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This paper investigates the impact of refusal to deal by a monopoly supplier of an essential input on firms’ investments in product quality, consumer surplus, and net social welfare.

The paper uses a standard economic model of endogenous quality choice for horizontally differentiated products to compare market performance with and without refusal do deal.

Refusal to deal increases the payoff of the integrated firm and reduces equilibrium investment in quality, consumer surplus, and net social welfare if varieties are moderate or good substitutes. If varieties are poor substitutes, the integrated firm maximizes its payoff setting a wholesale price that allows the downstream rival a small economic profit.

The analysis presented here implies that it is actual rivalry in the development of high-quality substitute varieties that promotes consumer welfare, and that such rivalry is ill served by the exercise of market power in input markets and by the refusal of vertically integrated upstream firms to deal with their nonintegrated downstream rivals. Reliance on the lure of monopoly profit to get good market performance is misplaced.

The paper sets out to reconcile some puzzles observed in the cellular mobile telecommunications industry. European auctions for 3G services led to unprecedented high spectrum licence fees in some countries. Some firms paying such high upfront fees did eventually forfeit rolling out the network or launching services. However, similar events happened in other countries, where the spectrum was assigned free but some licence holders decided not to launch services. The question therefore is why do some firms not pick up business opportunities provided by access to apparently scarce inputs? The paper presents an analytical framework to explore the conditions for such situations to arise.

In order to achieve a desirable level of market efficiency, regulators need to identify the strategic groups within an industry and understand the way the constituent groups relate to one another. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

In the current study, factors that may lead to strategic group formation were developed and used as clustering variables in a k-means cluster statistical analysis to categorize the firms into strategic groups. The factors used are entry costs, timing of entry, technology type and scope of operations. In addition, the number and type of competitive actions employed by the firms in the industry were identified by structured content analysis of a public source. The competitive actions were used to examine the dynamics of the resulting groups within the context of competitive behavior, resource and scope commitments and corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions. In addition, χ2 analysis was employed to ascertain the likelihood that actions of a firm will be responded to by firms from the same group or from outside the group.

License fees was found to be the most significant clustering variable. The study also showed that groups with significantly higher license fees carried out considerably more competitive actions, had higher resource and scope commitments and executed more CSR actions. In addition, the study revealed significantly more competition within strategic groups than between groups.

The absence of financial records for firms in the sample necessitated the use of CSR activity as a measure of firm performance. Some empirical studies have shown strong links between CSR and firm performance.

The study revealed high mobility barriers which prevent ease of movement of firms in the industry from one strategic group to the other. Therefore regulators who wish to promote competition must do so by identifying the strategic groups with significant market power and permitting entry not by lowering entry barriers but by allowing the entry of firms with proven resources similar to the firms in those groups and to stipulate similar commitments in entry conditions. The results also offer management practitioners an insight into competitive behavior in the industry.

The study utilized a unique data set (competitive actions of firms in the Nigerian Telecommunications industry as reported in the media) in contributing to empirical studies on competitive dynamics and strategic group literature.

The purpose of this paper is to make a critical review of the introduction of first third generation (3G) mobile services and the evolution of market structure. It aims to look for reasons for the poor market performance of 3G.

The study analyses market data from 17 Western European countries and tests propositions with statistical methods.

The paper finds that there is evidence in support of to the “overbidding” hypothesis, i.e. license fees determined in auctions were higher than ultimately compatible with the originally envisaged market structure based on the n+1 rule. 3G markets therefore are more concentrated than 2G markets. The correct design of market structure is crucial for accelerating the speed of introduction of 3G services: the speed increases with the number of licenses granted, but decreases with the number of idle licenses. Auctions are not superior to other methods with respect to speed of innovation.

This is the first study of this kind and should be read by academics or practitioners dealing with regulation, spectrum licensing and technology forecasting.

This paper aims to investigate how dynamic capabilities enabled survival in a select group of brewers, during one of the lengthiest and most severe industry consolidations in history. In doing so, we advance Abell’s (1978) theory of strategic windows through integration with the resource-based view of the firm.

Using a mixed method approach, we first apply case study methods to develop hypotheses around the timing and level of operational capability required for survival. In the second phase, we test these hypothesized estimations on the USA Brewing population.

Indicate that brewers which had advanced distribution and manufacturing operational capabilities before the strategic window of opportunity closed had higher survival rates.

This study reinforces the importance of making timely strategic investments in capabilities.

The integration of strategic window and capability theories advances our understanding of the roles that capabilities and time play in determining firm survival.

The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to review the literature in order to assess the opportunities and the possible welfare effects of differentiation strategies in the food market; and second, to analyse the current structure and organisation of the fresh produce market (fruit, vegetable, and salad) in the light of new product procurement, innovation, and differentiation policies carried out by retailers at the global level.

The paper used a single dyadic case study across two countries (Italy and the UK): the primary producer is engaged in “partner” supply to a principal category management intermediary for channel leading multiple retailers.

