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Book part
Publication date: 1 November 2008

Sandra Dow and Jean McGuire

We analyze corporate governance mechanisms in Canadian and US firms. We show that despite similarities in governance practices in both countries, there are differences in…

Abstract

We analyze corporate governance mechanisms in Canadian and US firms. We show that despite similarities in governance practices in both countries, there are differences in the efficacy of these mechanisms. In particular, the performance of Canadian firms is less sensitive to ownership structure than that of US firms. Differences are also found in the performance implications of incentive pay. Our study suggests that country-specific governance trends persist among Canadian firms cross-listed in the United States. These findings may explain why Canadian firms which are cross-listed in the United States continue to trade at a discount compared to their US counterparts.

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Institutional Approach to Global Corporate Governance: Business Systems and Beyond
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84855-320-0

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Book part
Publication date: 26 November 2016

Abstract

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The Theory and Practice of Directors’ Remuneration
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78560-683-0

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Article
Publication date: 25 July 2019

Muhammad Usman, Muhammad Umar Farooq, Junrui Zhang, Nanyan Dong and Muhammad Abdul Majid Makki

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the crucial question of whether gender diversity in boardroom is associated with CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link.

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the crucial question of whether gender diversity in boardroom is associated with CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors used the data of companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange for a sample consisting of KSE-100 index companies for the period of five years. The authors used the ordinary least square regression technique to test the developed hypotheses. The authors also used the two-step Heckman selection model, two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching method to control the problem of endogeneity.

Findings

The authors find reliable evidence of a negative association between gender diversity and CEO pay and of board gender diversity’s strengthening the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. The authors also find that women director are more effective in setting the optimal contract in non-family-owned firms and firms with dispersed ownership structure as compared to family-owned firms and firms with concentrated ownership structure. Moreover, results also reflect that the influence of board diversity on both CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link is stronger when gender diversity goes beyond tokenism.

Practical implications

The findings have implications in terms of providing the basis for policy makers to accord the same level of importance to gender diversity in the boardroom as well as contributing to the current debate on the desirability of mandating or recommending gender diversity on boardrooms.

Originality/value

This study is among the few studies which investigate the moderating role of boardroom gender diversity on the CEO pay-performance link. In addition, this study contributes to the institutional theory by providing the empirical evidence that the effect boardroom gender diversity on CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link varies by type of ownership.

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International Journal of Manpower, vol. 40 no. 7
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0143-7720

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Article
Publication date: 7 March 2016

Jianhui Huang, Ling Liu and Ingrid C. Ulstad

– The purpose of this study is to investigate the cross-sectional associations between growth options and the peer pay–performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to investigate the cross-sectional associations between growth options and the peer pay–performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.

Design/methodology/approach

This study includes analytical analysis and multivariable regression analysis.

Findings

It is predicted in this study that there is a non-linear concave relation between peer pay–performance sensitivity and a firm’s growth options. Results based on the executive compensation data from ExecuComp are consistent with the hypothesis presented in this study.

Research limitations/implications

Future scholars need to consider the non-linear impact of growth options on peer pay–performance sensitivity when they conduct research related to CEO compensation by differentiating the company’s growth options to be at a low, medium and high level. In an industry, when a compensation committee decides on the peers for performance comparison purposes, the committee needs to make sure that the peer firms they select have similar operational environments, for example, they face similar growth options (e.g. low, medium or high) and idiosyncratic variances.

Practical implications

This study contributes to the managerial compensation literature by revealing the important role growth options, as well as idiosyncratic variances, play on peer pay–performance sensitivity. The results of this study have implications for both future researchers as well as industrial practitioners.

Social implications

It gives guidance on designing CEO compensation contracts.

Originality/value

This is an original work from the coauthors listed on this study.

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International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, vol. 24 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1834-7649

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Article
Publication date: 12 July 2013

Peter Rampling, Ian Eddie and Jackie Liu

Kato & Long state that executive compensation has attracted much attention from economists in the past two decades yet most academic work on executive compensation has…

Abstract

Purpose

Kato & Long state that executive compensation has attracted much attention from economists in the past two decades yet most academic work on executive compensation has been concentrated on a few developed countries such as the USA and the UK, mainly due to data availability. In light of the mounting interest in the vital role that corporate governance may play in economic development, however, it is of considerable importance to study how firms in developing countries compensate their top executives. In particular, for transition economies struggling to transform their state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) into profitable modern firms through various reform measures, the provision of efficient managerial incentives is a crucial ingredient of the successful transition of the economy. Since executive pay‐performance link represents the bulk of managerial incentives for top management, a closer look at the nature of pay‐performance link for top management in transitional economies will provide much needed information for the evaluation of the current reform effort and the designing of future reform measures. This paper seeks to address these issues.

Design/methodology/approach

A review of available literature for this topic was sourced, collated and summarised.

