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This paper aims to highlight the role of the CEO’s background in the stock market reaction to a product recall. Based on the upper echelons theory and the crisis management literature, we argue that the CEO’s background influences the expected response in a product harm crisis and the updating of investors’ expectations following a product recall announcement. We test if the CEO’s background influences the abnormal stock market returns around product recalls and how it affects the way investors interpret the recall strategy and severity.

We use an event study, for a sample of 2,576 product recalls in the US automobile industry, between January 2010 and June 2021.

We observe that the stock market’s reaction is less negative if the firm’s CEO presents a core specialist background and for firms led by insider CEOs. This result is in line with our argument that in the presence of a crisis that requires operational and firm-specific knowledge, such as product recalls, the best alignment in terms of the CEO’s background occurs when the CEO was recruited inside and is a core specialist. Finally, we also find that the CEO’s background has a moderating effect on the impact of the recall strategy and severity on the stock market reaction to a recall announcement. In particular, a recall with high severity has a more negative stock market reaction when the CEO is a core specialist as such an event is not expected by the market.

These results have important implications for practitioners and scholars working in the areas of product quality and corporate governance. Given the high frequency and high costs for firms to carry out these operations in the automobile industry, we recommend a careful analysis of the CEO’s background before their appointment as well as careful planning to prevent and to adequately react appropriately to product quality problems. While there is a common tendency among executives to cut discretionary expenditures such as spending on product safety, our results regarding the stock market reaction to product recall announcements suggest that investors expect firms led by insider and core specialist CEOs to be more likely to ensure product quality and to respond to product quality crisis.

We extend knowledge of product recalls by studying the role of the CEO’s background on the stock market reaction to product recall announcements.

This study aims to explore the impacts of the knowledge structure of CEO on corporate innovation strategy in the background of China’s national policy of innovation-driven development.

Regression analysis is used to test the direct effects and the moderating roles of financial and power incentives. It screens 685 listed companies from Chinese stock market, with the time window from 2016 to 2018.

CEO’s knowledge breadth has a significant impact on innovation strategy, but the moderating effects of power and financial incentives are not significant. CEO’s knowledge depth is negatively correlated to corporate innovation strategy; moreover, power incentive significantly strengthens the relationship, whereas financial incentive significantly weakens it.

Firms are suggested to optimize CEO knowledge structure and organizational incentive system for better implementing innovation-driven development strategy.

It is beneficial to the exploration of the micro-mechanism that enables corporate innovation strategy. Scholars may gain additional insights into the strategic management of corporate innovation from the perspective of CEO’s knowledge structure.

This chapter investigates whether core competence of managers and their expansive (vs. specialized) managerial style affects firms' innovative ability, capacity, and efficiency. Using exogenous CEO departures as a natural experiment, it establishes a causal link between managerial capability and innovation. Importantly, it reveals that firms with talented managers receive significantly more nonself citations; make significantly lower self-citations and lesser citations to the others, indicating novel and explorative innovation achievements. Also, managers with higher general (specialized) ability are cited more (less) by patents from a wider range of fields. Lastly, career concern is identified as a mechanism linking higher ability and innovation.

Do female CEOs face a compensation gap? The purpose of this paper is to examine whether gender affects the total compensation of today’s CEOs, and whether it moderates ten factors influencing their total compensation.

Taking the 54 female CEOs cited in the US 2014 Fortune’s 1000 report, a matched sample of male CEOs was selected, matched according to the crosstab of age by education and by the sizes of the companies directed by these female CEOs.

Using four years’ worth of Fortune reports, between 2013 and 2016, this matched sample indicates that female CEOs are not discriminated against in terms of total compensation. However, eight factors do show a significant effect on total compensation. Using moderation analysis, the present study reveals how gender interacts with company size, sector, membership of outside boards and nature of previous experience.

This paper addresses an important and under-researched gap, with contradictory findings in the existing literature, by compiling and testing the characteristics of male and female CEOs which are not cited in Fortune 1000 reports.

Arguably, this is therefore one of the first papers to study gender differences in total compensation among Fortune 1000 CEOs using a matched sample technique, based on a larger number of female CEOs and a larger number of years than any previous research.

Prior research shows that managers with lower ability release less accurate management earnings forecasts and have more earnings restatements, lower earnings persistence and lower quality accruals estimations. Yet, whether the impact of managerial ability (MA) on financial reporting can be extended to the narrative section of firms' financial disclosures needs to be theoretically and empirically examined. The authors theorize in this paper that managers with low ability opportunistically inflate the tone to increase outsiders' perceptions of their ability. The authors also examine the relation between MA and the informativeness of tone to predict future firm performance and explain investors' reaction at earnings announcement.

The authors collect 24,000 earnings press releases of 1,149 distinct firms between 2004 and 2013. Content analysis is used to proxy the tone of the disclosures. The authors use the score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) to measure MA. The authors then employ panel data regressions to examine the impact of MA on disclosure tone.

The authors find that low-ability managers inflate the disclosure tone to positively influence labor market's perceptions about their ability. This effect is magnified for younger and shorter-tenured managers, for firms with more intense monitoring and during bear markets. The authors also find that the tone of earnings press releases of low-ability managers results in a lower stock price reaction. Supplementary analyses show that the results do not only hold for the tone, but also can be extended to other linguistic features such as the numerical intensity and the readability of earnings press releases. The results are robust to alternative library specifications and other corporate disclosures such as CEO letters to shareholders or 10-K filings.

The paper shows that managers worry about how firm performance influences the labor market assessment of their ability. In particular, the authors find that managers of low ability are willing to opportunistically manipulate the content of corporate disclosures to improve this perception and build their reputation.

