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With the rise of geopolitical tensions among the leading state actors, the Chinese citizens and companies are increasingly targeted by the unilateral restrictive measures. These frequently include the so-called secondary sanctions, i.e. penalties imposed on third parties for failing to comply with the sanctions regime, the US practice being a prominent example. The purpose of this paper is to analyze China's legal instruments related to imposition of and protection from unilateral restrictive measures of third countries.

The present paper discusses China’s legal defenses counteracting the extraterritorial sanctions by comparison with the legislative and enforcement practices of the EU, which has accumulated substantial experience trying to shield its businesses from the US secondary sanctions. The paper identifies the differences between the two anti-sanctions regimes and highlights the key factors that will affect the future enforcement of blocking rules in China.

When designing its anti-foreign sanctions legislation, China has considered similar legislation adopted by other jurisdictions, most notably – the EU blocking statute. The comparative assessment of the two blocking regimes reveals substantial similarities in legislative and procedural standards with important differences in enforcement capabilities and institutional frameworks.

The paper represents one of the first attempts to anticipate the directions in enforcement of China's blocking legislation taking into account the EU experiences in this domain.

This paper aims to critically examine whether it is timely and actionable for the European Union (EU) to adopt a global sanctions regime against corruption and how such a regime can be designed to maximise its efficiency. This paper argues that developing such a dedicated framework is necessary, feasible and supportive of the international fight against corruption and the efforts to enhance the recovery of corruption proceeds.

This paper draws on reports, legislations, legal scholarships and other open-source data on global sanctions against corruption and the recovery of corruption proceeds.

This paper argues in favour of a dedicated global sanctions regime against corruption, which is necessary to mitigate significant risks for the EU internal market.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is one of the first to examine recent legislative developments, such as the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime and the UK Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations, and the possible development of an EU-dedicated global sanctions regime against corruption with strong asset recovery components.

The article compares the effect of European Union (EU)-Russian sanctions imposed in 2014 with the influence of fluctuating oil prices on Danish trade.

In this paper annual import and export trade data between Denmark and 152 countries from the period 2002–18 were computed in STATA/SE 16.1 using the Gravity model to evaluate the effect of economic sanctions and the price of oil.

Results showed that the impact from the fall of oil price exceeded the negative effect from sanctions on Danish export. Additionally, the analyses suggest that the fall in oil price had a negative effect on Danish import. Even so, Danish import significantly increased due to growth in supplies of energy resources from Russia.

This study explains the overlapping effects of EU-Russian sanctions and fluctuating oil prices on Danish trade. This methodology can be expanded to encompass multiple countries using the two-sided Gravity model.

The probability of sanctions’ effectiveness increases not only due to their severity for the target country’s economy but is also a function of adherence to their principles by enterprises from senders’ countries. Sanctions avoidance and increasing investments in the target country (the observed behavior of many companies facing the European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia which were imposed in 2014) mitigate the impact of these restrictive measures. In this chapter we show (by analyzing adaptation strategies of EU enterprises affected by sanctions imposed on Russia by EU) how particular types of strategies affect the effectiveness of sanctions and what factors determine the choice of their respective behavior. We draw our conclusions from the online survey of more than 1,000 responses from British, French, German, Italian, and Polish enterprises. We find that while administrative burdens make conformance to sanctions more likely, market dependency and non-tangible assets in the target country induce strategies that challenge sanction policies. We conclude that the EU–Russian sanctions dispute incentivizes European companies to increase their engagement in Russia. These so-called defiance strategies diminish the real economic effect of the sanctions and generate a new equilibrium which outlasts the lifting of these restrictive measures and has negative long-term political implications.