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This paper aims to examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on financial stability. Financial sector reform, especially in developing countries, takes the form of a sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision. The main objective of the paper is to examine whether this fast and sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision has an undesirable impact on financial stability. Furthermore, the paper examines the role of real economic development in determining the impact of financial reform on financial stability.

Empirically, on a sample of 57 developing countries over the period 2000-2013, the author explored the impact of bank regulation and supervision on financial stability for different sub-groups of countries. The division is based on the real level of economic development and, most importantly, on the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision. The study uses the cross-sectional–ordinary least square model. Each country has three observations (average 2000-2004, average 2005-2008 and average 2009-2013), which are convenient, with the date of the three surveys on regulation and supervision (2002-2006-2011). The period of the averages is selected to cover periods before and after the survey as regulation and supervision may be adopted before the survey and as its impact may persist for the period after.

The major finding of this study is that it supports the important role of the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision, and its impact on financial stability. Soft adjustment in regulation and supervision has more positive impact on financial stability than fast adjustment. Activity restrictions have positive and significant impact on financial stability in soft adjustment countries’ group. On the other hand, in countries with fast adjustment, results show negative and statistically significant impact on financial stability, especially for supervisory independence. More time is needed for supervisors to adapt to new regulation and supervision and gain expertise to monitor financial condition of banks in a consistent manner. Results also show that the level of economic development is an important factor when testing the impact of regulation and supervision on financial stability. In lower income countries, more room is available for corruption in lending, which has a negative impact on financial stability.

This study advocates the necessity of taking the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision by policymakers in developing countries, while initiating reform in the financial sector. Financial sector reform that takes the form of a sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision may have undesirable results in terms of financial stability. On the other hand, soft adjustment in regulation and supervision, which gives more room for supervisors to adapt and gain expertise, may have more positive impact on financial stability.

This paper is the first paper to explore new methods of calculating the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision, and to examine whether the high speed of financial reform in developing countries has an undesirable impact on financial stability.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011.

The authors' approach is based upon the quantification of hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning, to form indices of key bank regulatory and supervisory policies.

It is found that the regulation and supervision of banks varies widely across countries in many different dimensions. Furthermore, there has not been a convergence in bank regulatory regimes over the past decade despite the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression.

The data are based on survey responses and this requires that the answers be accurate. To better ensure this is the case, several checks were made to ensure greater accuracy in all the answers. Using this database one can perform various statistical analyses in attempt to determine which bank regulatory regimes work best to promote well‐functioning banking systems.

The authors' data and measures are new and unique so as enable policy makers and researchers to examine cross‐country comparisons and analyses of changes in banking policies over time.

In this paper, the authors examine the association between the banking regulatory regime and the quality of bank earnings. We further investigate whether the banking agency regulatory characteristics moderate the association between banking regulation and earnings quality.

Using panel data spanning 29 years over the period 1991 to 2019, the authors model bank earnings quality as a function of scores for banking regulation for 170 banks in the East African region using both the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation methods.

The results, which are robust for endogeneity among other checks, reveal a positive impact of bank regulatory mechanisms on the quality of bank earnings. The authors further establish differential impact of specific regulatory mechanisms, with some contributing positively toward earnings management while others contributing negatively toward earnings management. The differential impacts of banking regulation on earnings quality are also manifested in the country-level analyses.

First, the study utilises a mix of bank-specific, country-specific as well as economy-specific variables in one dataset. Second, the authors utilise survey-based data using the World Bank's Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys (BRSS) for the periods 1999 to 2019. The authors assume that the bank regulatory mechanisms in place pre-1999 are close to the mechanisms in place as per the 1999 BRSS. Given limitations in data availability, the authors are not able to control for banks engaging in multiple activities such as insurance, underwriting of securities, FinTechs, among others.

The results are useful in bridging the gap between theory and practice regarding the expected effect of strict banking regulations on the quality of earnings in Eastern African Banks. For the positive impact of banking regulation on bank earnings quality to be felt, the institutional, social and environmental specificities of the five selected countries need to be adequately developed and taken into consideration.

This study is perhaps the first to utilise a large dataset of commercial banks from countries in a developing region characterised by relatively lower enforcement and dynamism in the banking regulation. Further, in-depth studies on the association between banking regulation and earnings quality remain sparse.

The purpose of this paper is to measure and rank territorial bias in prudential supervision and regulation in 22 EU and non-EU countries with financial systems predominantly owned by foreign banks.

Twenty-two host countries are surveyed along six dimensions. First a scoring system is developed to measure territorial bias on an individual country basis (vertical analysis). Second the results are compared across two peer groups EU and non-EU (horizontal analysis).

Territorial bias is present to a varying degree in the prudential supervision and the regulations of the countries surveyed. On average higher territorial bias is observed in the non-EU group. Generally there is also less dispersion in the EU which can be explained by a common regulatory framework and the efforts to achieve supervisory convergence. Non-EU countries use a wider array of instruments typically higher capital ratios stricter local governance requirements and liquidity restrictions.

This is the first quantitative measure and analysis of territorial bias in prudential supervision and regulation that has been established. It includes confidential supervisory measures and measures imposed by moral suasion.

The recurrence of banking crises throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in the more recent 2008‐09 global financial crisis, has led to an expanding empirical literature on crisis explanation and prediction. The purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical review of proxies for and important determinants of banking crises‐credit growth, financial liberalization, bank regulation and supervision.

