Developments in Litigation Economics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84950-385-3

Book part
Publication date: 6 April 2007

John M. Connor

This paper surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary finding is…

Abstract

This paper surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary finding is that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0%:18.8% for domestic cartels and 31.0% for international cartels. Cartel overcharges are positively skewed, pushing the mean overcharge for all successful cartels to 43.4%. Convicted cartels are on average as equally effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels, but bid-rigging conduct does display somewhat lower mark-ups than price-fixing cartels. These findings suggest that optimal deterrence requires that monetary penalties ought to be increased.

Details

Research in Law and Economics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-7623-1348-8

Book part
Publication date: 22 March 2022

David Hasen

Regulators can adjust penalties to compensate for incomplete monitoring of regulated parties that are subject to legal rules, but compensating penalty adjustments often…

Abstract

Regulators can adjust penalties to compensate for incomplete monitoring of regulated parties that are subject to legal rules, but compensating penalty adjustments often are unavailable when regulated parties are subject to legal standards. Incomplete monitoring consequently invites greater noncompliance under standards than under rules. This chapter develops a model that quantifies some of the specific tradeoffs that regulators face in designing standards regimes under incomplete monitoring. The model also considers the extent to which suboptimal compliance due to incomplete monitoring is likely to result in deadweight loss in different settings.

Details

The Law and Economics of Privacy, Personal Data, Artificial Intelligence, and Incomplete Monitoring
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-80262-002-3

Keywords

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