First, equilibrium in differentiated markets is not stable, and a welfare assessment is difficult. Second, a differentiation strategy in the market for fresh produce might benefit retailers more than in other sectors, which seem to be consistent with the theoretical findings. Third, when retailers engage in product differentiation it is more likely that channel relationships shift from collaborative to competitive types, with the power imbalance becoming the disciplinary means by which vertical coordination is achieved and maintained.

This article was based on a single case study.

For suppliers it could be wise to agree to some inequity as the cost of doing business, especially when smart large retailers carry out successfully competitive strategies with positive spill‐over effects on the upstream firms.

Using the industrial economic literature on the effects of differentiation strategies (horizontal and vertical differentiation) on market structure, firms' performance, and welfare effects, this paper analyses case findings from a study in the fresh produce industry and will be of interest to those within the field.

To provide an evaluation of an EU spectrum policy proposal aimed at furthering the goals of the i2010 Information Society initiative.

This paper revisits the methodology premised on neoclassical principles devised by Ronald Coase. An evaluation of EU spectrum reform based on the work of J.R. Commons is proposed.

The approach by Coase fails to take into account the need for institutional reform of the spectrum management process. The approach of J.R. Commons identifies areas that will have to be addressed if the proposals for EU spectrum reform are to be met.

The methodology advanced by J.R. Commons provides a more complete account of interdependent variables associated with spectrum management and is likely to lead to workable solutions to this complex policy problem. However, it is less theoretically coherent than Coase's model.

Recommendations for reform and problem areas are suggested that consider both market and extra‐market valuation of the spectrum resource.

This paper addresses this issue and provides an alternative model based on institutional economic analysis using the methodology given by J.R. Commons.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate empirically that corruption causes significant and sizeable macroeconomic costs to countries in terms of economic activity and economic growth. The authors modeled corruption building on the endogenous growth literature and finally estimated the baseline (bribes paid to public officials) macroeconomic cost of corruption using Argentina 2004-2015 as a case study.

The authors laid the foundations of a new methodology to account corruption losses using data from the national accounts and judiciary investigations within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) non-observed economy (NOE) instead of subjective indicators as in the earlier literature. They also suggested a new method to compute public expenditures overruns, including but not limited to public works.

The authors found the costs stand at a minimum accumulated rate of 8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) or 0.8 per cent yearly. These findings provided a corruption cost floor and were consistent with earlier research on world corruption losses estimated at 5 per cent by the World Economic Forum and with the losses estimated at between a yearly rate of 1.3 and 4 per cent and 2 per cent of GDP by Brazil and Peru’s corruption, respectively.

The authors would need to extend the application of their new suggested methodology to further countries. They are working on this. They would need to develop the methodology in full to compute the public works overruns input to future econometric work.

In this paper, the authors make a threefold contribution to the literature on corruption and growth: first, they laid the foundations toward a new methodology to make an accounting of the corruption costs in terms of GDP consistent with the national accounts and executed budgets; on the one hand, and the OECD NOE framework, on the other. The authors named those corruption costs as percentage of GDP the “corruption wedge.” Second, they developed an example taking corruption events and a component of their total costs, namely, the bribes paid to public officials, taking Argentina 2004-2015 as a case study. Finally, they plugged the estimated wedge back into an endogenous growth model and calibrated the growth–corruption path simulating two economies where the total factor productivity was different, at different levels of the corruption wedge.

Based on definition and characteristic analysis, this paper seeks to propose a formation mechanism of knowledge rigidity, which is constituted by the effects of three precipitating factors: time‐effectiveness of knowledge, reinforcing effectiveness, and sunk cost effect in knowledge selection mechanism.

By presenting knowledge time‐effectiveness model, reinforcing effectiveness model, and knowledge selection mechanism, the paper theoretically analyzes firms' rigid behavior of knowledge application. Theories of increasing returns and sunk cost are introduced to explain the formation process of knowledge rigidity in firms. Two cases are presented to analyze the knowledge rigidity in industrial firms basing on the proposed models and mechanism.

First, the lifecycle of knowledge rigidity is dynamically defined by knowledge time‐effectiveness. Second, the degree of rigidity and firm's dependence on specific knowledge are enhanced by reinforcing effectiveness during the process of application. At the end of the life cycle, the sunk cost mainly hinders a firm's decision making to replace ineffective knowledge.

Quantitative research is needed to further explore the formation mechanism of knowledge rigidity and to present operational approaches for practitioners. The proposed models and mechanism are useful for understanding the knowledge rigidity and analyzing its formation mechanism in firms.

This paper provides theoretical support to realize knowledge rigidity in KM practice. Three indicators were proposed to evaluate the rigidity and action suggestions were given to help control knowledge rigidity in firms.

Causal analysis models and a formation mechanism are proposed to show how knowledge rigidity forms.