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Documents evidence on the interdependence between the mechanisms used to control the agency costs in Turkish manufacturing firms where the external control devices are restricted and most of the firms have concentrated ownership. The ownership concentration, board size and composition, managerial shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, and family shareholdings are the selected devices. Evidence reveals that the proportion of insiders on the board is positively related to the percentage of family shareholdings and negatively related to the percentage of foreign institutional shareholdings and ownership concentration. Board size shows a significant negative relation with all the control mechanisms except the debt ratio. The finding that the managerially controlled firms have lower debt ratio than the institutionally controlled firms and the family controlled firms supports the entrenchment hypothesis. The capital market seems to complement the institutional shareholdings, family shareholdings, and ownership concentration in monitoring the CEOs.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the association between the corporate ownership characteristics and the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses over financial reporting under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002.

The paper employs both ordered and binary logistic regression models for a sample of 695 US firms who reported internal control weaknesses for the first time, pursuant to SOX Section 404, and evaluates the impact of the stock ownership characteristics on the timeliness in remediation of their control weaknesses.

The test results show that the corporate ownership characteristics, as a part of governance mechanism, play an incrementally critical role to influence firms' decisions to promptly remediate their internal control problems and improve the reliability of financial information. In addition, it was also found that a corporate board independent of its CEO is effective in monitoring timely remediation of control problems. Sub‐sample analyses for the company‐level and account‐specific internal control weaknesses produce similar results in support of the effect of corporate stock ownership characteristics on the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses.

First, the paper adds to the literature by demonstrating the incremental effect of the stock ownership characteristics on a firm's timeliness in remediation of control weaknesses, even after controlling the effect of audit committee and board characteristics in the analysis. Second, the paper shows that even in the post‐SOX years with enhanced regulatory oversight in corporate affairs, the effect of corporate ownership attributes as a part of governance is incrementally observable in a situation that calls for prompt managerial action to ensure the reliability of financial information. Third, for the first time, the study makes a separate detailed analysis on the association between the stock ownership attributes and the remediation of company‐level and account‐specific control weaknesses. The results provide valuable insights into the ownership governance effect on the remediation of the two types of control weaknesses that have different rigor, auditability (more or less auditable), and effects (pervasive or non‐pervasive) on financial reporting quality. Fourth, the study further enhances one's understanding of several important governance factors that help achieve a sound financial reporting system and restore investors' confidence in the system.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between selected board characteristics and ownership elements and the performance of firms listed in the Muscat Securities Market (MSM30). The examination focused on how the firm financial performance was affected by the board size, the number of board meetings and the ratio of the independent board of directors along to the ownership concentration types (i.e. institutional, state and concentrated individual ownership).

Data were extracted from the annual reports available online on the MSM30 website over a period of seven years (2009–2015). The sample consisted of 14 firms belonging to the non-financial sector. The data were of a balanced type and there were 98 observations. The analysis was conducted using the ordinary least square in STATA with the use of the robustness technique of standard error.

The findings of this study provide evidence that the selected elements for board characteristics and ownership influence firm performance. Nevertheless, such influence has its interpretation that differs to some extent from other securities markets in the developing countries. For instance, the ratio of the independent board of directors, the number of board director’s meetings, state ownership and concentrated individual ownership were inversely affecting the firm performance. However, institutional ownership and board size were found to have a positive effect on firm performance.

Studies on the influence of corporate governance and ownership structures in the context of Oman are still scarce. MSM30 received little attention, even though such an index encompasses the most liquid and the most profitable firms. MSM30 is an important index for investors in Oman looking for capital gains. Accordingly, this present study contributes to the knowledge body by providing new findings related to Oman and compares it with the other markets within Gulf Council Countries (GCC) and around the world. This will provide more understanding of the Omani context. Moreover, the authors anticipate that the outcomes of this research, which so far is the most comprehensive study in the Omani context in terms of the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure on firm financial performance can significantly shape corporate governance discourse, practices and policies in Oman, in particular, and in other GCC countries in general, to improve financial performance and corporate sustainability.

Purpose – The relationship between the board characteristics (i.e. board independence, CEO duality, board size, board meeting and board tenure) and the ownership structure (i.e. managerial ownership, family ownership and institutional ownership) and earnings quality is examined.

Design/methodology/approach – Data from 280 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia's Main Board for the year 2004 is used.

Findings – Significant association was found between board tenure and earnings quality. In addition, a positive significant association was found between outside board ownership and family ownership and earnings quality. However no significant relationship was found between board of directors’ independence and earnings quality.

Research limitations/implications – The association between audit committees’ characteristics and earnings quality was not examined. An examination of the impact of ownership structure on boards of directors and audit committees is warranted. An investigation of the impact of the ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia using separate test on family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms is suggested.

Practical implications – The appropriateness of policy directives requiring majority independent directors may be considered by policy makers.

Originality/value – The conflict of interest between outside shareholders and managers in a diffused ownership support the agency theory. However, utility of agency theory to explain the conflicts between the controlling owners and the minority shareholders where ownership concentration is prevalent is limited. Whilst demonstrating the dominant impact of ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia the study calls for alternative explanations of corporate governance practices in different institutional settings.

The main purpose of the present research is to study the relationship between ownership concentration and the type of ownership, i.e. state, firm (legal persons), individual, family, institutional – on the value of the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

The study applies panel data regression analysis to a sample of companies listed in TSE during the period 2005-2009. Two-stage least-squares analysis is conducted.

The paper finds that ownership concentration is positively related to ROE, and that ownership concentration is negatively related to ROA. Moreover, state, family, and individual ownership are negatively related to performance, and firm (legal person) and institutional ownership are positively related to performance. The paper also finds that higher firm profitability requires a more diffused ownership structure.

