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This paper aims to examine how the use of environmental, social and governance (ESG) incentives intersects with top management power and various corporate governance mechanisms to affect excess annual cash bonus compensation.

The authors use a novel artificial intelligence (AI) technique to obtain data about ESG incentives use by firms in the S&P 500. The authors test the hypotheses with an endogenous treatment-regression and a contrast test.

When the top management team has power and uses ESG incentives, there is a 32% reduction in excess annual cash bonuses implying ESG incentives are an effective corporate governance tool. However, nuanced analyses reveal that when powerful management teams with ESG incentives are from environmentally sensitive industries, have a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee or have long-term view institutional shareholders, they derive excess bonuses.

Stakeholders will better understand management’s motivations for the inclusion of ESG incentives in executive compensation contracts and be able to identify situations which require closer scrutiny.

Given the increased popularity of ESG incentives, society, regulators, boards of directors and management teams will be interested in better understanding when these incentives might be effective and when they might be abused.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the use of ESG incentives in relation to excess pay. The authors contribute to both the CSR and executive compensation literatures. The work also uses a new methodological technique using AI to gather difficult-to-obtain data, opening new avenues for research.

This study aims to explore the impacts of the knowledge structure of CEO on corporate innovation strategy in the background of China’s national policy of innovation-driven development.

Regression analysis is used to test the direct effects and the moderating roles of financial and power incentives. It screens 685 listed companies from Chinese stock market, with the time window from 2016 to 2018.

CEO’s knowledge breadth has a significant impact on innovation strategy, but the moderating effects of power and financial incentives are not significant. CEO’s knowledge depth is negatively correlated to corporate innovation strategy; moreover, power incentive significantly strengthens the relationship, whereas financial incentive significantly weakens it.

Firms are suggested to optimize CEO knowledge structure and organizational incentive system for better implementing innovation-driven development strategy.

It is beneficial to the exploration of the micro-mechanism that enables corporate innovation strategy. Scholars may gain additional insights into the strategic management of corporate innovation from the perspective of CEO’s knowledge structure.

In recent years, many firms from developing countries (LDCs) have engaged in foreign direct investment (FDI). Interestingly some of these firms locate their investments in developed countries (DCs) (i.e., upstream FDI), instead of in countries economically similar to or less than their home countries (i.e., downstream FDI). However, only a few researchers have examined the issues related to upstream FDI. Furthermore, when examining FDI, most studies have focused on manufacturing subsidiaries but paid less attention to sales subsidiaries. Due to the differences in nature, management of manufacturing and sales subsidiaries should be different. Using a case study approach and focusing on the behaviors of Taiwanese firms, we address two research questions: (1) what are the channel strategies adopted by the sales subsidiaries of Taiwanese high-tech firms (i.e., multinational corporations (MNCs) from LDCs (LDCMNCs)) in DCs? and (2) how do these subsidiaries manage their channels in DCs? Our findings are: (1) LDCMNCs tend to use multiple sales channels, to work with large national distributors, and to adopt high touch channels to market products in DCs; (2) to reduce channel conflict, less powerful LDCMNCs tend to adopt multiple independent channel system, instead of dual channel system; and (3) due to limited resources, LDCMNCs make more effort on designing channel conflict prevention mechanisms than designing channel conflict resolution mechanisms, emphasize more on building relationships with distributors and tend to use financial incentives/high-power incentives than use other types of incentives to motivate distributors. The findings of this study are helpful for LDC firms to operate their sales subsidiaries more effectively in DCs.

Technological development has not only helped in effective integration of renewable sources but also made it possible for consumers to participate in system operation. Different market players are coming up in the electricity market, microgrid being one of them. Thus, this paper aims to investigate consumers’ role in the dispatch of a microgrid system that has a hybrid market structure under varied system conditions.

The mathematical model developed has been solved by the CONOPT solver in the GAMS optimization tool. GAMS-MATLAB interfacing is done to obtain solutions.

The problem formulated shows the effect of consumers in dispatch and overall operational cost. Consumers’ participation has been proposed through a quadratic cost function. The system operation under pool and bilateral contracts has been investigated. It shows that proper incentives to the consumers can help in reduction and effective management of the demand, carbon emission and overall system operational cost.

This paper considers the hybrid market structure to find the load dispatch in a microgrid system. The participation of consumers in the microgrid system has been implemented considering variations in wind power, solar power and load. The power exchange between the grid and microgrid system has been modeled showing the contribution of the consumers in system operation.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether the use of money, social recognition, and feedback have a similar impact on employee performance in the context of a modern Korean broadband internet service firm.

The study design was a quasi‐field experiment (with control group). First, the leaders of this Korean firm were trained in behavioral performance management. Following the steps of organisational behaviour modification (O.B. Mod.) they identified, measured, and analyzed critical performance behaviors and then intervened with the following reward incentives: money (n=38), social recognition and caring attention (n=41), and objective feedback only (n=31). The main dependent variable was overall performance, and this was also broken down into quantity and quality dimensions.

As hypothesized, money and social recognition had a significant impact on performance outcomes, but feedback did not result in as strong a result. When compared to the control group (n=23), all three reward incentives showed significantly more improvement of overall performance. These findings also indicated, as hypothesized, that the impact of this behavioral management approach on Korean employees did not appear as robust as previous meta‐analytic research based on samples of US employees. Finally, although in the predicted direction, the hypothesis that social recognition would have a relatively stronger impact than money and feedback in this context was not statistically supported.

