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The dependent variables for this analysis include three measures of arms embargo effectiveness, which were referred to as ‘levels of effectiveness’ in the Framework Chapter. These are the embargo's success in causing a targeted policy change (level I effectiveness), success in changing arms flow to the target (level II effectiveness), and a measure of effectiveness to capture the arms embargo initiators satisfaction with the operation of the embargo (level III effectiveness).

The popularity of arms embargoes makes sense on the one hand but can be puzzling on the other. Since arms are a type of good often linked directly to war and peace as one of the central objects of international politics, stemming the flow of arms to a country or group accused of acting against international peace and security is a logical response. However, while this reaction is frequent, it is not generally regarded as being effective. In fact, arms embargoes have a reputation of not functioning well. One can find many references, in academic literature and policy papers alike, which state that arms embargoes “do not work” that they are “ineffective” or that they are “not worth the paper they are printed on.” The paradox that sanctions are deemed to be of little consequence but are still popular among policy-makers (Baldwin, 1997) is particularly striking.

The probability of sanctions’ effectiveness increases not only due to their severity for the target country’s economy but is also a function of adherence to their principles by enterprises from senders’ countries. Sanctions avoidance and increasing investments in the target country (the observed behavior of many companies facing the European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia which were imposed in 2014) mitigate the impact of these restrictive measures. In this chapter we show (by analyzing adaptation strategies of EU enterprises affected by sanctions imposed on Russia by EU) how particular types of strategies affect the effectiveness of sanctions and what factors determine the choice of their respective behavior. We draw our conclusions from the online survey of more than 1,000 responses from British, French, German, Italian, and Polish enterprises. We find that while administrative burdens make conformance to sanctions more likely, market dependency and non-tangible assets in the target country induce strategies that challenge sanction policies. We conclude that the EU–Russian sanctions dispute incentivizes European companies to increase their engagement in Russia. These so-called defiance strategies diminish the real economic effect of the sanctions and generate a new equilibrium which outlasts the lifting of these restrictive measures and has negative long-term political implications.

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the international community took vigorous, unprecedented steps to curb Saddam Hussein's military ambitions. The central component of these actions was a set of comprehensive arms, aviation, maritime, and economic sanctions, each imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). When the multinational coalition forces ousted Iraq from Kuwait the following year, the UNSC made these sanctions and embargoes a component of the armistice agreement. Over time, these sanctions were subsequently used as leverage to press for Iraqi compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions calling for Iraqi disarmament.¹

The use of economic sanctions has grown dramatically in recent decades. Nevertheless, many arguments are presented in the public policy space regarding their effects on target populations. The author presents the first systematic analysis of the effects of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey and assessment of the literature on the effects of economic sanctions on living standards in target countries. The author identifies 31 studies that apply quantitative econometric or calibration methods to cross-country and national data to assess the impact of economic sanctions on indicators of human and economic development. The author provides in-depth discussions of three sanctions episodes—Iran, Afghanistan and Venezuela—that illustrate the channels through which sanctions affect living conditions in target countries.

Of the 31 studies, 30 find that sanctions have negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality and human rights. The author provides new results showing that 54 countries—27% of all countries and 29% of the world economy— are sanctioned today, up from only 4% of countries in the 1960s. In the three cases discussed, sanctions that restricted the access of governments to foreign exchange limited the ability of states to provide essential public goods and services and generated substantial negative spillovers on private sector and nongovernmental actors.

This is the first literature survey that systematically assesses the quantitative evidence on the effect of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

The article presents an empirical analysis that evaluates the effects of a systemic corruption scandal on the demand in the short and the long run. In 2006, the Calciopoli scandal uncovered the match rigging in the Italian soccer first division. The exemplary sportive sanction of relegating the primary culprit to the second division imposed further negative externalities on the other clubs. Should we prefer the sportive sanction on the team or the monetary fines for the club?

We estimated two log-linear models of the demand side (stadium attendance) using a fixed effect estimator, on two panel data set made of all the Italian soccer clubs in the first and second division (Serie A and Serie B) for the seasons 2004/2005 to 2009/2010, considering the relegation of the Juventus as the event which impacted the demand for soccer.

Relegating Juventus to Serie B caused an immediate decrease of 18.4% in the attendance for all the teams, both in Serie A and in Serie B, for the three seasons considered, and 1% decrease when all the seasons are considered to measure the fallout of the scandal on the fans' disaffection.

The effect of corruption in sport on demand is an important issue, and there are few studies already published. As for sports economics and management, our results are of interest for sport-governing bodies – as a case study that can help in designing a more effective sanctioning system to prevent corruption episodes.

The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act was enacted on 3rd December, 1999, as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. The Kingpin Act calls for the imposition of a series of US economic and financial sanctions — with a worldwide reach — on ‘foreign narcotics traffickers’, their related ‘organisations’, and those ‘foreign persons’ who support their activities, enforced by penalties ranging up to fines of $10m and imprisonment for ten years. In passing this legislation, Congress specifically looked to the example provided by an earlier set of economic sanctions that prohibited dealings with Colombian narco‐traffickers or entities which they controlled, established by the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC). The controls established by the Kingpin Act, and the associated Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations (FNKSR), accordingly, are neither a unique nor an isolated programme. Rather, they represent the latest step in the evolution of a series of distinct, but related, economic sanctions programmes administered by OFAC.

This study integrates fishers’ and decision-makers’ views on the critical factors for non-compliance in the artisanal fisheries of Oman.

A questionnaire survey was implemented covering all coastal governorates of Oman. The questionnaires for fishers and decision-makers contained 46 and 43 questions, respectively, divided into various sections based on the Table of Eleven. Compliance factors were divided into spontaneous factors and enforcement factors. The data were collected through 1,242 questionnaires (1,125 fishers and 117 decision-makers).

The results indicated that spontaneous compliance factors (e.g. financial/economic, level of knowledge and social norms) and enforced compliance factors (e.g. social control, sanction certainty and sanction severity) have a significant influence on fishers' motivation to comply with regulations. The chi-square test (X²) was used to show that the differences between the means of responses of fishers and decision-makers in regard to the factors that influence non-compliance in the fishery were insignificant.

This consistency of opinions has an essential policy inference for the regulatory institutions in that it delivers assistance and trust in fisheries management authority's efforts to create effective compliance plans for the fisheries.

Tax evasion and money laundering have become important sources of illicit financial flows in developing countries. Foreign capital flows used by shell corporates are generally with no real economic activities but motivated by harmful tax practices, thereby inducing loss of revenue for developing countries. Despite the coercive actions, such as backlisting of noncooperative jurisdictions to anti-money laundering and countering terrorism financing standards, illicit financial activities are still eroding the tax base in developing countries. The purpose of the paper is to assess the blacklisting effectiveness as a coercive policy against illicit financial activities.

This paper applies a propensity score matching strategy to a sample of 118 developing jurisdictions from 2009 to 2017 to evaluate changes in illicit financial activities following the blacklisting.

The results show that rather than altering illicit inflows in blacklisted countries, financial restrictions have produced the inverse, causing a boomerang effect on financial crime activities. The illicit share of capital inflows increases on average by 6 percentage points and 0.7% of GDP following the blacklisting. These results are robust to alternative matching methods and to the hidden bias problem.

Most of the previous research analyzed the link between blacklisting and fiscal revenues. However, here, the study analyzes whether blacklisting makes countries more cooperative in terms of fighting illicit financial flows.