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The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of prompt corrective action on bank risk and returns in an empirical framework.

The paper uses a difference-in-difference specification to analyse whether and how PCA affects bank risk and returns. As part of robustness, the analysis also uses a fixed effects specification with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors to account for serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence.

The findings reveal that banks under PCA framework contribute less to systemic risk and exhibit higher market valuation. These findings differ across recapitalised versus non-recapitalised banks and for banks with differing asset quality, capital and profitability. The overall price impact is a decline in lending rates and deposit costs.

To the best of the author’s understanding, this is one of the early studies in the Indian context to carefully examine the linkage between PCA and bank behaviour.

The success of banking regulations depends on their effective and efficient enforcement. Therefore, the penalties or sanctions for failures to comply with prudential regulatory requirements shall clearly be specified in the law. The aim of this paper is to describe and discuss the enforcement of prudential regulations in Turkish banking law.

The paper explains the necessity of the prudential standards in banking regulation and their enforcement, and elaborates the Turkish Banking Act to analyze the sanctions provided for the enforcement of prudential requirements.

The Turkish Banking Act comprises many of the contemporary prudential standards for banks. It also establishes an effective sanctioning regime to ensure the implementation of these standards. The sanctions in the Banking Act can be broadly classified as institutional and personal sanctions. Institutional sanctions consist of three categories: prompt corrective actions, revocation of license and closure, and financial penalties. Personal sanctions, on the other hand, comprise management overhaul and loss of job, temporary prohibition from employment in the banking sector, financial penalties, criminal liability, and civil liability of managers and controlling shareholders.

This paper systematically analyzes enforcement of prudential standards in Turkish banking law, and aims to introduce the Turkish system to international scholars.

The academic literature has examined why bank runs happen based on the work of 2022 Nobel Prize-winning economists Diamond and Dybvig. They have found the source of banking/financial crisis in terms of mismatch between liabilities (deposits being short term and savers wanting to short-term access to their money) and assets (long term and illiquid). The Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB) crisis intensified when it came under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This situation provides the opportunity to study whether the elements embodied in the theoretical models like Diamond and Dybvig hold true for LVB crisis. This study aims to examine the reasons for the demise of LVB in India using DuPont financial model, peer group analysis and time series structural break in crucial financial parameters.

The study examines the reason for insolvency of LVB using financial ratios, financial models (DuPont), financial distress model (Z-score) and asset-liability management. The study also adopts univariate structural break models using quarterly financial data covering the key financial measures used in the RBI’s PCA framework.

LVB crisis is like Diamond–Dybvig model, in the sense, savers requiring short-term access to their money (liquidity for their deposits) on the information of high non-performing assets, which further deteriorates the illiquid nature of loan portfolio (assets) of banks. The study finds its profit margin (net interest margin and non-interest margin) and managerial efficiency had started deteriorating since 2018. The study finds that LVB’s main weakness lies in its limited credit appraisal ability, its monitoring and weak internal controls. Lending to sensitive sectors (like real estate, capital markets and commodities) and exposure to large business groups also contributed to its weakness. The study also finds huge, elevated asset-liability mismatch, especially in the short-term maturity buckets. Using univariate econometric time series model, the study also confirms financial weakness being evident much earlier than the time when resolution was undertaken by the RBI through PCA.

The study has implications for analysing and monitoring financial distress of banks. The study also has implications for devising banking regulation and supervision.

The study brings in a perspective of the banking regulations using the application of PCA framework on a listed private sector bank. The authors combine an accounting ratio model and combine risk measures that could identify the incipient risks in a bank. The authors believe this will help in refinement of banking regulations and better monitoring mechanisms.

This study develops a multi-period structural model to value bank subordinated debt (subdebt) under different regulatory policies. The model provides a complete framework for analyzing how various factors, such as credit and interest rate risks, bank characteristics, and regulatory policies, affect subdebt prices and yield spreads. It finds that the implementation of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) will raise subdebt prices and lower subdebt spreads, while capital forbearance will have the opposite effects. Also, subdebt spreads are less sensitive to bank risk when PCA is imposed than when capital forbearance occurs. The results of the paper suggest that enhancing market discipline through giving subdebt investors more rights to force timely reorganization of weak banks will reduce the subdebt spreads required by investors.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of financial penalties on the stability of the banking sector.

A unique database of 671 financial penalties imposed on 68 international listed banks between 2007 and 2014 and a fixed-effects panel data approach were used.

The results show that financial penalties increase banks’ systemic risk exposure but do not significantly affect banks’ contribution to systemic risk. Additionally, the link between financial penalties and systemic risk exposure is weaker in regulatory and supervisory systems with more prompt corrective power among national authorities. By contrast, supervisory authorities’ stronger power to declare insolvency and a greater external monitoring culture exacerbate the positive effects of financial penalties on systemic risk exposure.

The punishment of misconduct should correct the social harm and prevent future misconduct while ensuring the banking system’s stability. Therefore, authorities should punish misconduct by implementing penalties against the financial institutions at a specific amount that offsets the damages of misconduct but does not threaten systemic stability. Penalties against institutions may be complemented by financial penalties against upper management to induce a more responsible culture in banks.

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial penalties on the stability of the financial system. The results contribute to the ongoing debate on the appropriateness of financial penalties and address the question of whether bank regulators reduce or contribute to banks’ systemic risk.

Presents the NUMASS Web‐based system, which was developed for the needs of the European Commission (designed to be used mainly by AIDCO‐A5). Its main objective is to improve the management and monitoring of Tacis Nuclear Safety Programme, by showing in a graphical way the progress of projects/works and prompting for corrective actions.

