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The probability of sanctions’ effectiveness increases not only due to their severity for the target country’s economy but is also a function of adherence to their principles by enterprises from senders’ countries. Sanctions avoidance and increasing investments in the target country (the observed behavior of many companies facing the European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia which were imposed in 2014) mitigate the impact of these restrictive measures. In this chapter we show (by analyzing adaptation strategies of EU enterprises affected by sanctions imposed on Russia by EU) how particular types of strategies affect the effectiveness of sanctions and what factors determine the choice of their respective behavior. We draw our conclusions from the online survey of more than 1,000 responses from British, French, German, Italian, and Polish enterprises. We find that while administrative burdens make conformance to sanctions more likely, market dependency and non-tangible assets in the target country induce strategies that challenge sanction policies. We conclude that the EU–Russian sanctions dispute incentivizes European companies to increase their engagement in Russia. These so-called defiance strategies diminish the real economic effect of the sanctions and generate a new equilibrium which outlasts the lifting of these restrictive measures and has negative long-term political implications.

Economic sanctions imposed by the EU and United States on Russia have brought significant changes into Russian foreign economic policy, in particular leading to deepening cooperation with Asian countries and China in particular. The present contribution aims to shed light on the influence of sanctions on Russian multinational enterprises (MNEs) internationalization toward China using the example of energy and information and communication technology (ICT) industries.

The chapter builds on case study analysis. The choice of sectors allows us to highlight the recent strategic trends in the internationalization of oil and gas industry, dominated by state-owned multinationals, and in ICT by privately owned companies.

Our results provide empirical data for understanding the influence of sanctions on MNEs from the country being under the sanctions. In the case of Russian oil and gas industry and ICTs, research indicates that the shift toward China was not initiated primarily by the sanctions. In both cases, expansion to Asian markets was correlated with business interests in the Chinese market. However, changes in geopolitical and macroeconomic business environment accelerated Russian MNE’s pivot to China, for the purposes of attracting capital and reaching new markets in context of deteriorating relations with western partners. The cases demonstrate a moderating role of the industry in the context of sanctions, helping compensate for the slowdown of economic relations with traditional partners.

The novelty of the chapter is to delineate the consequences of sanctions on MNEs from the country being under sanctions. In this way, it illustrates the role of geopolitical environment in intensifying internationalization of Russian MNEs toward China.

When terrorism threaten geopolitical stability, many policymakers turn to economic sanctions. In this way, governments and multilateral organizations continue to affect corporate and managerial choices, through the shaping and constraining of international trade policies. Still, most of the international business remain relatively quiet about the impact of the non-market environment on firms’ strategic efforts. Questions remain about how firms adjust their strategies in the face of the often-sudden impact of changes in multilateral rules and enforcement mechanisms. This study aims to address this question by shedding light on three potential adjustment strategies for firms that have been impacted by sanctions.

As part of a larger, multimethod study, the authors undertook 16 semi-structured interviews with senior managers of firms whose operations have been affected by international sanctions.

International and political tensions can affect businesses in many ways, from exporting to strategies associated with global knowledge sourcing. Learnings from organizations that have had to respond to sudden and extreme changes in their fragile ecosystems will aid this study. In this commentary paper, the authors offer suggestions about how to adapt, respond and operate in a new reality.

While the imposition of long-term political sanctions, especially by powerful nations and multilateral institutions, has become more frequent, how businesses cope with these extreme external shifts still remains unknown. This paper focuses on firms operating in a sanctioned regime, investigating how they deal with these sudden changes in their environment.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Law enforcement agents enforce rules that they might transgress in their private lives. Building from a theory of “hypocrisy aversion” where agents incur psychological costs from imposing a sanction on others for rules that they might break, the authors design a two-player game in which players are simultaneously placed in the roles of enforcer and potential transgressor. In this model, discretionary enforcement is endogenous to the size of the sanction. Conditional on rewards to enforcement and punishment that are both sufficiently small in the status quo, the authors demonstrate that price effects can be dominated by second-order hypocrisy effects, leading to rates of transgression that increase with larger sanctions. The authors test the model within a laboratory experiment where individuals can simultaneously gamble at the expense of a third party and punish those they observe gambling. Examining the comparable testable predictions of models of (i) selfish agents, (ii) pro-social agents, and (iii) pro-social agents who are averse to hypocrisy, the authors find evidence of hypocrisy aversion in the rates of gambling, sanctioning, and the changing composition of agent strategies. Our results suggest that increasing sanctions can backfire in the deterrence of common criminal and non-criminal offenses.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the dramatically changed role of Russia in the global economy since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the Soviet institutions collapsed and were either reformed or replaced in a new Russian institutional landscape. The paper presents a fact-based and balanced view of Russia’s evolving role in the global economy, as distinguished from the sometimes one-sided view presented by some Western commentators. The authors establish that the two countervailing views are fundamentally based on different cultural perspectives about institutions, primarily the roles of business and government.

This paper is developed as a perspectives article drawing upon the decades of academic and business experience of all three authors with Russian business, management and the economy. The paper focuses on the structure of Russian institutional change and places it within the historical context of the challenges of various periods of time from the late 1980s to the present. The authors posit that cultural foundations complicate that institutional evolution.

Russia will remain a major player in world markets for energy, raw materials and armaments for the near future at least. Principal institutional questions facing Russia have to do with how to reduce the country’s overall dependence on raw material exports, with its vulnerability to world market fluctuations, and how to modernize Russian economic and political institutions. The degree of success in addressing these questions will depend largely upon the ability of the new and reformed economic institutions to show the flexibility to respond to changes in the global order, on whether political considerations will continue to supersede economic issues, and how markedly cultural traditions will continue to impede positive changes.

The entire system of international trade is under question, disrupted by the growing nationalism that is threatening the globalization that became institutionalized over decades in the wake of the Second World War. Russia’s future role is partially dependent upon how new patterns of international trade develop in response to the current disruption of established trade regimes, and by how political conflicts are expressed economically. The authors observe that Russia’s historical and cultural traditions, especially acquiescence to a highly centralized government with a strong autocratic leader, limit the country’s options. The authors explore how Russia’s reactions to Western sanctions have led to a new strategic approach, moving away from full engagement in the global economy to selective economic, and sometimes political, alliances with primarily non-Western countries, most notably China. The authors contrast Russia’s situation with that of China, which has been able to make substantial economic progress while still embracing a strong, centralized political institutional structure.

Many Western analysts have viewed Russian institutional evolution very critically through the lens of Western politics and sanctions, while Russia has continued along its own path of economic and institutional development. Each view, the authors argue, is based upon differing cultural perspectives of the roles of business and government. As a result, a distinct difference exists between the Western and Russian perspectives on Russia’s role in the world. This paper presents both points of view and explores the future of Russia’s position in the world economy based upon its evolving strategy for national economic policy. The authors contrast the situations of Russia and China, highlighting how Western-centric cultural views have affected perceptions of each country, sometimes similarly and at times with decided differences.

Looks at the 2000 Employment Research Unit Annual Conference held at the University of Cardiff in Wales on 6/7 September 2000. Spotlights the 76 or so presentations within and shows that these are in many, differing, areas across management research from: retail finance; precarious jobs and decisions; methodological lessons from feminism; call centre experience and disability discrimination. These and all points east and west are covered and laid out in a simple, abstract style, including, where applicable, references, endnotes and bibliography in an easy‐to‐follow manner. Summarizes each paper and also gives conclusions where needed, in a comfortable modern format.