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This study aims to define a “technological statecraft” concept to distinguish tech-based measures/sanctions from an array of economic measures ranging from restrictions of rare earth elements and natural gas supplies to asset freezes under the wider portfolio of economic statecraft. This concept is practically intended to reveal the USA’s “logic of choice” in its employment of technology as an efficient instrument to deal with China in the context of the great power rivalry.

This study follows David A. Baldwin’s statecraft definition and conceptualization methodology, which relies on “means” rather than “ends.” In addition to Baldwin and as an incremental contribution to his economic statecraft analysis, this study also combines national political economy with statecraft analysis with a particular focus on the utilization of technological measures against China during the Trump administration.

The US rationale for choosing technology, namely, emerging and foundational technologies, in its rivalry against China is caused at least by two factors: the nature of the external challenge and the characteristics of the US innovation model based largely on radical innovations. To deal with China, the USA practically distinguished the role of advanced technology and followed a grammer of technological statecraft as depicted in the promulgated legal texts during the Trump administration.

Despite a growing volume of literature on economic statecraft and technological competition, studies focusing on countries’ “logic of choice” with regard to why and under what conditions they choose financial, technological or commodity-based sanctions/measures/controls are lacking. Inspired from Baldwin’s account on the “logic of choice” from among alternative statecrafts (i.e. diplomacy, military, economic statecraft, and propaganda). This study will contribute to the literature with a clear lens to demonstrate the “logic of choice” from among a variety of economic statecraft measures in the case of the US technological statecraft toward China.

Economic statecraft is a critical aspect of China’s foreign policy and has played a vital role in China’s relations with its Asian neighbors. The Chinese economic ties with Asia are significant not only because China is the second largest economy in today’s world but also because it has an important impact on regional economic co‐operation and international supply chains. Relentless growth in military buildup and more assertive foreign policy led many pundits to focus almost exclusively on political and military aspects of the Chinese grand strategy in Asia. The purpose of this study is to re‐examine this picture by studying China’s economic statecraft in the region.

This paper will address following research questions: How does the Chinese foreign economic policy serve its political aspirations in East Asia? Why has China increasingly relied on a combination of economic pressures and incentives to achieve its foreign policy objectives? How effective is China’s economic diplomacy as a strategic weapon? What are the limitations of such policy? What challenges does Beijing face in exercising its economic power in East Asia?

Beijing has a comprehensive, long-term grand strategy in Asia, and economic statecraft is a major component of it. Economic statecraft is a double-edged sword. It has given the People’s Republic of China more political influence but frictions and disputes between China and its trading partners are growing as well. Even with the slower growth of the Chinese economy, China will continue to be a game changer for the region. The economic diplomacy has long been part of the foreign policy toolkit used by the People’s Republic of China and will play more important role in the years to come.

Thus far, China’s expanding economic ties with many countries in the world have not generated significant spillover effects. Although China is the dominant economic partner for every country in East Asia, its “soft power” remains to be weak. With the slower growth of the Chinese economy, another looming issue is whether China is going to be able to make a shift away from a trade- and export-led growth model that brought its dramatic economic success. All these could lead China’s economic statecraft less potent. Meanwhile, it should be noted that Asian economies that once relied on the USA are reaching a turning point as China comes to the fore, a trend that may challenge the existing international order. Should this momentum continue, it could alter the balance of power between Washington and Beijing in the region.

For Beijing, economic statecraft concerns both the economic dimension of foreign policy and the strategic dimension of economic policy. Although there is a growing literature on China’s soft power and military capabilities, the study of the economic dimensions of China’s foreign policy remains underdeveloped. With rising confidence and sophistication, Beijing has deployed economic resources to achieve geopolitical aims.

Needless to say, China’s economic statecraft has already triggered heated debate in the United States, Asia and elsewhere in the international community. However, the study of the Chinese economic diplomacy has received relatively little scholarly attention in the English-speaking world. This paper will fill a gap in the analysis and literature.

