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Government agencies have endeavored, with limited success, to improve the methodological consistency of regulatory benefit–cost analysis (BCA). This paper recommends that an independent cohort of economists, policy analysts and legal scholars take on that task. Independently established “best practices” would have four positive effects: (1) they would render BCAs more regular in form and format and, thus, more readily assessable and replicable by social scientists; (2) improved consistency might marginally reduce political opposition to BCA as a policy tool; (3) politically-motivated, inter-agency methodological disputes might be avoided; and (4) an independent set of “best practices” would provide a sound, independent basis for judicial review of agency BCAs.

Policy or regulatory risks represent one of the major barriers for renewable energy investments, especially against the background of several retrospective reductions of support schemes in Europe. This paper aims to contribute to the literature by offering a categorization of major risk drivers and determinants of policy risk associated with renewable energy projects in developed countries.

Based on a narrative (traditional) review of the academic literature and supported by industry studies regarding cases of support scheme cuts in Europe (from the end of 2010 until the end of 2013), the paper derives determinants of policy risks of renewable energy investments.

As a main result, the paper offers a concise categorization of major risk drivers of policy and regulatory risks associated with renewable energy investments in developed countries along with potential indicators.

The derived categorization of major risk drivers and the set of indicators are of high relevance for risk management and risk assessment of renewable energy investments, where understanding the underlying risk drivers is vital. The findings can thus be applied when establishing a sound risk management for renewable energy investments.

The paper helps (potential) investors, policymakers and regulators to assess policy risks associated with renewable energy investments.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Socially responsible investment (SRI) engagement currently performs a variety of supportive regulatory functions such as reframing norms, establishing dialogue and providing resources to improve performance, however corporate responses are voluntary. This chapter will examine the potential gains in effectiveness for SRI engagement in a responsive regulatory regime.

Global warming is a pressing environmental, social and governance (ESG) issue. By using the example of climate change the effectiveness of SRI engagement actors and the regulatory context can be considered. This chapter builds the conceptual framework for responsive regulation of climate change.

SRI engagement may face resistance from corporations due to its voluntary nature and conflict with other goals. Legitimacy and accountability limit the effectiveness of SRI engagement functioning as a voluntary regulatory mechanism. This chapter argues that the effectiveness of SRI engagement on climate change could be enhanced if it served as part of a responsive regulation regime.

Engagement is used by SRIs for ESG issues. A comprehensive regulatory regime could enhance corporate adaptation to climate change through increasing compliance with SRI engagement. The implication for SRI practitioners is that lobbying for a supportive regulatory regime has a large potential benefit.

Responsive regulatory policy involves both support and sanctions to improve compliance, enhancing policy efficiency and effectiveness. There are potentially large net social benefits from utilising SRI engagement in a regulatory regime.

In seeking to re-articulate voluntary and legal approaches this research addresses a gap in the literature on climate change regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the institutional challenges of coordinating regulatory agencies and the costs associated with compliance requirements in Tanzania’s tourist industry.

This paper is based on qualitative research conducted in the northern tourism circuit of Tanzania. Data were generated through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with owner-managers of tourism enterprises, heads of regulatory agencies and leaders of business associations (n=60). The findings were analysed through triangulating the data from various sources to establish emerging themes and patterns in accordance with the theoretical underpinnings and research objectives.

The findings show that tourism enterprises are governed by a multitude of national, sub-national and sectoral institutions mandated to impose several taxes, fees and levies on enterprises. As a result, tourism enterprises are required to obtain duplicate licences and are subjected to uncoordinated inspections. The poor treatment by regulatory agencies, the unclear basis for estimating taxes and levies, inadequate tax education and closure of businesses were also reported as key regulatory challenges. Most challenges emerge from agentification of the public sector and the lack of a legal framework in which to formally facilitate coordination and information sharing amongst government agencies.

The paper proposes streamlining the functions of divergent institutions governing the industry by increasing intergovernmental coordination through delegating some functions, sharing information and enforcing formal inter-ministerial and cross-government consultation structures.