Findings

The significant pay‐performance link for top management in China's listed firms is overall encouraging news for current policy makers in China, who consider public listing in the stock market as a key mechanism of achieving such a goal for large SOEs. However, not all news is good. Perhaps most importantly, they have found that government ownership of China's listed firms is weakening pay‐performance link for top managers and thus possibly making China's listed firms less effective in solving the agency problem.

Originality/value

Taken in context with other literature and research, this paper provides an insight into the link between Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and other publicly listed firms and executive remuneration.

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Asian Review of Accounting, vol. 21 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1321-7348

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Article
Publication date: 20 July 2021

Chwee Ming Tee

The purpose of this study is to examine whether board diversity can attenuate weaker executive directors' pay-performance link in high free cash flow and low-growth firms…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine whether board diversity can attenuate weaker executive directors' pay-performance link in high free cash flow and low-growth firms (HFCF_LGRW).

Design/methodology/approach

This study employed the Malaysian dataset from 2005 till 2016 and the fixed-effect model to investigate the developed hypotheses. The two-stage least squares method (2SLS) is employed to mitigate endogeneity issues.

Findings

This study finds that a positive association between executive directors' pay and firm performance is weaker in HFCF_LGRW firms. However, board diversity, namely ethnic and gender diversity, can mitigate weaker executive directors' pay-performance link, indicating effective monitoring.

Originality/value

This study is among the first to reveal that executive directors' pay-performance link is weaker in firms with HFCF_LGRW growth, consistent with Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. However, findings suggest that this agency problem in HFCF_LGRW firms is attenuated by board diversity, namely ethnic and gender diversity. This supports the notion that diversity in corporate boards serves as an effective internal monitor.

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International Journal of Emerging Markets, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-8809

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Article
Publication date: 1 September 1999

Anthony J. Crawford

Reviews previous research on the effects of CEO compensation structure, outlines the criteria for relative performance evaluation (RPE) and notes the paucity of empirical…

Abstract

Reviews previous research on the effects of CEO compensation structure, outlines the criteria for relative performance evaluation (RPE) and notes the paucity of empirical evidence to support it. Reports a study of the use of RPE for US bank CEO compensation 1976‐1988; and its relationship to shareholder, market and industry returns. Explains the methodology and presents the results, which suggest that CEO pay is positively linked to firm performance, but negatively linked to market/industry performance; and that performance is positively linked to CEO option wealth. Adds that both the pay/performance link and the use of RPE increased after bank deregulation in the early 1980s. Considers consistency with other research and concludes that the reduction in compensation risk offered by RPE should reduce compensation cost and thus provide a good reason for the banking industry to increase its use.

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Managerial Finance, vol. 25 no. 9
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

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Book part
Publication date: 7 June 2010

Beth Florin, Kevin F. Hallock and Douglas Webber

This paper is an investigation of the pay-for-performance link in executive compensation. In particular, we document main issues in the pay–performance debate and explain…

Abstract

This paper is an investigation of the pay-for-performance link in executive compensation. In particular, we document main issues in the pay–performance debate and explain practical issues in setting pay as well as data issues including how pay is disclosed and how that has changed over time. We also provide a summary of the state of CEO pay levels and pay mix in 2009 using a sample of over 2,000 companies and describe main data sources for researchers. We also investigate what we believe to be at the root of fundamental confusion in the literature across disciplines – methodological issues. In exploring methodological issues, we focus on empirical specifications, causality, fixed-effects, first-differencing, and instrumental variable issues. We then discuss two important but not yet well-explored areas, international issues, and compensation in non-profits. We conclude by examining a series of research areas where further work can be done, within and across disciplines.

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Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-85724-126-9

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Article
Publication date: 16 July 2020

Muhammad Usman, Muhammad Abubakkar Siddique, Muhammad Abdul Majid Makki, Ammar Ali Gull, Ali Dardour and Junming Yin

In this paper, the authors investigate whether an independent and gender-diverse compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers' pay and firm…

Abstract

Purpose

In this paper, the authors investigate whether an independent and gender-diverse compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers' pay and firm performance in Chinese companies. The authors also investigate whether the independent compensation committee composed of all male directors is effective in designing the optimal contract for executives.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use data from A-share listed companies on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2005 to 2015. As a baseline methodology, the authors use pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression to draw inferences. In addition, cluster OLS regression, two-stage least square regression, the two-stage Heckman test and the propensity score matching method are also used to control for endogeneity issues.

Findings

The authors find evidence that an independent or gender-diverse compensation committee strengthens the link between top managers' pay and firm performance; that the presence of a woman on the compensation committee enhances the positive influence of committee independence on this relationship; that a compensation committee's independence or gender diversity is more effective in designing top managers' compensation in legal-person-controlled firms than they are in state-controlled firms; that gender diversity on the compensation committee is negatively associated with top managers' total pay; and that an independent compensation committee pays top managers more.

Practical implications

The study results highlight the role of an independent compensation committee in designing optimal contracts for top managers. The authors provide empirical evidence that a woman on the compensation committee strengthens its objectivity in determining top managers' compensation. The study finding supports regulatory bodies' recommendations regarding independent and women directors.

