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Book part
Publication date: 22 December 2016

Xu Zhang, Mingling Zhai, Yanyan Wang, Yulei Gao, Haoliang Zhao, Xiang Zhou and Jun Gao

In order to verify the feasibility of different techniques, this chapter further studies the adaptability of two massive straw biomass applications in rural areas in China.

Abstract

Purpose

In order to verify the feasibility of different techniques, this chapter further studies the adaptability of two massive straw biomass applications in rural areas in China.

Methodology/approach

The methods of assessing biomass power generation project with Life Cycle Assessment (LCA), survey and field test of one biogas station, and game-theoretic analysis are adopted.

Findings

The following conclusions can be drawn: The air pollution costs account for more than 60% of the total environmental cost, followed by depreciation expense and maintenance fee of 18%, compared to that of biomass power generation at 0.01711 CNY/kWh. The adopted greenhouse sunlight technology of Solar Biogas Plant in Xuzhou, China, raises the inside average temperature by 11.0 °C higher than outside and keeps the pool temperature above 16 °C in winter, ensuring a gas productivity of biogas project in winter up to 0.5–0.7 m3/m3 by volume. This chapter also analyzes the information cost incurred by asymmetric information in biomass power generation via game theory method and illustrates the information structure with game results. It provides not only a foundation for the policy research in promoting straw power generation but also theoretical framework to solve the problem of straw collection.

Social implications

These studies will propose solutions to relevant problems arisen in the running process.

Originality/value

These studies are all based on real cases, field research, and appropriate theoretical analyses, so, they can reduce the relevant costs and promote the application of relevant technologies.

Details

China and Europe’s Partnership for a More Sustainable World
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78635-331-3

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Book part
Publication date: 2 December 2013

Angelina Nikitenko Christie

To provide a selective review of most recent developments in experimental economics of banking and lending and to summarize and synthesize the experiment designs and…

Abstract

Purpose

To provide a selective review of most recent developments in experimental economics of banking and lending and to summarize and synthesize the experiment designs and results in banking under asymmetric information.

Methodology

The review includes recently published or working papers (2006–2013) that exclusively employ experimental economics methodology, especially for studying the impact of formal or informal institutions on lending in credit markets.

Findings

The results of the reviewed experimental studies provide support for the important role of both informal (e.g., relationship banking and reputation) and formal (e.g., third-party enforcement; collateral) institutions and their impact on credit market performance, as well as the importance of studying the interaction of the two types of institutions.

Research limitations/implications

The number of studies reviewed is fairly small but growing, indicating that this is the area of growing significance.

Practical implications

Controlled economic experiments are better able to address the questions regarding the direction of causality in empirical relationships. Economic experiments are particularly useful in studying complex markets like credit and capital and in eliciting specific effects of institutions on credit market performance. Such well-established empirical relationships will be able to provide guidance for policy making for financial market reform.

Originality/value

This is the first review of laboratory research in banking and lending under asymmetric information that aims to call attention to this area of research and serves as a starting point for an interested researcher and provide future direction.

Details

Experiments in Financial Economics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78350-141-0

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Article
Publication date: 11 September 2017

Bryan C. McCannon and John Stevens

The purpose of this paper is to identify whether personality traits can help explain the outcomes that arise in bargaining outcomes.

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to identify whether personality traits can help explain the outcomes that arise in bargaining outcomes.

Design/methodology/approach

Experiments with subjects playing the alternating-offers bargaining game are considered. Both full information and asymmetric information treatments are considered. Subjects also complete standardized Myers-Briggs Type Indicator assessments.

Findings

Personality type measurements are shown to help explain the opening offers, rejections, and resulting wealth in the negotiations. It is shown that interactions between the personality dimensions are important and that the interaction between personality and information play a key role in bargaining outcomes.

Research limitations/implications

The research utilizes laboratory experiments to generate data. This expands our understanding of individual-level behavior, but suffers from the limitation of not replicating realistic bargaining situations.

Practical implications

The work should serve as a guide to organizations to identify traits of effective negotiators.