The study surveys the banking crisis literature by comparing proxies for and measures of banking crises and policy‐related variables in the literature. Advantages and disadvantages of different proxies are discussed.

Disagreements about determinants of banking crises are in part explained by the difference in the chosen proxies used in empirical models. The usefulness of different proxies depends partly on constraints in terms of time and country coverage but also on what particular policy question is asked.

The study offers a comprehensive analysis of measurements of banking crises, credit growth, financial liberalization and banking regulations and concludes with an assessment of existing proxies and databases. Since, the review points to the choice of proxies that best fit specific research objectives, it should serve as a reference point for empirical researchers in the banking crisis area.

This paper aims to assess the topography of financial regulation, supervisory styles and performance of banking systems across the world.

The author gains insights by comparing regulatory and supervisory practices and their impact on banking system performance before and after the global crisis. The study illustrates the differences in regulation/supervision among crisis, non-crisis and BRICS countries. Even as capital ratios increased, bank governance and supervision regimes were strengthened, the private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.

The results show that the crisis-countries had weaker regulatory and supervisory frameworks than those in emerging countries during the crisis period. BRICS countries as a distinct block have demonstrated uniqueness in their regulatory/supervisory styles that are similar neither to those in the crisis-countries nor to those in the non-crisis countries.

The originality of this study lies in its unique approach to assessing the bank regulation and supervision styles around the world and their impact on banking system profitability, as it uses a robust database. Further, this study provides not only a general assessment but also a comparative analysis of the BRICS and emerging economies. Regulatory agencies around the world would greatly benefit from systematic evidence on the relationship between bank performance and regulatory/supervisory systems.

The purpose of this study is to examine how banking regulation and supervision affect the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). It proposes performance of the MFIs from the aspect of social and financial efficiency because the MFIs nowadays not only view to sustain the social role of poverty eradication but in the same time they must strive the financial sustainability to maintain the operation in long run. This study also includes the macroeconomic condition and firm level variables to control for social and financial efficiency of the MFIs.

The data consists 168 MFIs from five countries in Southeast Asia from year 2011 to 2017. First stage of analysis is to identify level of social and financial efficiency by using data envelopment analysis approach. Second stage is to examine impact of bank regulation and supervision to the social and financial efficiency by applying panel regression analysis and generalized method of moments for robust estimation methods.

The finding shows the MFIs own lower social efficiency and higher score in financial efficiency. This indicates in pursuing financial sustainability, the MFIs in Southeast Asia countries have lost sight of their original mission of poverty reduction. Furthermore, the result also presents a significant impact of bank regulation and supervision to the social and financial efficiency of the MFIs. However, the results appear in different direction when more negative effect is associated with social efficiency. This specifies that bank regulation and supervision are not appropriate to accommodate the social needs, thus hampering the effort of poverty reduction by the MFIs.

The present study only concentrates on the impact bank regulation and supervision to the performance of the MFIs. As the operation of the MFIs currently has been largely exposed in banking operation, it is suggested that future studies to look for other special issues such as country governance that might influence specifically in social and financial aspect of the MFIs.

The empirical findings from this study could be useful and may have significant implications for the regulators. The regulators or policymakers could establish the new regulation framework that fulfil the dual needs (social and financial) of the MFIs. Furthermore, the empirical findings also could serve as guidance to regulators and decision-makers in designing new policies for a sustainable and competitive sector of the MFIs. Although the MFIs recently brings a similar role as commercial banks, they need to retain the social aspects as that is the original mission of the MFIs

The present study proves that the bank regulation and supervision have brought a significant influence to the performance of the MFIs in ASEAN 5 countries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on bank development, efficiency and fragility over the period of 1999-2011.

The authors’ approach is based on a multivariate difference-in-difference model which controls for potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables and unobservable country-specific effect. The paper investigates the changes of bank outcomes and a country’s regulation and supervisory practices, in terms of capital regulation, supervisory power, private monitoring, entry into banking requirements, overall restrictions on bank activities and government ownership of banks in a sample of 53 countries with a total of 482 observations.

Empirical results indicate that greater capital regulatory requirements reduce bank fragility, as measured by lower levels of non-performing loans but reduce bank efficiency, as measured by higher levels of net interest margin; supervisory practices that strengthen private sector monitoring of banks improve bank development, as measured by bank private credit as a share of gross domestic product; lower levels of non-performing loans are associated with greater enter-into-banking requirements and less restrictiveness on bank activities; and greater government ownership of banks is associated with both higher levels of net interest margin and higher levels of non-performing loans. Overall, the findings support Basel II’s first and third pillars: capital requirements and private monitoring.

This cross-country analysis provides evidence on which specific regulatory and supervisory practices work best in light of what was learned from the recent financial crisis.

This study examines the impact of the regulatory and supervisory environment on the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. The impact of the heterogeneous nature of the banking environment in the sampled countries is also considered.

A dynamic panel data analysis with system GMM estimators was used with a sample consisting of 120 Islamic banks from 21 countries for the period 2000-2013.

The results demonstrate that main regulation and supervision proxies have significant negative effects on risk levels of Islamic banks, which implies that further restricted regulatory and supervisory environment can lower risk levels of Islamic banks. In addition, the Islamic banks operating under the dual banking system seem to prefer to take a lower risk. Furthermore, the results identify that a stable political environment encourages Islamic banks to take higher risks in their operations.

In addition to examining the common factors, the empirical analysis in this study is extended to the investigation of the effects of several political indicators on risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks, which should be considered as an important contribution.