Social implications

The study findings contribute to the recent debate about gender equality around the globe. Given the discrimination against women, many regulatory bodies mandate a quota for women on corporate boards. The study findings support the regulatory bodies' recommendations by highlighting the economic benefit of having women in top management positions.

Originality/value

This study contributes to literature by investigating the largely overlooked questions of whether having a gender-diverse or independent compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers' pay and firm performance; whether an independent compensation committee is more efficient in setting executives' pay when it is gender-diverse; and whether the effect of independent directors and female directors on top managers' compensation varies based on the firm's ownership structure. Overall, the main contribution of the study is that the authors provide robust empirical evidence in support of the managerial power axiom.

Details

International Journal of Emerging Markets, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-8809

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Article
Publication date: 9 April 2018

Herman Aguinis, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Geoffrey P. Martin and Harry Joo

The purpose of the study is to set a research agenda so that future conceptual and empirical research can improve the understanding of why CEO pay and CEO performance are…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of the study is to set a research agenda so that future conceptual and empirical research can improve the understanding of why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper compiles and adds to many of the explanations provided by this special issue’s nine commentaries regarding why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled. These explanations were grouped into two categories: economic (e.g. marginal productivity theory, agency theory and behavioral agency model) and social-institutional-psychological (e.g. CEO individual differences and characteristics and CEO-organization interactions). Moreover, new analyses based on additional data were conducted to examine measurement-related explanations for the observed pay-performance decoupling.

Findings

Results based on alternative measures of pay and performance confirmed, once again, the existence of pay-performance decoupling.

Research limitations/implications

This paper will stimulate research pitting theoretical explanations against each other to understand their relative validity in different contexts.

Practical implications

The paper informs ongoing efforts to link CEO pay to performance.

Social implications

The paper also revisits the decoupling of CEO pay and firm performance from a normative and value-based perspective (i.e. regarding whether pay and performance should be related).

Originality/value

The paper clarifies that the articles in this special issue largely concluded that CEO pay is decoupled from CEO performance.

Objetivo – El objetivo es proponer una ageda de investigación de forma que la futura investigación conceptual y empírica pueda mejorar la comprensión sobre por qué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO no están conectados.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – El artículo compila y añade a la mayoría de las explicaciones proporcionados por los nueve comentarios publicados en este número especial acerca de porqué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO están desconectados. Estas explicaciones se agrupan en dos categorías: económicas (e.g. teoría de la productividad marginal, teoría de agencia, modelo de agencia comportamental) y socio-institucional-psicológicas (e.g. diferencias y características individuales del CEO, interacción CEO-organización). Además, se llevan a cabo nuevos análisis sobre datos adicionales para examinar algunas explicaciones relativas a la medición para la falta de conexión entre retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Resultados – Los resultados basados en medidas alternativas de retribución y rendimiento confirman, una vez más, la existencia de una desconexión entre ambas magnitudes.

Limitaciones/implicaciones – Este artículo estimulará a investigación contraponiendo diferentes explicaciones teóricas para entender su validez relativa en diferentes contextos.

Implicaciones prácticas – El artículo informa sobre los esfuerzos actuals para relacionar la retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Implicaciones sociales – El artículo revisa la desconexión entre la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO desde una perspectiva normativa y de valor (i.e. sobre si la retribución y el rendimiento deben estar conectados).

Originalidad/valor – El artículo clarifica que los artículos en este número especial concluyen que la retribución del CEO está desconectada de su rendimiento.

Objetivo

O objetivo é estabelecer uma agenda de investigação para que futuros estudos conceptuais ou empíricos possam melhorar a compreensão do porquê de a compensação do CEO e o desempenho do CEO estarem dissociados.

Metodologia – O artigo compila e acrescenta às muitas explicações fornecidas pelos oito comentários deste número especial sobre as razões da dissociação da compensação e do desempenho do CEO. Estas explicações agrupam-se em duas categorias: económicas (eg., teoria da produtividade marginal, teoria da agência, modelo da agência comportamental) e Socio-institucional-psicológicas (eg., características e diferenças individuais do CEO, interações CEO-Organização). Além disso, conduziram-se novas análises baseadas em dados para examinar explicações baseadas em medições para a dissociação pagamento-desempenho.

Resultados – Resultados baseados em medidas alternativas de pagamento e desempenho confirmaram, uma vez mais, a existência da dissociação entre pagamento e performance.

Limitações/implicações – Este artigo estimula investigação que contraponha diferentes explicações teóricas, para perceber a sua validade relativa em diferentes contextos.

Implicações práticas – O artigo dá informação sobre esforços em curso para ligar a compensação do CEO ao desempenho.

Implicações sociais – O artigo revisita a dissociação do pagamento e desempenho da empresa Numa perspectiva normative e baseada em valores (ie, sobre se a compensação e a performance devem estar relacionadas).

Originalidade/valor – O paper clarifica que os artigos neste número especial basicamente concluiram que a compensação do CEO está dissociala do desempenho do CEO.

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