This paper adds value to previous regulatory assessments by empirically analysing the specific sector and showing how the principal–agent relationship for the public sector can be improved through enforcing coordination of the multiple agencies governing the tourist industry.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of China's contemporary banking regulatory system, with particular focus on regulatory control of foreign banks trading in China. The paper addresses three aspects of Chinese banking regulation: what does China regulate; why does China regulate; and how does China regulate. Much of the discussion is concerned with China's regulatory agencies particularly with the role of the CBRC as the principal regulator in China's banking sector.

In the first instance the paper presents an overview of banking regulatory models gained from a review of theoretical literature in the area. Then through a wide ranging review of Chinese publications, both academic and official, the paper seeks to relate the course of regulatory reform in China, both in terms of compliance with orthodox regulatory theory, and the unique regulatory requirements of the Chinese banking system.

The paper recognises that China has embraced the need for banking regulation with the establishment of an institutional structure that is responsive to both banking supervision and government policy. Within that structure the role of the CBRC, the pervasive manner in which that agency operates, and the content of its regulatory output have been identified and critically reviewed.

In its review of the modernization of China's banking regulatory system, the paper achieves originality from the author's research into, and critical reflections on Chinese generated literature, both institutional and academic, which is then communicated in a manner that will be understood by readers familiar with Western banking regulatory theory.

This paper seeks to identify policy and regulatory bottlenecks that need to be overcome in order to stimulate private sector investment in backbone networks in selected African countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda).

It does so by exploring policy and regulatory frameworks and market structures that influence investment decisions on backbone infrastructure roll‐out; it investigates models and strategies adopted by the public sector to finance national backbone infrastructure; and it provides recommendations on how to stimulate private investment in backbone roll‐out by creating an enabling policy and regulatory environment.

Research findings show that the telecommunications sector in the selected African countries has witnessed the return of state‐led investment in the roll‐out of fibre backbones. The rationale for state‐led intervention has often been cited as market failure regarding investment in broadband backbone roll‐out. However, many of the policy and regulatory barriers to market entry remain, including protectionist legislation, which has limited private sector participation in investing in backbone.

The reality is that African governments are maintaining control over national backbones and, in some markets where the telecommunications infrastructure sector has been liberalised, the state‐owned operators may enter into direct competition with the private sector or may delay delivery by the private sector.

The value of the paper is that it provides evidence on how to improve the roll‐out and extension of national broadband backbone networks through the development of a policy and regulatory framework which facilitates private sector investment in this sector. The paper also makes recommendations to governments for the facilitation of private investment in backbone networks through the development of an enabling policy and regulatory environment.

This paper contrasts the regulatory experience of the telecommunications industry in two regions, Africa and the Caribbean. Whilst possessing some socio‐economic similarities, they remain quite distinct in terms of size and political history. In particular the relatively more stable Caribbean political history has secured a firm basis for the democratic process and the development of institutional infrastructure supportive of good governance. Therefore, despite a monopoly telecommunications structure evident in both regions, the Caribbean has generally been more successful in forestalling anti‐competitive behaviour than in the case of African economies. In this respect a critical role has been played by competition policy supporting the view of the prominence of legislative endowments in informing regulatory governance.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011.

The authors' approach is based upon the quantification of hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning, to form indices of key bank regulatory and supervisory policies.

It is found that the regulation and supervision of banks varies widely across countries in many different dimensions. Furthermore, there has not been a convergence in bank regulatory regimes over the past decade despite the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression.

The data are based on survey responses and this requires that the answers be accurate. To better ensure this is the case, several checks were made to ensure greater accuracy in all the answers. Using this database one can perform various statistical analyses in attempt to determine which bank regulatory regimes work best to promote well‐functioning banking systems.

The authors' data and measures are new and unique so as enable policy makers and researchers to examine cross‐country comparisons and analyses of changes in banking policies over time.