Social implications

Bargaining is a central economic activity. Being able to identify the root of differences in outcomes from negotiations should be able to inform institutional design issues.

Originality/value

Little work has been done connecting the rich literature in social psychology and management on personality to economic outcomes. The research on bargaining neglects to incorporate individual-level traits into the process. This research begins to bridge this gap and informs both bargaining theory as well as emphasizes on the importance of personality in application.

Details

International Journal of Social Economics, vol. 44 no. 9
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0306-8293

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Article
Publication date: 2 October 2017

Honglin Yang, Erbao Cao, Kevin Jiang Lu and Guoqing Zhang

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. First, the authors…

Abstract

Purpose

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. First, the authors model the optimum revenue sharing contract in a dual-channel supply chain under both the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Second, they contrast the optimal decisions of a dual-channel supply chain between the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Third, they explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors present two main issues associated with revenue sharing contracts to alleviate manufacturer–retailer conflicts in a dual-channel supply chain. In the first issue, a revenue sharing contract is designed in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric cost information conditions, based on the principal-agent model. In the second issue, an optimal revenue sharing contract under full information conditions, based on the Stackelberg game is discussed. They explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value based on comparative static analysis.

Findings

First, the direct sale price is unchanged and independent of the retailer’s cost construct, but the wholesale price increases and the retail sale price does not decrease under asymmetric cost information. The information asymmetry leads to higher direct sale demand and lower retail sale demand. Second, information asymmetry is beneficial for the retailer, but imposes inefficiency on the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Third, the performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved if the retailer’s cost information is shared and the dual-channel supply chain reaches coordination. The retailer is willing to share its cost information if the lump sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up the retailer’s reduced profit due to sharing this information.

Originality/value

The authors proposed a contract menus design model in a dual-channel supply chain. They examine how information asymmetry affects optimal policies and performance. They compared the optimal policies under symmetric information and asymmetric information. Conditions under which the partners prefer sharing information are identified. They quantified the information value from the points of partners and the whole system.

Details

Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, vol. 32 no. 8
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0885-8624

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Article
Publication date: 1 October 2019

Dhruv Gupta

In this paper, the author develops a game theoretical model to understand why Union Government of India, as a third party, has used different schemes at different times in…

Abstract

Purpose

In this paper, the author develops a game theoretical model to understand why Union Government of India, as a third party, has used different schemes at different times in history to assist the State Governments in fighting the Naxalite insurgency. Comparing across schemes, it was found that though Matching Security Grants scheme was preferred in general, during asymmetric information scenario it led to an emergency situation wherein the Union Government had to provide the less preferred Bulk Security Grants. Later, it became difficult to withdraw these grants as the State Governments free rode by reducing own security contribution. The author finds that instead, in this scenario, Matching Development Grants are more suitable, as they incentivize the State Governments to reveal private information and help the Union Government exit its third-party role. For a practitioner involved in conflict resolution, these conclusions imply that as the desirability of policies can change diametrically overtime, Union Government must spend resources only on those heads of expenditure that provide both security and development benefits provided they aid in preventing flow of resources to Naxalites. Further, to end its assistance, the Union Government’s expenditures should also complement the capabilities of the State Government rather than substituting them. These results can also guide policy in other protracted civil wars with substantial third-party intervention, which are common these days.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper is an historical analysis of strategies used by Union and State Governments and Naxalites. The analysis is based on game theoretic tools supported with examples.

Findings

The Union Government must provide matching grants instead of bulk grants such as Central Armed Police Forces, and the grants should be aimed at building complementarities with the state governments’ security contributions. Under asymmetric information scenario, the Union and State Governments reduce their expenses incurred to fight the Naxalites. A Matching Development Grants scheme would have done better. Union Government must spend resources on heads of expenditure that provides both Development and Security benefits, to curb flow of resources to Naxalites, besides complementing the Security Contributions of the State Government.