The authors contribute by providing theoretical and empirical evidence on how managers attempt to steer assessments of their ability by manipulating corporate disclosures. Consistent with prior business research suggesting that one's ability is a key feature that affects managers' propensity to engage in ethical practices, such as tax avoidance or manipulation of financial information, this study shows that less able managers tend to inflate the tone of the earnings announcements and that this ability-driven bias is likely to be magnified by career concerns.

The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate in the literature about generalist CEOs by exploring the effect of board governance on CEO general managerial ability, focusing on one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors, board size. Prior research shows that smaller boards constitute a more effective governance mechanism and therefore are expected to reduce agency costs.

The authors estimate the effect of board size on CEO general managerial ability, using a fixed-effects regression analysis, propensity score matching, as well as an instrumental-variable analysis. These techniques mitigate endogeneity greatly and make the results much more likely to show causality.

The results show that firms with smaller board size are more likely to hire generalist CEOs. Specifically, a decline in board size by one standard deviation raises CEO general managerial ability by 15.62%. A lack of diverse experiences in a small board with fewer directors makes it more necessary to hire a CEO with a broad range of professional experiences. Furthermore, the agency costs associated with generalist CEOs are greatly diminished in firms with a smaller board. Hence, firms with a smaller board are more inclined to hire generalist CEOs.

Although prior research has explored the effects of board size on various corporate outcomes, strategies and policies, this study is the first to investigate the effect of board size on CEO general managerial ability. This study contributes to the literature both in corporate governance and on CEO general managerial ability.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of short sellers in foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions. Drawing on threat rigidity theory, the authors argue that short sellers pose a threat to chief executive officers (CEOs) by exerting downward pressure to target firms’ stock prices. That threat will evoke rigid managerial responses that hinder new FDI activities. The authors also posit that CEOs will be less reactive to short sellers’ threats when they are generalist CEOs who have extensive general work experience or when they serve as the board chair.

The authors collect data from S&P 1,500 firms, and the final sample consists of 717 firms and 6,930 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2016. The authors use an Arellano and Bond generalized method of moments static linear probability panel data model and an instrumental panel count data model to test the hypotheses.

The findings support the hypotheses and suggest that CEOs who are under more pressure from short sellers engage in fewer new FDI activities. The negative impact of short sellers on FDI decisions is less salient when CEOs have general work experience or are the chairperson of the board.

This study contributes to the international business research by stressing the need to consider the role of short sellers in firm internationalization decisions.

The purpose of this study is to study the impact of the chief executive officer (CEO) general work experience on the level of firm internationalization in the form of foreign direct investment.

The author collects and analyzes data on publicly traded US firms in the manufacturing sector from 1993 to 2012.

The author finds that CEOs with more general work experience tend to engage in a higher degree of foreign direct investment (FDI)-based internationalization. This relationship will be weakened by CEO stock ownership and enhanced by CEO Ivy League education.

This study enriches the understanding of the important role top managers play in internationalization decisions. The study also contributes to the literature on managerial risk-taking by exploring the outcomes of managerial risk-taking, which have been less studied than the antecedents.

The purpose of this paper is to assess whether multiple directorships have an influence on earnings management for Australian publicly listed firms. This paper attempts to determine whether boards with multiple directorships are effective monitors and are able to constrain earnings management activities.

The study adopts resource dependency theory on the relationship between multiple directorships and the extent of earnings management. Data analysis is based on publicly listed firms on Australian Stock Exchange utilising SIRCA database with a final pooled sample of 1,815 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2012.

Using different measures of multiple directorships, it is found that firms having board of directors with multiple directorships exhibit lower levels of earnings management. The results validate the applicability of resource dependency theory on the relationship between multiple directorships and the extent of earnings management suggesting that directors with multiple board seats by sharing experiences, skills, information and other resources limit the extent of earnings management by firms. Evidence also suggests that earnings management behaviour is more pronounced in larger firms compared to smaller firms and as predicted, industry audit specialists restrain earnings management activities.

This study introduces methodological enhancements to the literature as it measures the multiple directorships in a number of different ways. Firms may be encouraged to actively seek board members with diverse backgrounds, international exposure/experience and pertinent skill-sets with multiple board memberships. These benefits will assist firms to determine the optimal board composition that will enable it to function effectively.

Empirical studies on the association between multiple directorships and earnings management in Australia are scarce and this paper provides an update of the effect of multiple directorships on earnings quality in Australia.

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which accounting standards for social impact reporting are in the public interest. This study aims to explore what the public interest means for social impact reporting by charities; and assess the extent to which the accounting standardisation of social impact reporting supports the public interest so defined.

This study conducts a case study of how stakeholders in Australian charities conceptualise the public interest when discussing accounting standardisation. This paper distinguishes three concepts of the public interest from prior research, namely, aggregative, processual and common good. For each, this paper analyses the implications for accounting and how accountants serve the public interest, and how they align with stakeholder views.

Stakeholder views align with the aggregative and processual concepts of public interest, however this was contested and partial. Accounting standards for social impact reporting will only serve the public interest if they also capture and implement the common good approach.

Clarifying how key stakeholders interpret the public interest can help standard-setters and governments design (or withhold) accounting standards on social impact reporting. This paper also distinguishes different practical roles for accountants in this domain – information merchants, umpires or advocates, which each public interest concept implies.

This paper extends prior research on accounting for the public interest to social impact reporting. The paper empirically demonstrates the salience of the common good concept of public interest and demonstrates the diversity of views on the standardisation of social impact reporting by charities.