Relative performance evaluation in CEO pay contracts: evidence from the commercial banking industry

Abstract

Reviews previous research on the effects of CEO compensation structure, outlines the criteria for relative performance evaluation (RPE) and notes the paucity of empirical evidence to support it. Reports a study of the use of RPE for US bank CEO compensation 1976‐1988; and its relationship to shareholder, market and industry returns. Explains the methodology and presents the results, which suggest that CEO pay is positively linked to firm performance, but negatively linked to market/industry performance; and that performance is positively linked to CEO option wealth. Adds that both the pay/performance link and the use of RPE increased after bank deregulation in the early 1980s. Considers consistency with other research and concludes that the reduction in compensation risk offered by RPE should reduce compensation cost and thus provide a good reason for the banking industry to increase its use.

Citation

Crawford, A.J. (1999), "Relative performance evaluation in CEO pay contracts: evidence from the commercial banking industry", Managerial Finance, Vol. 25 No. 9, pp. 34-54. https://doi.org/10.1108/03074359910766145