The learning outcomes of this paper is as follows: to understand and analyze the turnaround model of Pearce and Robbins (1993); to familiarize with parameters and actions in the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework of Reserve Bank of India (RBI); to comprehend the probable situation warranting turnaround; to identify the key ratios which signal the financial health of a bank; and to understand the applicability of the turnaround model in bank’s revival.

The case explores various challenges faced by Mr Prashant Kumar during the turnaround process of Yes bank. The youngest bank started its operation in 2004, and in the first six years of operations, Yes bank registered a compound annual growth rate of 100% on the balance sheet, becoming the fourth-largest private sector bank in the country. However, the irony is that this shine and glitter was a short-lived phenomenon and after the regulatory inspection of 2016, Yes bank collapsed like a house of cards. This case has incorporated the three major phases of Yes bank i.e. the rise, the fall and the revival. The turnaround process led by Mr Kumar was explained using the turnaround model given by Pearce and Robbins (1993) and the PCA framework of the RBI. The conditions which warranted the need for the turnaround in Yes bank and the factors responsible for the same are discussed. The multiple challenges faced by Mr Kumar and the strategic responses adopted by him were incorporated in great detail. What were the outcomes of those strategic choices? Should he continue with similar approaches? Was he successful in stabilizing the bank which was broken from the core? What next if stability is achieved? How Mr Kumar should lift Yes bank to the recovery zone? And most importantly, will Mr Kumar be able to change the poor public image of Yes bank? The reflections of all the above questions are narrated with the actions of Mr Kumar.

The case is intended to be taught in the class of strategic management for postgraduate-, master- or executive-level participants of business administration. As the case is focused on a banking organization, it also can be taught in banking class.

Teaching Notes are available for educators only.

CSS 1: Accounting and Finance.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the association between the corporate ownership characteristics and the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses over financial reporting under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002.

The paper employs both ordered and binary logistic regression models for a sample of 695 US firms who reported internal control weaknesses for the first time, pursuant to SOX Section 404, and evaluates the impact of the stock ownership characteristics on the timeliness in remediation of their control weaknesses.

The test results show that the corporate ownership characteristics, as a part of governance mechanism, play an incrementally critical role to influence firms' decisions to promptly remediate their internal control problems and improve the reliability of financial information. In addition, it was also found that a corporate board independent of its CEO is effective in monitoring timely remediation of control problems. Sub‐sample analyses for the company‐level and account‐specific internal control weaknesses produce similar results in support of the effect of corporate stock ownership characteristics on the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses.

First, the paper adds to the literature by demonstrating the incremental effect of the stock ownership characteristics on a firm's timeliness in remediation of control weaknesses, even after controlling the effect of audit committee and board characteristics in the analysis. Second, the paper shows that even in the post‐SOX years with enhanced regulatory oversight in corporate affairs, the effect of corporate ownership attributes as a part of governance is incrementally observable in a situation that calls for prompt managerial action to ensure the reliability of financial information. Third, for the first time, the study makes a separate detailed analysis on the association between the stock ownership attributes and the remediation of company‐level and account‐specific control weaknesses. The results provide valuable insights into the ownership governance effect on the remediation of the two types of control weaknesses that have different rigor, auditability (more or less auditable), and effects (pervasive or non‐pervasive) on financial reporting quality. Fourth, the study further enhances one's understanding of several important governance factors that help achieve a sound financial reporting system and restore investors' confidence in the system.

The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the structure, regulation, and performance of banks in the EU and G‐10 countries. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the structure of banking in the nineteen separate countries comprising these two groups. The regulatory, supervisory, and deposit‐insurance environment in which banks operate in each of these countries is also compared and contrasted. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the regulatory environment that may help explain the structure of banking in the various countries. Beyond this, the effect of the overall structural and regulatory environment on individual bank performance is investigated in order to evaluate the appropriateness of existing regulations in individual countries and any proposals for reforming them. Hence, an exploratory empirical analysis based upon a sample of banks in the different countries is conducted to assess the effect of the different “regulatory regimes” on the performance of individual banks, controlling for various bank‐specific and country‐specific factors that may also affect bank performance. In this way, the paper attempts to contribute to an assessment of the appropriate balance between market and regulatory discipline to ensure that banks have sufficient opportunities to compete prudently and profitability in a competitive and global financial marketplace. In the process of conducting such an assessment, the paper necessarily provides information as to whether the U.S. is “out‐of‐step” with banking developments in other industrial countries.

This study aims to demystify how the critical regulations affecting the bank competition have instituted, amended and fine-tuned over the years in India and its peers in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). The gaps in the regulatory practices influencing bank contestability and competition in BRICS nations are identified. Also, the regulatory convergence is tested by comparing the policies embraced in India vis-à-vis its peer nations.

A methodological framework by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2013) is adopted to construct various regulatory indices. The empirical analysis is based on information available in five rounds of the bank regulation and supervision survey conducted in 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2017 by the World Bank.

The empirical findings elucidate that although bank entry regulations have been liberalized over time, the bank contestability seems to be low in the BRICS countries, especially in India. This might be due to the substantial government ownership and the presence of notional powers that are conferred to bank supervisors. On comparing the bank regulations in India vis-à-vis its peers, the author find a strong convergence in licensing requirements for entry into the banking business, foreign bank entry mode, restrictions on conglomerate formation and adoption of prompt corrective action framework.

The study suggests that future policy initiatives in India need to focus on redesigning the banking structure by reducing the share of state ownership, permitting joint ventures and liberally allowing the entry of new domestic and foreign banks in the industry. In the years to come, regulators in India will continuously face the challenge of fostering bank contestability without jeopardizing bank efficiency and overall stability.

This study is perhaps first of its kind, which analyzes the inter-temporal changes in regulatory indicators to examine the variations in the competitive environment of the banking markets of BRICS economies in general and India in particular.