The major limitation concerns generalizability of the findings. However, the experimental design provides support for internal validity.

The study results have practical implications for the value of behavioral performance management, but also that cultural contingencies should also be considered for successful application.

This study contributes preliminary evidence for O.B. Mod to have applicability across cultures.

This study aims to consider the theoretical potential for client influences to bias valuations, and assess the validity of the resulting framework by seeking input from practising valuers and commissioning clients.

Reports upon a series of individual interviews with senior New Zealand property executives responsible for the management of large portfolios of institutional‐grade property assets.

The results indicate that clients with expertise and a high level of knowledge of the property market are able to influence valuers by way of expert and information power. Opportunities to exert influence are afforded by the control the client has over the valuation process including the common practice in New Zealand of permitting clients to review draft valuations prior to their formalisation.

The general aim of this paper is to build on the theory as opposed to testing theory. In order to achieve this aim a qualitative approach was taken, this permits a focus on the search for meaning and understanding. As in most qualitative research therefore it does not claim that the findings can be generalised to a wider population, but it provides theory for later testing. The results however, not only provide a more in‐depth understanding of the process, motivation and opportunities for client influence but also help to highlight the justification for further theoretical and empirical research in this area in order to achieve a more in‐depth knowledge of the valuation process.

This paper succeeded in its objective of developing an holistic and deeper understanding of valuation by gaining insights from clients involved directly in the commissioning of valuations for property funds in New Zealand. The results suggest that there are a number of specific influences that have not been previously documented, but appear to have the potential to affect valuation outcomes and valuations that are ultimately reported to stakeholders.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between the readability of sustainability reports and chief executive officer (CEO) attributes, comprising monetary, non-monetary incentives and personal characteristics.

The study is based on an international sample of companies operating in sustainability-sensitive industries during 2016–2018.

The results prove that CEO monetary incentives, as well as CEO non-monetary incentives, negatively influence the readability of sustainability reports, revealed in a positive relationship with readability indexes, by providing reports with greater reading difficulty. Additionally, this study shows evidence about the relation of complementarity between these incentives. Other CEO characteristics have no significant effect on the readability of sustainability reports.

This research sheds the light on the role of CEO incentives in obfuscating sustainability information to portray the company, operating in sustainability-sensitive industries, in a favorable image.

Based on stakeholder and upper echelons theory, this study aims to analyze whether the link between environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance and financial performance is moderated by chief executive officer (CEO) power.

Listed corporations with reference to the German two-tier system (HDAX and SDAX) for the business years 2010-2018 (775 firm-year observations) have been included. Fixed effects panel regression analysis was conducted to analyze the link between ESG performance (in total and its three pillars) and financial performance (ROA), with special reference to the interaction of a CEO power index.

While ESG performance has a positive impact on financial performance, the link is more pronounced by CEO power. Thus, in line with prior research on the one-tier system, CEO incentives can positively contribute to the CSR-business case in the German two-tier system. The results remain constant after conducting several robustness checks.

A key contribution to the empirical CSR literature can be stated, as the moderating role of CEO power in the ESG–financial performance link is rather neglected in prior studies. Thus, corporate governance and sustainability should be classified as interactive aspects for the business case of a successful stakeholder management.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how negotiators’ self-evaluated emotion perception is related to value claiming under two incentive schemes. Adopting an ability-motivation interaction perspective, the authors hypothesize that the relationship will be stronger in the contingent (upon value-claiming performance) versus fixed (non-contingent upon value-claiming performance) pay condition.

Multi-level analysis of data (120 participants, 60 dyads) from a laboratory study provided evidence supporting the hypothesis proposed in this paper.

Emotional perception was indeed more strongly related to value claiming in the contingent pay condition than in the fixed pay condition. Negotiators’ emotion perception also had a direct, positive linkage with relationship satisfaction, regardless of the incentive scheme.

The limitations of the current paper include self-report measures of emotion perception, a US student sample and a focus on value claiming as the instrumental outcome. The authors urge future research to address these limitations in replicating and extending the current findings.

The present paper is the first to explicitly test the moderating role of incentive schemes on the linkage between negotiators’ emotion perception and performance. The findings not only show the context-dependent predictive value of negotiators’ emotion perception but also shed light on both negotiation and emotional intelligence (EI) research.

The purpose of the paper is to synthesize and evaluate the stream of research that links large shareholders to the production of shared corporate benefits.

The methodology is to review the literature with an emphasis on the development of findings.

The presence of large shareholders is positive only if their incentives are aligned with other owners and they have the power to exert influence. The presence of large shareholders, even those whose interests are aligned with owners, does not always result in stronger governance structures.

The research is limited by the existing stream of literature and the completeness of our search process.

A synthesis and evaluative summary of the research is presented that may be used by researchers, executives, and board members.

From a research viewpoint, effective research designs should incorporate both incentive and power when assessing the monitoring role of large shareholders to aid in the validity and comparability of research results. From a practice viewpoint, managers and board members may use our summary figure to evaluate power relationships and likely reactions to strategic and tactical decisions in their firm's governance structure.