China has showed its eagerness in using its economic strength in the very recent years. Is China going to be a major sanctioning state like the United States or the European Union? This chapter argues that although there have been an increasing number of economic sanctions imposed by China with its expanding national interests and growing diplomatic problems, China will still keep a low profile in using economic sanctions because of the restraining factors such as the WTO rules, inherent problems in its economy, the pursuit of a good reputation and its strategy of peaceful development. Thus the frequency and tactics of using economic sanctions may vary according to its rising economy and changing international situation, but that will go in a very limited way.

The purpose of this paper is to study key economic strategies in Asia laid out by the Chinese Government since Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

The paper is composed of six parts. The first part analyzes China’s Asian trade strategy with a focus on the free-trade agreement. The second part elaborates the Asian finance and currency strategy with the core being the regionalization of RMB. The third part introduces China’s newly proposed Belt and Road Initiative (B&R). The fourth part deals with the China–USA economic relationship with a view to China’s economic strategy in Asia. The fifth part explains China’s domestic economic policy which forms the basis of the Asian Economic Strategy.

A marked change has taken place in China’s economic strategy in Asia, namely, giving more consideration to how to offer more public goods to the region. This is natural as China’s economic power is developed to a certain level and it is highly related to China’s attempt to growing its economic influence in this region. China believes that the B&R Initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are both public goods China has provided to Asia. China’s economic strategy in Asia demonstrates that China, as a rising power, though faced with domination of established power and the original regional economic rule system, still promotes the cooperation, integration, participation and development of this region. In general, China’s economic strategy in Asia offers an alternative for countries in this region so that Asian countries can better safeguard their rights amid China–America competition, and a new Asian economic order can be better built.

The paper contributes to the researched area of China’s economic strategy in Asia by comprehensively elaborating its trade, money, B&R Initiative and so on. This paper also shows the major challenges of China’s economic strategy in Asia and therefore is helpful to fully understand China’s economic statecraft.

The performance of public sector institutions has always been contentious – this is as old as the system of government itself and its provision of collective goods, irrespective of whether they are tangible or intangible. In the context of South Africa, with its ever-increasing political competitiveness, this chapter assesses political leadership and the African philosophy of Ubuntu or humanism in improving public sector performance management in the country. It does so by addressing certain distinct questions: What is the state of public sector performance and leadership in South Africa? What have scholars contributed in linking public sector performance, and the politics and public administration dichotomy? Are the Batho Pele principles, underpinned by Ubuntu, a worthy notion on which to pillar African political leadership? By adopting an interpretivist, qualitative research design, the study reflects on the essence of a public administration that is effective in delivering political goods and managing the performance of bureaucracies and the political leadership therein. This chapter argues that the performance of public administrations remains a “wicked” problem in South Africa as political populism is on the rise in the country. However, the argument is made that with “good” political leadership – which naturally and effectively encompasses the philosophy of Ubuntu and which understands and mobilizes statecraft – great strides can be made beyond the current rhetoric.

The use of economic sanctions has grown dramatically in recent decades. Nevertheless, many arguments are presented in the public policy space regarding their effects on target populations. The author presents the first systematic analysis of the effects of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey and assessment of the literature on the effects of economic sanctions on living standards in target countries. The author identifies 31 studies that apply quantitative econometric or calibration methods to cross-country and national data to assess the impact of economic sanctions on indicators of human and economic development. The author provides in-depth discussions of three sanctions episodes—Iran, Afghanistan and Venezuela—that illustrate the channels through which sanctions affect living conditions in target countries.

Of the 31 studies, 30 find that sanctions have negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality and human rights. The author provides new results showing that 54 countries—27% of all countries and 29% of the world economy— are sanctioned today, up from only 4% of countries in the 1960s. In the three cases discussed, sanctions that restricted the access of governments to foreign exchange limited the ability of states to provide essential public goods and services and generated substantial negative spillovers on private sector and nongovernmental actors.

This is the first literature survey that systematically assesses the quantitative evidence on the effect of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

This introductory essay historicizes the evolution of China’s geopolitical strategy from the Maoist era (1949–1976) to the present. It examines the Chinese strategic thinking in four spatial settings: Eurasia, maritime Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The Chinese strategic concerns are comparable across these regions, but the ability to pursue security interests is contingent on many circumstantial factors. This study refers to some snapshots of the ongoing regional disputes to discuss the continuities and breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world.

