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Change of leadership is a big and important incident in the life of a company. As important as it is for the company, it is equally a difficult decision to make for the board of directors. Most of the big companies have a committee dedicated toward laying out a succession plan of the existing chief executive officer (CEO). The big dilemma, however, is whether to appoint someone from within the company and let him or her lead as he or she has been associated with the company and knows the internal dynamics better or to induct some outsider and take advantage of his or her expertise/reputation in the market. The balance appears lopsided when the result of this chapter is perused. Companies on an average seem to reap more benefits if an existing executive is promoted to the office of CEO rather than hiring an outsider. The benefits which are talked here from promoting insiders are indirect ones and do not have a direct bearing with the finances of the company. As shown by the results that insiders are more likely to continue with the company for a longer duration as the CEO as well as not as the CEO which defers the hiring and firing costs (screening candidates, conducting interviews, huge severance packages, golden parachutes, etc., are the costs referred to) for a longer period. Other benefits arising from insider CEOs are upfront awareness about the company’s work culture, production/service capacity, efficiency, strategies followed till date, etc., which gives him or her a head start compared to an outsider.

The recent IBM Institute for Business Value CEO survey of 3,000 chief executives globally offers insight into CEO attitudes and behaviors in order to discern the strategies and actions most highly correlated to successful digital transformation and performance.

The IBM Institute for Business Value, in collaboration with the Oxford Economics, surveyed 3,000 CEOs and senior public sector executives between September and November 2020. The analysis identified a group of CEOs whose outlook on transformation and success with digital implementation sets them apart from others.

These Dynamic CEOs, who represent 38 percent of all commercial leaders in the IBM IBV research, shared two crucial insights: that traditional business models no longer differentiate their organizations; their organization?s digital transformation journey will never be complete.

These Dynamic CEOs are almost 70 percent more likely to lead high performing organizations than other top leaders.

Almost 90 percent of Dynamic CEOs expect their business and IT investments to deliver a material improvement in business performance over the next three years, with the greatest emphasis on investments in customer experience improvement, decision-making processes and business agility.

This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance related turnover. Our results indicate that smaller boards and institutional block holders are positively related to the likelihood of performance related turnover. CEOs that also hold the position of the chairman of the board or belong to a founding family face lower likelihood of turnover. CEO stock ownership is negatively related to turnover and CEOs who own 3 percent or more of their company stock face a significantly lower likelihood of performance related turnover. Moreover, protection from external control market has no effect either on the likelihood of turnover.

The previous literature finds evidence from birth dates of CEOs that the relative-age effect continually influences their career success. The authors look at a significantly larger collection of CEOs and more exact information on school cut-off dates to reexamine the relative-age effect.

The relative-age effect suggests that older individuals within a cohort are more successful. This study investigates if the relative-age effect exists for CEOs in the S&P 1500 by analyzing the distribution of their relative age. The authors utilize an identification strategy that allows to calculate a CEO's relative age in months and enables to resolve known identification problems.

The authors find no support for the existence of the relative-age effect for CEOs either by season of birth or relative age in months. On the whole, the distribution of CEO birth dates is similar to the US population. Additionally, the authors find no evidence of a relative-age effect on firm performance.

Contrary to previous findings, there appears to be no relative-age cohort effect for CEOs of major corporations.

Research shows that CEO characteristics shape firm strategy that in turn affects firm performance. Despite previous work that suggests a relative-age effect, the authors provide a more comprehensive data set and better measurement of relative-age within a cohort. The authors find that the relative-age effect does not continue throughout a CEO's career, and therefore, birth dates are not a characteristic that influences firm strategy and performance.

This study aims to investigate how three critical governance decisions by foreign firms impacted their survivability post-initial public offerings (IPO): the choice of CEO (founder vs non-founder); the power the founder CEO wields relative to the board in terms of CEO duality; and board size.

This study uses data from 86 foreign firms that completed IPOs in the US market between 2000 and 2008 and adopts a Cox proportional hazards model to examine how the founder, founder CEO duality and board size influence foreign firm delisting post-IPO.

