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This paper aims to manage better the conflicts in labor disputes by improving the understanding of mediation dynamics from a game-theoretical perspective.

Signaling game model is adapted to a hypothetical labor dispute based on the legislative regulations on the mandatory mediation system in Turkey.

The paper determines mediation equilibria in which both players get positive payoffs. Analysis of the mediation equilibria helps to improve the understanding about the litigation and mediation dynamics depending on the variables. The variables are clearly separated from each other due to their reverse effects on strategy choices of the parties. Mediation payoff and litigation cost are characterized by their incentive effects on mediation preferences, whereas mediation fee and litigation payoff are characterized by their disincentive effect. While increasing amounts of incentive variables strengthen the mediation tendency of the employee, increasing amounts of disincentive variables reveal the opposite effect. Furthermore, the analysis also indicates that if the litigation payoff is too small to recover litigation costs, accepting the mediation becomes the optimal strategy. This prediction is contrary to that of traditional game-theoretic litigation/settlement models, in which small-claim disputes typically cannot be settled.

The assumption that the mediation fee is not a part of the litigation cost eliminates the disincentive effect of mediation fee and makes it neutral on the strategy choice of employee.

This paper first analyzes the strategic role of mediation in labor disputes by using a signaling game. Despite its mediation focus, the paper also provides practical insights for litigation.

The purpose of this study is to establish a comprehensive service recovery mechanism by analyzing different behaviors of customers with different personality traits after service failures and by proposing different service recovery measures that service providers could adopt based on diverse customer personality traits.

This paper constructs a service recovery mechanism based on a signaling game theory by considering customers and service providers as two players in the game and analyzing possible outcomes under both separating and pooling equilibria to achieve an optimized strategy and set of actions that allow the highest payoffs for both service providers and customers.

This study successfully simulated the separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium between service providers and customers in a signaling game with incomplete information. It also provides a reference for service providers to design service recovery strategies after service failures. By using this model, when facing problems related to service failures and service recovery, service providers will have a better chance of increasing the service recovery success rate, improving customer satisfaction and achieving optimal payoffs for both themselves and their customers.

Based on concepts of service science, this study designed a service recovery mechanism by applying the signaling game from game theory and introducing personality traits theory to the service recovery scenario so that service providers are able to execute service recovery after service failures more effectively. This study proposed a service recovery mechanism based on the perspectives of both service providers and customers, considering the mutual influence of key variables related to both of them, as well as the context of service failures, customers’ personality traits and service providers’ available resources. Many studies have applied personality traits to different fields; however, to the best of authors’ knowledge, few studies have applied this concept to service-related subjects, and only the influence of employees’ personality traits on service providers has been discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a game-theoretical model for commercial bank foreign direct investment strategy, government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system. Government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system.

The paper develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the optimality of the limiting entry strategy followed by a given domestic institutional sector when considering the entry applications of foreign banks in the domestic financial system. The model analyzes the strategic options available to an emerging market country with a relatively underdeveloped banking system when deciding whether or not and to what extent allow for the entrance of better reputed and more technologically advanced foreign banks in its domestic financial system.

The paper shows that the progressive liberalization of entry restrictions would define the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subsequent set of continuation games and the respective payoffs derived from this liberalization as the domestic economy integrates and competes within the global financial system.

Banks operating in the international financial market have incentives to invest directly in emerging market economies and governments have incentives in allowing foreign banks entry to their market. As banking systems in these economies are generally underdeveloped, opening the financial system to foreign competitors could lead to a decrease in the market share of local banks. Eventually foreign banks could control the banking system and could de facto control the money supply.

The paper aims to expand the authors' knowledge on gamification and the signals sent on behalf of the organization when gamified assessments are used. The authors examine the mechanisms through which the use of gamification into an assessment method may increase the attractiveness of an organization as a prospective employer.

The first study examines, following a longitudinal design, the signals that an organization sends to applicants about the organization's symbolic traits (e.g. innovativeness), through the characteristics of a gamified assessment, in terms of enjoyment and flow and impact on organizational attractiveness. Upon clarifying this mechanism, the second study uses an experimental design to provide evidence that people's perceived enjoyment and flow is enhanced when a gamified version of a situational judgment test (SJT) is used, leading to more positive perceptions of organizational characteristics and attractiveness.

Positive perceptions of the characteristics of a gamified assessment influenced the attractiveness of the organization via the symbolic organizational traits.

Organizations should be aware of the signals sent to applicants when different assessment formats (such as gamified assessments) are used.

The authors' findings contribute to gamification and signaling theory by testing a signaling mechanism in a novel and timely assessment context.

This paper aims to study the preferences of the supply chain (SC) members on various power structures under demand information asymmetry considering competing retailers.

