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Increasing managerial ownership gives rise to the managerial opportunistic behaviors, among which bad news hoarding has attracted a lot of attention. Nevertheless, there always exists a threshold level at which the accumulated bad news releases abruptly, thereby resulting in corporate stock price crash risk. On the above arguments, this study aims to investigate the impact of managerial ownership on stock price crash risk of the firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

Sample includes the 485 firm-year observations from companies listed on the TSE during the years 2012-2016 and the research hypothesis was tested using multivariate regression model based on panel data.

The results reveal that managerial ownership increases the corporate stock price crash risk. These findings are robust to an alternative measure of stock price crash risk, individual analysis of the research hypothesis for each year and endogeneity concern.

The current study is almost the first study, which has been conducted in emerging capital markets, so the findings of the study not only extend the extant theoretical literature concerning the stock price crash risk in developing countries including emerging capital market of Iran but also help policymakers, regulators, investors and users of financial reports to make informed decisions.

The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of managerial stock ownership on the relationship between material internal control weaknesses (ICW) and audit fees.

The paper uses multivariate regression analyses on a sample of 1,578 ICW and 1,578 pair-matched (based on both propensity score and managerial stock ownership) non-ICW firm observations for a period from 2004 to 2010 to investigate how managerial incentive at various stock ownership levels impacts the relationship between material ICW and audit fees.

For the firms with low managerial stock ownership (up to 5 per cent stockholdings), the authors find no significant effect of managerial ownership on the positive relationship between audit fees and ICW. However, the impact of managerial stock ownership on the relationship between ICW and audit fees is significantly positive when managerial ownership is medium, i.e. more than 5 per cent and less than or equal to 25 per cent stockholdings, and the managerial ownership effect is even higher when managerial stock ownership is high, i.e. more than 25 per cent stockholdings. The result is especially robust for the ICW firms with high managerial stock ownership (i.e. where managers hold more than 25 per cent equity stake in the firms). The additional analyses further show that this managerial ownership effect is more pronounced when the firms suffer from company-level material control weaknesses that have pervasive negative effect on financial reporting quality.

The results imply that in a low managerial ownership firms with substantial misalignment between manager and shareholder incentives, managerial stock ownership has little effect on the ICW and audit fee relationship. But when managers’ ownership interest is at a high level, they are more prone to purchase higher-quality audit service to reduce the risk of financial misstatements due to material ICW, which results in higher audit fees. The results add to the audit fee literature by suggesting that managerial incentive at various ownership levels is a critical governance factor that impacts auditor’s fee structure especially when higher reporting risk exists due to material ICW.

Prior literature documents that there is some relationship between managerial attributes and earnings quality; however, there is no substantive empirical evidence on the effect of managerial stock ownership on audit pricing when client companies face higher risk of financial misreporting as a result of material ICW. In this study, the authors seek answers to these empirical questions and fill the gap in the literature.

Terminations of overfunded pension plans may strengthen a financially‐weak firm. When manager's interests are aligned with shareholder's, either through high levels of stock ownership, or through labor and takeover market discipline at low levels of ownership, termination strengthens the firm and the stock price should react positively. In contrast, managers at middle levels of ownership hold enough stock to be entrenched, but not enough to be aligned with shareholder interests. Terminations may then be for reasons other than strengthening a financially‐weak firm and may not generate a positive stock price reaction. We find that the financial incentives for terminations differ significantly between terminators and nonterminators at high and low levels of managerial ownership, but not at intermediate levels. Our stock return analysis indicates that terminations by high and low ownership firms are consistent with shareholder welfare. Concern has been expressed that terminations of defined benefit pension plans transfer wealth from plan participants to plan sponsors. Plan terminations can have a value‐maximizing motive when the reversions are used as a source of financing, thereby helping firms avoid bankruptcy and liquidation. The empirical evidence (e.g., Alderson and VanDerhei (1992), VanDerhei (1987), and Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen (1990)) showing favorable stock price reactions to terminations by financially‐weak firms are consistent with the value‐maximizing justification for plan terminations. Prior studies (e.g., Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Sicherman and Pettway (1987), Hill and Snell (1989), Benston (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Carter and Stover (1991) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)) have also documented that management's ownership interest in the firm has an important effect on the incentive to maximize firm value. This paper examines the effect of managerial ownership on financial termination. Specifically, we address whether or not financial motivation to terminate plans exists at all levels of managerial ownership. Our results suggest that the terminating firms, when compared to the nonterminating firms, are financially weak at high and low levels of managerial ownership. In contrast, there is no significant difference in financial weakness between the terminators and the nonterminators at the middle ownership levels. Also, stockholders reactions to terminations are higher at high and low levels of managerial ownership.

The ownership structure of a corporation can alleviate the agency problem that arises between shareholders and managers of a corporation, which implies that the ownership composition of a firm may infl uence the level of voluntary disclosure. This study investigates whether the ownership structure of U. S. based multinational corporations affects the managerial decision to voluntarily disclose quarterly foreign segment data. The empirical results show that the three ownership variables of interest, institutional stock ownership, managerial stock ownership and outside blockholder stock ownership are inversely related to the level of voluntary disclosure of quarterly foreign segment data. Therefore, it is inferred that an increase in the proportion of outstanding common stock held by these ownership groups is accompanied by a decrease in the probability that a U.S. multinational firm voluntarily discloses quarterly foreign segment data.