A founder CEO or a founder CEO with duality (i.e. when a founder CEO is also chair of the board of directors) does not support a foreign firm’s survival post-IPO. Expectedly, board size has a negative impact on post-IPO firm survivability; however, founder CEO duality positively moderates this negative relationship. Therefore, founder CEO duality plays a positive indirect role in the context of post-IPO firms with large boards.

First, while the benefits of CEO duality have been empirically ambiguous, this study clarifies how founder CEO duality manifests its positive impacts in foreign listings. Second, by focusing on board cognition, this study confirms the negative impact of large boards, but highlights that this can be mitigated by governance leadership structure. Finally, despite organizational life-cycle theorists’ advocacy of the replacement of founder CEOs with professional CEOs in sizable ventures, this study shows the benefits of their retention when the board is large.

This study aimed to examine how senior leadership influences corporate communication and employees' attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Using two-way symmetrical communication model in public relations and leadership theory, it investigated the effects of CEOs' task- and relationship-oriented leadership on symmetrical internal communication, employees' organizational commitment and communicative behaviors.

An online survey was conducted with 417 full-time employees working in various industries in the United States.

The results showed that CEOs' relationship-oriented leadership significantly influenced symmetrical internal communication, which, in turn, increased affective commitment and employees' scouting behavior. CEOs' task-oriented communication had no significant effect on symmetrical communication.

This study advances theoretical understanding of two-way symmetrical communication in relation to senior leadership and provides practical insights for corporate leaders and public relations practitioners regarding how to improve employee outcomes through CEOs' strategic leadership and internal communication practices.

The authors suggest ways CEOs can orchestrate their relationship with their board to optimize its potential to become a strategic asset for the company, as distinct from its more traditional role as overseer of management.

To better understand how CEOs can actively engage their boards to make them become strategic assets, the authors conducted research involving more than 50 conversations with Fortune 1,000 CEOs, board chairs, directors, academics and external board advisors to ask them to share their experience and perspectives.

The challenge for both CEOs and boards is to fight the natural tendency to evade confrontations or smooth things over, rather than harness conflict to achieve higher-value decisions.

CEOs can also model confident transparency for their executive teams and send a strong signal that it is okay to share information about work in progress with the board even if it is not finalized.

The stakes have never been higher for CEOs as they are expected to manage, make sense of and take advantage of unprecedented levels of ambiguity and uncertainty. To help do this, they need board members who are fully engaged and willing and able to prod, push, challenge and champion–to work with their CEOs to get to better insight and decisions.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earnings management (EM) in US commercial banks and examines whether the chief executive officer (CEO) power can moderate this relationship.

For a sample of American commercial banks covering 2009–2018, several equations and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for bank EM. The authors use the fixed effects model and generalized method of moment to investigate the CSR–EM relationship.

The authors find a significant positive relation between CSR and EM. Moreover, the authors find that CEO power moderates the CSR–EM relationship. This study also suggests a bidirectional relationship between CSR and EM.

The findings of this paper have important policy implications for policymakers, regulators and investors in their attempts to constrain EM practices and enhance the quality of financial reporting in US commercial banks.

The study contributes to the literature by exploring the relationship between CSR practices and firm EM by particularly focusing on banking. This study offers new insights into whether the association between CSR practices and EM is moderated by the CEO power. To the best of the knowledge, the relationship between CSR and EM is not studied yet with the moderating role of CEO power.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between the readability of sustainability reports and chief executive officer (CEO) attributes, comprising monetary, non-monetary incentives and personal characteristics.

The study is based on an international sample of companies operating in sustainability-sensitive industries during 2016–2018.

The results prove that CEO monetary incentives, as well as CEO non-monetary incentives, negatively influence the readability of sustainability reports, revealed in a positive relationship with readability indexes, by providing reports with greater reading difficulty. Additionally, this study shows evidence about the relation of complementarity between these incentives. Other CEO characteristics have no significant effect on the readability of sustainability reports.

This research sheds the light on the role of CEO incentives in obfuscating sustainability information to portray the company, operating in sustainability-sensitive industries, in a favorable image.