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The purpose of this paper is to examine one of the largest data sets on the hashtag use of #fakenews that comprises over 14m tweets sent by more than 2.4m users.

Tweets referencing the hashtag (#fakenews) were collected for a period of over one year from January 3 to May 7 of 2018. Bot detection tools were employed, and the most retweeted posts, most mentions and most hashtags as well as the top 50 most active users in terms of the frequency of their tweets were analyzed.

The majority of the top 50 Twitter users are more likely to be automated bots, while certain users’ posts like that are sent by President Donald Trump dominate the most retweeted posts that always associate mainstream media with fake news. The most used words and hashtags show that major news organizations are frequently referenced with a focus on CNN that is often mentioned in negative ways.

The research study is limited to the examination of Twitter data, while ethnographic methods like interviews or surveys are further needed to complement these findings. Though the data reported here do not prove direct effects, the implications of the research provide a vital framework for assessing and diagnosing the networked spammers and main actors that have been pivotal in shaping discourses around fake news on social media. These discourses, which are sometimes assisted by bots, can create a potential influence on audiences and their trust in mainstream media and understanding of what fake news is.

This paper offers results on one of the first empirical research studies on the propagation of fake news discourse on social media by shedding light on the most active Twitter users who discuss and mention the term “#fakenews” in connection to other news organizations, parties and related figures.

The objective of this chapter is to outline the problem of information security in Russia and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries since 2000. It demonstrates the specifics of Russian propaganda in the CEE, which visibly poses a security threat to those countries. To address this issue, the authors present the evolution of Russian information policy, propaganda, its tools and instruments (traditional and social media), and examine the mechanisms of exerting social influence used in practice in the CEE countries. The authors discuss the implications of Russia’s information war with the West and for the CEE states’ domestic problems, which provide vast opportunities for Russian activity in the region. Changes in information policy and information management are bound to a revision of Russian foreign policy. The authors assumed that the information war in the CEE is not directed toward the countries of this region but rather aims to weaken the West, especially the European Union. Moreover, there is a need to speak out about the rise of populism and extremist movements exploited through Russian media influence to undermine regional stability and weaken state authorities. Additionally, it is suggested more attention should be paid to education and public awareness. The lack of new media literacy skills, together with the combination of populism and pro-Russia business links in the CEE states, will increase their vulnerabilities to more risks than information security.

As fake news and other disinformation are spread primarily online and erode trust in experts and institutions, they challenge the role of librarians as information gatekeepers. Experts have advocated for libraries to educate the public to resist misinformation, yet libraries cannot assume sole responsibility for information literacy work. In this chapter, the authors explore several successful information literacy programs in Ukraine, whose fake news problems made global headlines in 2014, when the Russian annexation of Crimea was accompanied by a flood of crude but effective disinformation. The authors look particularly at the Learn to Discern programs established by the international non-profit organization IREX to foster information literacy using techniques grounded in interdisciplinary expertise and carefully evaluated through pilot studies and follow-up evaluations. These programs train instructors through workshops and provide them with materials. In the first program, aimed at the general public, many of the instructors were librarians, and library facilities were heavily used to deliver the public training. In the second program, information literacy was integrated into the public school curriculum and thousands of teachers were trained to deliver expertly designed materials for particular grade levels and subjects. The authors also consider the special challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, both as a source for new forms of misinformation and as a disruptor of training previously delivered in tightly packed libraries and classrooms. These Ukrainian programs demonstrate the potential for fighting fake news and other misinformation on a scale far beyond what could be accomplished by individual libraries acting alone.

Yet, at the beginning of the 21st century, Russia has found itself in search of a lost national identity. The communist regime has collapsed, country has broken into separate nations and it has suffered a decade of deep social reform. Russian identity inevitably is, and should be, multidimensional. Russian self-perception and self-value vis-à-vis the West is an important component of this identity. The combined (but internally split) essence of Russian civilization is often defined as Eurasian. For years, Russian civilization was a mixture of European and Asian. The School of Eurasianism, which interprets Russia’s relationship with Europe and Asia, has recently been rejuvenated, based on the work of Russian political classical thinkers like N. Danilevskyi, N. Berdyaev, L. Gumilev, L. Karsavin, V. Illyin, P. Savitskyi, and N. Trubetskoy. Classical Eurasianism is aimed at overcoming the seemingly irreconcilable contradiction between the well known Slavophil and Westerner schools. Through this dialogue, debates about Russian policy toward the West have returned (after decades of Soviet ideology), seeking a middle path between the purity of Slavophils and the extremist Westerner views.