The results of the present research support agency theory and efficient monitoring hypothesis. The results strongly suggest the failure of state ownership in increasing companies' value and underline the importance of accelerating privatization in Iran.

To improve the performance and consequently the value of companies, the process of privatization in Iran must be accelerated and public ownership must be transferred to the private sector. Further, investors must pay special attention to the type of ownership and ownership concentration of companies when deciding to buy their shares.

The study builds on prior research in several ways. First, the paper offers new insights into the relationship between corporate governance and economic performance by using data from Iranians listed firms, this new evidence from an emerging market enhances the understanding of corporate governance in Asian countries. Second, the study focuses on five dimensions: ownership concentration, state, firm, individual, family, and institutional ownership which allow one to get a more accurate picture of the ownership structure-firm value relationship.

Concentrated ownership implies greater alignment between ownership and control, mitigating the agency problem. However, it may also engender governance challenges such as funds appropriation through related party transactions and the oppression of minority shareholders, especially in the context of weak legal systems. We draw from legal theory (the tradeoff controlling shareholder model and private benefits of control) and from organization theory (socioemotional wealth), to suggest that concentrated ownership can be beneficial in both robust and weak legal systems for different reasons. We advance theory on the effects of controlling shareholders and suggest that the longer-term outlook associated with engaged concentrated ownership can aid the shift of the corporation toward Berle and Means' (1932, p. 355) “third possibility” of corporations serving the interests of not just the stockholders or management but also of society.

This chapter analyzes the early post-transition privatization and enterprise reform efforts of three major countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia (subsequently the Czech Republic), and the Soviet Union (subsequently Russia). For each, it discusses the prevailing ideologies of key decision makers and their external advisors prior to and during the transition process, the initial conditions faced by reformers and advisors, the policy frameworks that evolved, the results achieved, the mistakes made, and the opportunities missed. The ultimate conclusion is that while privatization could have and probably should have been done better, it nonetheless had to be done. The Czech Republic and Russia, and others in the region, are better off after the flawed privatizations they carried out than they would have been had they avoided or delayed divestiture. Poland, which did quite well at first in the absence of mass and rapid privatization, now finds itself burdened with a number of expensive and unproductive state firms. This chapter shows how and why these outcomes came about, and discusses the role of external advisors in the process.

Whether institutional investors monitor corporations and improve firm value is a key question for corporate governance and investment management. I find little empirical support for the hypothesis that institutions undertake monitoring that increases firm quality and valuation. Granger causation tests show that while quality firms do attract institutional investment, institutions do not monitor and firm value subsequently declines. Instead, institutional incentives are critical; some institutions with strong incentives to monitor do, indeed, monitor. Institutions with concentrated portfolios successfully monitor while institutions with a larger percentage stake do not. Pensions and endowments are better monitors than insurers, banks and mutual funds.

This study is motivated by the competing views on whether internal governance mechanisms complement or substitute for external auditing, and how this association is affected by ownership concentration. The complementary view predicts that good internal governance mechanisms are related to high-quality audit. On the other hand, corporate governance mechanisms may be substituted for each other, so more investment in governance mechanisms leads to less investment in external auditing. Therefore, this study aims to examine the association between internal governance mechanisms and the demand for audit quality.

Data from Malaysian listed companies during the period 2009 to 2012 are used. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is applied to analyse the data.

Companies with a higher concentration of ownership are less likely to demand extensive auditing. In addition, the study provides supporting evidence for the complementary association between a company’s governance and audit fees. However, the ownership concentration plays a minor role in the positive association between internal corporate governance and audit quality. Further tests are conducted and support the main findings.

Significant implications are provided for the audit profession in emerging economies, where concentrated ownership is common, to help policymakers and regulators in determining the power of controlling shareholders on audit quality and firm’s governance. The study’s findings open up avenues for further research.

This is the first work to address the role of ownership concentration in the association between corporate governance and audit quality; it suggests that the ownership structure must be considered in examining the effectiveness of corporate governance. The study also provides a comprehensive combination of internal governance mechanisms.

This study aims to explore the moderating impact of governance structure, that is, board characteristics including board size, board independence, board committees and ownership structure like ownership concentration, on the underpricing of small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) initial public offerings (IPOs) in the context of an emerging economy such as India.

Using a sample size of 403 SME IPOs listed on Bombay Stock Exchange SME platform and National Stock Exchange EMERGE, this study uses moderated hierarchical regression analysis to investigate these relationships.

The findings highlighted that board independence, board committees and ownership concentration negatively influence underpricing measured using market-adjusted excess returns. While analysing the moderating relationship, this study finds that ownership concentration positively moderates the relationship between board independence and underpricing, as well as the relationship between board committees and IPO underpricing.

This study is limited to a single country only. Although perfectly suitable for our research inquiry, it is imperative to check the validity of the findings by extending it to other emerging countries with similar socio-economic characteristics. Furthermore, this study tested the hypotheses concerning three board characteristics only. Hence, it could be extended to explore additional governance characteristics for a more comprehensive understanding.

This study provides a foundation for managers to adopt a fine-grained approach to effectively design the board structure ahead of an IPO event. Additionally, the findings may assist policymakers in formulating various policies and guide regulators in regulating the limit on ownership held by various shareholders to prevent their opportunism. The results of this study may further advise potential investors interested in SME IPO firms to critically consider the ownership concentration as a driving factor when scrutinizing their investment portfolios.

This study is unique as it advances the debate on the importance of a governance characteristic, that is, ownership concentration, as a moderating variable in the underexplored context of IPO underpricing of small- and medium-sized firms in India.