The authors examine how a firm’s risk change around an international acquisition is related to the managerial equity interest in the firm. Focusing on the international acquisitions made by bidding fi rms that have weak monitoring from outside shareholders, those that make an acquisition in an unrelated industry, and those that experience negative stock returns around announcements, the authors find that managers of these firms tend to undertake risk‐decreasing international acquisitions with the increase of managerial equity ownership and previously granted stock options. The evidence suggests that managerial incentives to use foreign acquisitions to reduce the risk of their personal wealth are more often utilized in the absence of shareholder monitoring.

This study aims to analyze the effect of ownership structure that consists of managerial ownership and institutional ownership of the extensive of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure.

The population in this study is manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI), as the manufacturing companies are considered to have great potential on environmental damage (Mathews, 2000). The selected sample were the companies which meet certain criteria (purposive sampling) which published the complete annual financial statements from 2011 to 2015. This study used an analysis method using partial least square (WarpPLS) to assess the effect of the structure of ownership consists of managerial ownership and institutional ownership on the extent of the CSR disclosure.

The results showed that there is a direct effect of a negative and significant correlation between managerial ownership on CSR disclosure, and there is a direct effect of a positive and significant correlation between institutional ownership on CSR disclosure.

Originality of this paper shows PLS (WarpPLS) that applied to determine the effect between variables managerial and institutional ownership on CSR disclosure. This research is collected data financial statements and annual reports of manufacturing companies obtained from the Indonesia Capital Market Reference Center (PRPM), which is located in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), which there has not been research by the methods and the same location.

This study examines the impact of managerial ownership on risk‐taking and firm performance. The study utilizes data for thirty randomly selected companies from four industries in four different sectors. Industries are oil & gas and field services from energy sector; insurance, property, and casualty from the financial sector, drugs from the health sector; and computer and data processing from the technology sector. This yielded a total of 120 observations. Accounting measures and correlation analysis are used to determine the relationship between managerial ownership, risk‐taking, and firm performance in each industry and for the whole sample. We found no significant relationship between these variables in different industries and for the whole sample. Managerial ownership seems to be merely a reflection of the way in which managers receive their benefits. Managerial ownership does not seem to provide any incentive to work harder for improving the company’s performance in the accounting sense.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the association between the corporate ownership characteristics and the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses over financial reporting under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002.

The paper employs both ordered and binary logistic regression models for a sample of 695 US firms who reported internal control weaknesses for the first time, pursuant to SOX Section 404, and evaluates the impact of the stock ownership characteristics on the timeliness in remediation of their control weaknesses.

The test results show that the corporate ownership characteristics, as a part of governance mechanism, play an incrementally critical role to influence firms' decisions to promptly remediate their internal control problems and improve the reliability of financial information. In addition, it was also found that a corporate board independent of its CEO is effective in monitoring timely remediation of control problems. Sub‐sample analyses for the company‐level and account‐specific internal control weaknesses produce similar results in support of the effect of corporate stock ownership characteristics on the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses.

First, the paper adds to the literature by demonstrating the incremental effect of the stock ownership characteristics on a firm's timeliness in remediation of control weaknesses, even after controlling the effect of audit committee and board characteristics in the analysis. Second, the paper shows that even in the post‐SOX years with enhanced regulatory oversight in corporate affairs, the effect of corporate ownership attributes as a part of governance is incrementally observable in a situation that calls for prompt managerial action to ensure the reliability of financial information. Third, for the first time, the study makes a separate detailed analysis on the association between the stock ownership attributes and the remediation of company‐level and account‐specific control weaknesses. The results provide valuable insights into the ownership governance effect on the remediation of the two types of control weaknesses that have different rigor, auditability (more or less auditable), and effects (pervasive or non‐pervasive) on financial reporting quality. Fourth, the study further enhances one's understanding of several important governance factors that help achieve a sound financial reporting system and restore investors' confidence in the system.

This study investigates the convergence-of-interest and entrenchment effects on the relationship between managerial ownership and financial distress using evidence from the Chinese stock market. It also analyzes whether the relationship is mediated by research and development (R&D) investment.

Using a dataset consisting of 19,059 firm-year observations of Chinese listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2010 and 2020, this study employs both piecewise and curvilinear models.

The results indicate that managerial ownership has a negative association with firm financial distress in both the low (below 12%) and high (above 18%) convergence-of-interest regions of managerial ownership, suggesting that managerial ownership in this region may contribute to improve firm financial status. Meanwhile, managerial ownership has a positive association with firm financial distress in the entrenchment region (12–18%), implying that managerial ownership in the entrenchment region may contribute to impair firm financial status. Furthermore, the results show that R&D investment mediates the association between managerial ownership and financial distress.

This study is the first to provide evidence of a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and financial distress, and identify the entrenchment region in the Chinese setting.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk and the moderating effects of corporate governance.

This study investigates the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk using the sample consisting of listed firms in Vietnam for the period of 2011–2020 using panel regressions.

The authors find that there is a positive relationship between tax avoidance and stock price crash risk. Foreign ownership weakens the impacts of tax avoidance on stock price crash risk, while managerial ownership strengthens the impacts. Female Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and female chairpersons weaken this relationship. Board gender diversity and state ownership have insignificant moderating impacts.

These findings could help the stock market build better internal monitoring mechanisms to reduce the impacts of tax avoidance on future stock price crash risk. Investors can recognize the characteristics of corporate governance, especially foreign ownership, managerial ownership, female CEOs and female chairpersons when making investment decisions. The policy makers should consider policies to attract foreign investment and support women entrepreneurship.

This paper contributes to the literature on the impacts of tax avoidance on stock price crash risk in emerging countries. This paper is the first to investigate the influence of corporate governance mechanisms including state ownership, foreign ownership, female CEOs and chairpersons and board gender diversity on this relationship.