A two-level SC with one manufacturer and two retailers is designed. The retailers are in Bertrand competition. The manufacturer who holds the confidential demand information chooses the appropriate information sharing (IS) format. Three IS formats are provided, i.e. no IS (the manufacturer never shares with the retailers), partial IS (the manufacturer shares with one retailer), full IS (the manufacturer shares with all retailers). In addition, the authors model two power structures based on the decision sequences in the SC, i.e. retailers or manufacturer-dominant SC. The authors characterize the equilibrium solutions and payoffs and then investigate the members’ preferences for IS formats.

It is shown that in retailers (manufacturer)-dominant SC, the retailers prefer full (no) IS, but the manufacturer prefers no (full) IS. Moreover, the authors analyze the members’ preferences on power structures under demand information asymmetry, which has a relationship with the degrees of demand uncertainty and competition intensity.

The analysis regarding the preferences of the SC members on power structure under demand information asymmetry provides valuable managerial insights to enhance cooperation and achieve a win-win result.

Examines the power of market signalling through a market simulation. Finds that use of marketing signals by firms within an industry is positively related to the profitability of the industry and the profits of the individual firms within the industry. The marginal contribution by the addition of another signaller to the industry is significant. However, there is a negative incentive for a firm to be the only signaller within an industry. This “lone man out” phenomenon puts a firm at a competitive disadvantage to the other firms within its industry. A “temporal pattern recognition deficiency” also seems to exist which inhibits managers from finding patterns of behaviour over time.

This study explores how organizations deal with divergent institutional logics when designing new products. Specifically, we investigate how organizations approach and embody institutional complexity in their product design. Through a multimodal study of serious games, we identify two design strategies, the proximity and the amplification strategies, which organizations employ to balance multiple institutional logics and design novel products that meet competing institutional expectations. Our study makes an important theoretical contribution by showing how institutional complexity can be a source of innovation. We also make a methodological contribution by developing a new, multimodal research design that allows for the in-depth study of organizational artifacts. Altogether, we complement our understanding of how institutional complexity is substantiated in organizational artifacts and highlight the role that multimodality plays in analyzing such situations.

This experiment analyzes multi-offer versions of the signaling and screening litigation games, as well as a bilateral multi-offer litigation game. A plaintiff has either a low or a high claim on an uninformed defendant, and the two negotiate in an attempt to reach a pre-trial settlement. Trial is costly, and settlement generates surplus over which the two parties can bargain. In the signaling game, the defendant has the power to make the offer, while the plaintiff makes the offer in the screening game. Previous experiments on single-offer games find that disputes occur even when offers contain surplus not predicted under the theory, and fairness appears to be important in explaining deviations from theory. This research examines whether renegotiation in the form of successive sequential offers can yield efficiency gains via lower dispute rates. There are four main findings. One, under the one-sided multi-offer structure the excess dispute rate is 23 percentage-points lower in the screening game, and the high-offer dispute rate is 31 percentage-points lower in signaling game. The bilateral game yields an additional 15 percentage-point reduction in the high-offer dispute rate, but excess disputes persist. Two, in these games, proposers take advantage of the multi-offer opportunity and make around three to four offers per negotiation. Three, across games the surplus in a fair offer remains constant at about one-sixth of the surplus, but the empirical benchmark from which this is measured varies according to which player has the power to make the offer. In the one-sided games, the benchmark is the respective zero-surplus endpoint, but in the bilateral game the benchmark is the surplus midpoint. Fourth, dynamic behavior plays an important but complex role in observed outcomes. Multi-offer mechanisms may be alternatives to costly information transmission mechanisms like disclosure or discovery.

Upstream suppliers attempt to outsource product after-sales services to midstream third-party service providers while selling the product directly to downstream sellers, forming a networked supply chain. However, a problem of information asymmetry in the market demand among supply chain members exists. The authors investigate the impact of demand information asymmetry among third-party service providers, upstream suppliers and downstream sellers in the supply chain on the supplier's contract selection under the networked framework.

The authors establish a model in which the supplier can use a wholesale price contract and facilitate a signaling game between the third-party service provider and the seller. Conversely, the supplier could use a menu contract to establish an incentive mechanism to solve information asymmetry. The authors propose heuristic algorithms to quickly estimate a supplier's optimal profit.

The results show that when the demand forecasting bias is relatively small, the use of a menu contract by the supplier could eliminate information asymmetry; when the demand forecasting bias is large enough, the signaling mechanism between the third-party service provider and the seller could alleviate the double marginalization effect in the supply chain. Although it is common to solve the asymmetric information problem by establishing incentive mechanisms, the authors found that in the latter case, the supplier is better off when no incentive mechanisms are implemented in the networked supply chain.

This study compares screening and signaling effects and compares firms' profits in both cases.