Research limitations/implications

The research is limited by disaggregated data to test the hypotheses. It is also limited by the data on hidden variables like the contribution of the Naxalites to fighting. The research is also limited to the extent that individual groups in the war like police commanders, politicians and Naxalite commanders are not incorporated. Multiple asymmetric parties are also not considered; that may generalize the model to other theaters of insurgency.

Practical implications

Certain heads of expenditure such as roads, mobile communication, improving quality of investigation, preventing human rights violations by the security forces, etc. are both security and development enhancing. The Union Government's expenditures must be directed toward this end. Therefore, from a practitioner's perspective, the debate between greed and grievances exists not as a limitation but as a guide. The relevant articles of Constitution of India must be redrafted on these principles. Third-party interventions in other insurgencies may be revisited under these conclusions.

Social implications

Security and Development policies are tools for controlling Naxalite insurgency, which can also be used to prevent flow of resources to Naxalites. Security and development policies to resolving insurgencies are useful at different information scenarios. Therefore, information neutral policies should be preferred.

Originality/value

This paper has contributed theoretically in modeling continuing conflicts like Naxalite insurgency, explicitly. The author also shows that though the field of civil wars may have evolved along the Greed vs Grievance debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), for a practitioner, the lines blur when it comes to solutions, as many heads of expenditures have features of both security and development. This paper also shows that when the Union Government faced asymmetric information scenario, the policy of matching development grants would be beneficial in long run though of limited value in short run. This is an important conclusion as the most intense period of violence was preceded by the asymmetric information scenario. Besides, it has relevance for the other civil wars with third-party intervention, such as NATO in Afghanistan.

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Article
Publication date: 24 January 2019

Ilias O. Pappas, Patrick Mikalef, Michail N. Giannakos and Panos E. Kourouthanassis

In the complex ecosystem of mobile applications multiple factors have been used to explain users’ behavior, without though focusing on how different combinations of…

Abstract

Purpose

In the complex ecosystem of mobile applications multiple factors have been used to explain users’ behavior, without though focusing on how different combinations of variables may affect user behavior. The purpose of this paper is to show how price value, game content quality, positive and negative emotions, gender and gameplay time interact with each other to predict high intention to download mobile games.

Design/methodology/approach

Building on complexity theory, the authors present a conceptual model followed by research propositions. The propositions are empirically validated through configurational analysis, employing fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) on 531 active users of mobile games.

Findings

Findings identify ten solutions that explain high intention to download mobile games. Alternative paths are identified depending on the gender and the time users spend playing mobiles games. The authors highlight the role of price value and game content quality, as well as that of positive emotions, which are always core factors when present.

Originality/value

To identify complex interactions among the variables of interest, fsQCA is employed, differentiating from traditional studies using variance-based methods, leading to multiple solutions explaining the same outcome. None of the variables explains the intention to download on its own, but only when they combine with each other. The authors extend existing knowledge on how price value, game content quality, emotions, gender and gameplay time combine to lead to high intention to download mobile games; and present a methodology for how to bridge complexity theory with fsQCA, improving our understanding of intention to adopt mobile applications.

Details

Internet Research, vol. 29 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1066-2243

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Article
Publication date: 20 November 2020

Shujie Yao and Jiefei Wang

The purpose of this paper is to reveal the internal mechanism of the deviation of targeted poverty alleviation under the condition of asymmetric information.

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to reveal the internal mechanism of the deviation of targeted poverty alleviation under the condition of asymmetric information.

Design/methodology/approach

Introducing a traditional signaling game theory model with dynamic asymmetric information, this study uses a dataset covering 813 poor households from Southern Xinjiang, China, to theoretically and empirically study the effect of aspiration of the poor households on poverty alleviation.

Findings

First, there exists asymmetric information between the poor households and village leaders. Second, the “short, arbitrary and fast” poverty alleviation approach may quickly pull people out of poverty, but it may also nurture a dependency culture where poor households lose their aspiration and ability to escape poverty through their own efforts. Third, due to long lasting universal state support, poor households in the national designated poor counties are less able and ambitious to escape poverty by themselves than their counterparts living in the national nondesignated areas.