This study draws on the scholarly literature and policy papers to examine the interrelated forces that shape China’s rise to regional dominance: how Beijing has co-opted a series of global and regional crises for its rise to domination; how China, the USA and neighbouring countries have adjusted and adapted to a new changing international order; and how major powers in littoral and maritime Asia respond to an increasingly assertive Chinese state.

This study documents the combination of smart, soft and sharp power that China has deployed, since the global financial crisis of 2008, to enforce its dominance against the USA across the Pacific Rim and Eurasia. It argues that General Secretary of the Chinese Communist PartyXi Jinping initially launched the Belt and Road Initiative to respond to former US President Barak Obama’s policy of rebalancing Asia, and he has expanded these expansionary projects to counter US President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, thereby asserting Chinese influence abroad and tightening control against discontented populations at home.

Many Western policy analysts are wondering whether a rising China will be a “status quo” state or a revisionist state that attempts to challenge the existing world order. The lack of clarification from Beijing has prompted Washington to shift from a longstanding strategy of diplomatic engagement to that of geostrategic containment to balance against China.

The strategic goals of China in the early 21st century pertain to security reassurance, access to energy resources and national image building. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, China has become immensely confident of its own socio-economic accomplishments and scornful of what it perceives as an American conspiracy to undermine its rise to power. Following in the footsteps of the USA in the post-Second World War era, Japan in the 1980s and Taiwan in the 1990s, Beijing has used international commercial activities and business contracts to achieve specific political, strategic and diplomatic objectives.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the origin of economics as a separate science.

A very comprehensive approach is presented for determining the origin of economics as a science. Three kinds of inter‐related issues are discussed: how to interpret and evaluate earlier, particularly ancient, writings, the specification of the requirements for declaring economics as a science and the definition, scope and methodology of economics.

Application of the most stringent requirements for declaring economics as a separate science to Kautilya's Arthashastra validated A.K. Sen's claim that it is the first book on economics.

According to Kautilya, economics is a separate science but not independent of other disciplines and particularly of ethics. Whereas, most of the current research ignores this inter‐dependence and consequently does not fully capture reality.

It implies that the inter‐dependence between economics and other disciplines should be encouraged and vigorously explored.

It validates Redman's assertion, “The history of economics as a science is, in my view, still waiting to be properly written”.

Economic diplomacy refers to methods and processes by which states take advantage of cross-border economic activities to achieve their national interests. It makes connections between the sphere of corporate players, who export or invest abroad, and the sphere of diplomats, who represent the state on the international scene and implement geopolitical decisions. The main purpose of this paper is to provide an overall and coherent framework for asking, classifying and discussing the main issues raised by economic diplomacy. It investigates concepts such as national interest, power and influence. It surveys the relevant literature and deals with various expressions of economic diplomacy such as export promotion agencies, economic role of embassies and consulates, or international economic sanctions. It analyzes the two-way relationship between international economics and international politics, which is at the core of economic diplomacy, and tries to answer the following questions: on the global scene, is diplomacy just accompanying the economy? Is diplomacy driving the economy?

Since China’s “opening-up” in the late 1970s, Singapore has played a major role in enhancing China’s engagement with the world, especially in economic terms. This traditional relationship is well manifested in the third government-to-government (G–G) project under the BRI, which is known as the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative (CCI). The purpose of this paper is to address the following question: despite Singapore’s initial reluctance to agree on a third G–G project with China, why did Singapore eventually decide to join the CCI?

This paper draws on archives of over 700 Chinese language media reports and over 400 English language media reports, as well as private interactions with scholars interested in Sino-Singapore relations and with both sides’ officials in charge of the CCI project.

The paper finds that it is the goal of connecting the region, along with the need to maintain Singapore’s relevance to China and the regional economy that led to Singapore’s participation in the third G–G project. This paper also uses this case to analyse the changes that are taking place in the bilateral economic relations.

Despite wide media coverage, op-ed commentaries and respective government statements, there are a limited number of academic studies on the rationale of the third G–G project and contemporary Sino-Singapore relations in the literature. The scholarship has not addressed the rationale for Singapore’s changing attitude towards CCI and the manner in which the CCI has improved cooperation (or upgraded cooperation to a broader and regional level).