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The purpose of this paper is to examine the dramatically changed role of Russia in the global economy since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the Soviet institutions collapsed and were either reformed or replaced in a new Russian institutional landscape. The paper presents a fact-based and balanced view of Russia’s evolving role in the global economy, as distinguished from the sometimes one-sided view presented by some Western commentators. The authors establish that the two countervailing views are fundamentally based on different cultural perspectives about institutions, primarily the roles of business and government.

This paper is developed as a perspectives article drawing upon the decades of academic and business experience of all three authors with Russian business, management and the economy. The paper focuses on the structure of Russian institutional change and places it within the historical context of the challenges of various periods of time from the late 1980s to the present. The authors posit that cultural foundations complicate that institutional evolution.

Russia will remain a major player in world markets for energy, raw materials and armaments for the near future at least. Principal institutional questions facing Russia have to do with how to reduce the country’s overall dependence on raw material exports, with its vulnerability to world market fluctuations, and how to modernize Russian economic and political institutions. The degree of success in addressing these questions will depend largely upon the ability of the new and reformed economic institutions to show the flexibility to respond to changes in the global order, on whether political considerations will continue to supersede economic issues, and how markedly cultural traditions will continue to impede positive changes.

The entire system of international trade is under question, disrupted by the growing nationalism that is threatening the globalization that became institutionalized over decades in the wake of the Second World War. Russia’s future role is partially dependent upon how new patterns of international trade develop in response to the current disruption of established trade regimes, and by how political conflicts are expressed economically. The authors observe that Russia’s historical and cultural traditions, especially acquiescence to a highly centralized government with a strong autocratic leader, limit the country’s options. The authors explore how Russia’s reactions to Western sanctions have led to a new strategic approach, moving away from full engagement in the global economy to selective economic, and sometimes political, alliances with primarily non-Western countries, most notably China. The authors contrast Russia’s situation with that of China, which has been able to make substantial economic progress while still embracing a strong, centralized political institutional structure.

Many Western analysts have viewed Russian institutional evolution very critically through the lens of Western politics and sanctions, while Russia has continued along its own path of economic and institutional development. Each view, the authors argue, is based upon differing cultural perspectives of the roles of business and government. As a result, a distinct difference exists between the Western and Russian perspectives on Russia’s role in the world. This paper presents both points of view and explores the future of Russia’s position in the world economy based upon its evolving strategy for national economic policy. The authors contrast the situations of Russia and China, highlighting how Western-centric cultural views have affected perceptions of each country, sometimes similarly and at times with decided differences.

Looks briefly at where China has done better than the Russian Federation in the process of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. Examines various possible reasons for the different degree of success, drawn from such disciplines as economics, political science, international relations and history, as well the administration and processes adopted, and the cultures involved. Finally, considers a cross‐discipline explanation. Concludes that it is neither possible nor desirable to seek a single explanation for such a complex question. Draws some tentative conclusions about what we can learn from the experiences of both.

Throughout the past 30 years, major economic reforms have been implemented in China; in 2001, China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was a major step, since it enabled the country to formally join the globalised world. But China entered the WTO without market economy status (MES), meaning that other countries can easily use the WTO international settlement body in antidumping procedures against Chinese firms. Since joining the WTO, Chinese authorities have repeatedly attempted to gain this status, arguing that considerable progress has been made in dealing with dumping, and that the transition process from a planned to a market economy (ME) has been considerable. This paper aims to explore the issues surrounding this situation.

The authors searched the literature in order to understand the reasons why China has been denied the MES until now, according to previous analyses, in order to confront those findings with their own ideas on the subject. Moreover, they list the criteria used by the USA and the European Union (EU) in order to justify the non‐recognition of China as an ME, and they question whether the Chinese economy meets those criteria.

The paper assesses the extent of the reforms implemented, and determines the further stages that are needed in the transition process.

This paper is a viewpoint that enables readers to have a more precise idea of the present situation of the Chinese economy in terms of being or not an ME, an issue that is often raised but with no clear‐cut conclusion.

A high quality of corporate governance practices is important for a sustainable development of an economy. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the convergence and adaption of corporate governance practices in emerging markets. It shows how Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) firms apply international standards of good corporate governance and which factors affect the quality of corporate governance practices in BRIC countries.

The authors use country and firm-level data from the BRIC countries and apply statistical models to identify the convergence of corporate governance practices. In all, 135 largest firms from Brazil, Russia, China, and India are analyzed.

The study shows that firms from BRIC countries adapt to international best practices in corporate governance beyond the official requirements by national corporate governance codes. International institutions positively influence BRIC firms to apply international standards of good corporate governance. National corporate governance regimes (Anglo-American, Continental-European, and mixed systems) follow path dependencies and lead to differences in corporate governance practices among firms in different regimes.

Only a small number of 13 corporate governance best practices and a small number of countries have been selected and coded for this analysis. The presented results have to be interpreted with some caution.

The study concludes with practical and specific insights for investors, managers, and policy makers on the importance of national government regimes and international institutions on corporate governance practices. Investors in BRIC need to better understand the contrasting governance environments in emerging markets, and their effects on corporate governance practices in each country. The findings suggest that corporate governance should be studied by considering multilevel antecedents on a country-, industry-, and firm-level.

The purpose of this paper is to measure the influence of corruption distance (CD) on foreign direct investment (FDI) with the characteristics of the value function from the Prospect Theory (PT) such as loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity.

Data are derived from Transparency International and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and tested on the countries China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Russia, Spain and the UK and are analysed with a natural log (LN) regression model.

The findings indicate a negative asymmetric relationship for China, Germany, Korea, Spain and Russia. This means that negative performance on CD will not have greater impact on FDI outflows than positive performance on CD in the same country. Loss aversion, as well as diminishing sensitivity, as suggested by the PT, cannot be supported with the empirical results.

Its originality lies in contributing and extending knowledge on CD on FDI in several ways. First, it analyses the data of emerging and industrialized countries, namely, Russia, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain and the UK. Second, a potential asymmetric impact is explained by the characteristics of the hypothetical value function of the PT. Third, it seeks empirical evidence by applying an econometric model developed to analyse the variables CD and FDI.

Nonaka (1990) makes the distinction between generic knowledge that can be applied in many similar contexts, and local knowledge that can be best applied in a specific local context. Israel (1987) and Fukuyama (2004) point out that “high specificity” tasks (i.e. with clear objectives, and using well-defined technologies) with low transaction volume are more likely to be performed successfully by organizations across a wide range of cultural contexts. In this spirit, Friedman (2005, pp. 313–323) observes that countries can benefit from the “flat world” through a combination of “reform wholesale” and “reform retail”. The former entails market-centered reforms such as privatization, deregulation, reducing trade barriers, and adopting flexible labor laws. A handful of leaders in each country have pushed through such reforms in a wide range of cultural contexts including the developed OECD countries, plus many others such as Brazil, India, Mexico, Russia, China, and other East Asian “tiger” economies. The latter entails upgrading infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and education and health standards. Unlike the former, the latter reforms cannot be instituted by a handful of leaders, but require broad changes at many levels of society. Although the end results in countries successful at “reform retail” have many similarities (e.g. healthy, well-educated citizens) the steps toward achieving the results are very different, depending on culture and other contextual factors.