Originality/value

The research results show that pro-poor development policies should be upheld to improve the residual utility that can benefit all households as a result of the poverty alleviation campaign. Relevant policy recommendations are made for China's continuous effort to fight relative poverty beyond 2020.

Details

China Agricultural Economic Review, vol. 13 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1756-137X

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Article
Publication date: 25 February 2019

Longxiao Li, Xu Wang, Yun Lin, Fuli Zhou and Shan Chen

In the context of sharing economy and online shopping, establishing a stable urban joint distribution alliance (JDA) is extremely necessary for the entire logistics…

Abstract

Purpose

In the context of sharing economy and online shopping, establishing a stable urban joint distribution alliance (JDA) is extremely necessary for the entire logistics service market. The purpose of this paper is to rationally allocate the profits and determine the most stable allocation scheme for the urban JDA as well as provide a direction for cooperation between express enterprises and lead managers to pay more attention to the comprehensive performance.

Design/methodology/approach

Cooperative game-based methodologies including the proportion method, the core theory, nucleolus and Shapley value have been employed. Four criteria consisting of enterprise operation, customer satisfaction, environmental sustainability and information technology have been incorporated into Shapley value for improvement.

Findings

This paper reveals that express enterprises in logistics service market can achieve more benefit from JDA than those who operate separately. Among proposed profit allocation schemes, improved Shapley value scheme shows more rationality by considering partners’ asymmetric contribution. Besides, a stable alliance can be always ensured with partners’ lower propensity to disrupt and relatively balanced negotiation power under improved Shapley value scheme.

Originality/value

This paper makes a few attempts to contribute to the literature on the improvement of Shapley value and applies the concept of “propensity to disrupt” into the field of logistics. Besides, this paper provides various profit allocation schemes and incorporates influencing factors into Shapley value for an improvement thus helping policy-makers make better-informed decisions on urban distribution. Additionally, a case study based on urban express enterprises in Southwest China has been conducted to verify the proposed profit allocation schemes.

Details

Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics, vol. 31 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1355-5855

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Book part
Publication date: 24 May 2011

Frank C. Zagare

This chapter explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives, both generally and specifically. First, a causal…

Abstract

This chapter explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives, both generally and specifically. First, a causal explanation of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 is developed within the confines of a game-theoretic model of asymmetric or unilateral deterrence. Then some methodological obstacles that may arise in more complex cases are discussed and suggestions for overcoming them are offered. Finally, the advantages of using game models to more fully understand real world events are highlighted.

Details

Frontiers of Peace Economics and Peace Science
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-85724-701-8

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Article
Publication date: 4 December 2018

Xue Chen, Bo Li and Simin An

A lack of visibility into the manufacturer’s production cost information impedes a retailer’s ability to maximize her own profits, especially when market demand is…

Abstract

Purpose

A lack of visibility into the manufacturer’s production cost information impedes a retailer’s ability to maximize her own profits, especially when market demand is uncertain. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of an option contract within a one-period two-echelon supply chain in the presence of asymmetric cost information.

Design/methodology/approach

Based on the principal-agent model, the retailer, acting as a Stackelberg leader, offers a menu of option contracts to mitigate the risk of uncertain demand and reveal asymmetric production cost information. The optimal contract in asymmetric and symmetric information scenarios is derived. Finally, the impact of production costs on the optimal contracts and the actors’ profits is explored by numerical experiments.

Findings

By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions in two scenarios, the authors show that asymmetric cost information has a large impact on the optimal option contract and profits. In addition, information rent is affected by the type differential. The results prove that the level of information asymmetry plays a vital role in option contracts and profits.

Originality/value

Different from the existing literature on private demand information, this paper considers a supply chain with asymmetric cost information in the context of option contracts. Interestingly, not only the production cost but also the probability of a low production cost can affect the option strike price. In addition, from the perspective of the manufacturer, a high cost does not always bring a high information rent. These findings can provide some guidance to decision-makers.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. 48 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

Keywords

1 – 10 of over 2000