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This is a short commentary on Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment.”

Using insights from prior studies on executive compensation, the author’s commentary presents a critical evaluation of “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […].” In addition, the author offers potential avenues for further research.

The paper “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” is well executed and makes several significant contributions to the management and executive compensation literature. Particularly, noteworthy are the use of advanced quantitative methods, the use of power law distributions to explain chief executive officer (CEO) pay outcomes, the focus on pay-for-performance and the role of justice in CEO outcomes. The author’s commentary in the present paper discusses the measurement of CEO pay and performance, poses alternative estimation methods to explore the pay-for-performance link and offers thoughts on justice theory in the context of CEO pay.

The authors’ findings may be briefly stated as CEO pay is better described by a power law distribution than a normal distribution, CEO pay is not linked to firm performance and the patterns of CEO pay does not conform to patterns of distributive justice. Overall, the authors provide an important way to evaluate CEO pay outcomes. Thy set the stage for new avenues of research.

CEO pay is a highly controversial subject in the domain of corporate governance. This paper offers boards of directors and policymakers a method to better understand the success or failure of boardroom pay policies.

CEO pay is an important social measure.

The authors’ paper is original by offering a method for determining over and underpayment of CEOs. The author in the present paper makes suggestions on how one might extend the research.

Objetivo – Este es un comentario sobre el trabajo de Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle y Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Utilizando las ideas de la literatura previa sobre retribución de ejecutivos, mi comentario presenta una evaluación crítica del artículo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […]”. Además, esbozo algunas ideas para la investigación futura.

Resultados – El artículo “Dos lados de la injusticia de la retribución de los CEO” está bien desarrollado y realiza varias contribuciones significativas a las literaturas de gestión y retribución de ejecutivos. En particular, son de señalar: a) el uso de métodos cuantitativos avanzados, b) el uso de la distribución de ley de poder para explicar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO, c) el foco en el pago por resultados, d) el papel de la justicia en el rendimiento del CEO. Mi comentario a) discute las medidas de retribución y rendimiento del CEO, b) propone métodos de estimación alternativos para la relación entre retribución y rendimiento y c) ofrece ideas en torno a la teoría de la justicia en el contexto de la retribución del CEO.

Implicaciones – Los resultados de los autores pueden resumirse así: a) La retribución de los CEO se describe mejor como una distribución de ley de poder que como una distribución normal, b) la retribución del CEO y el rendimiento empresarial no están conectados, c) los patrones de retribución del CEO no concuerdan con los patrones de justicia distributiva. En general, los autores proporcionan un importante método para evaluar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO y fomentar la investigación futura.

Implicaciones prácticas – La retribución del CEO es un tema muy controvertido en el ámbito del gobierno corporativo. Este artículo proporciona a los consejos de administración y a los decisores públicos un método para entender mejor el éxito o fracaso de las prácticas retributivas en los consejos de administración.

Originalidad/valor – El trabajo de los autores es original al ofrecer un método para determinar la sobre o la infra retribución de los CEO. Yo apunto algunas sugerencias sobre cómo puede extenderse esta investigación.

Objetivo – Este é um breve comentário a Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Metodologia – Usando conhecimentos de estudos anteriores em compensação executiva, o meu comentário apresenta uma avaliação crítica de “Two sides of CEO pay injustice:….”. Adicionalmente, ofereço potenciais avenidas para investigação futura.

Resultados – O artigo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” está bem feito e apresenta diversas contribuições importantes à literature sobre compensação executiva e de gestores. Em particular, são de salientar: a) o uso de métodos quantitativos avançados b) o uso de distribuições da lei de potência para explicar os resultados do pagamento a CEOs c) O enfoque no pagamento pela performance d) o papel da justiça nos resultados para o CEO. O meu comentário a) discute a medida de pagamento ao CEO e do desempenho b) Propõe métodos alternativos de estimação para explorar a ligação pagamento ao desempenho e c) Apresenta argumentos da teoria da justiça no contexto da compensação do CEO.

Implicações – Os resultados dos autores podem resumir-se como: a) Compensação do CEO é mais bem descrita por uma distribuição da lei de potência que por uma distribuição normal b) Compensação do CEO não está ligada à performance da empresa c) Os padrões da compensação do CEO não se conformam com justiça distributiva. Em geral, os autores fornecem uma forma importante de avaliar a compensação do CEO. Apresentam por isso novas vias para investigação futura.

Implicações práticas – Compensação do CEO é um tópico controverso do domínio da governança corporativa. Este artigo oferece aos Conselhos de Administração e decisores politicos um método para melhor perceber o sucesso ou insucesso das políticas de pagamento aos membros das Administrações.

Originalidade/valor – O artigo é original e oferece um método para determinar sobre ou sub compensação do CEO. Faço sugestões de como se pode estender a investigação.

The purpose of this paper is to interpret the use of accounting information relating to the House of Correction, a public safety institution established in Rio de Janeiro for the control of workers under a tutelage system (1831–1864). The aim of the House of Correction was to develop a disciplined workforce of former slaves and other “Free Africans”. Various control and information procedures were put in place to monitor its achievement of this goal.

This study is based on historical archival research, mainly conducted at the National Archive of Rio de Janeiro and at the Brazilian National Library. The study uses Althusser’s ideology concept and the Marxist concept of reproduction of labour to show how accounting information enabled the administrator of the House of Correction to exercise control over the “Free Africans” consistent with the ideologies of the period and place.

The authors find that the House of Correction pursued a policy of ensuring “Free Africans” were docile, obedient and familiar with State ideology.

The research is based on a single case study and it shows the need for both comparative and interdisciplinary analysis in order to increase an understanding of the use of accounting information in ancient prison contexts, as well as in contemporary situations.

This paper extends our knowledge of the use of accounting for the control of workers, who were either captive or repressed due to their ethnical differences; and it shows how ideology can be imposed through the use of accounting information. The authors extend theory by applying the Marxist and Althusserian concept of reproduction of labour to the case of “Free Africans”.

This study aims to understand, from the analysis of the work of a Brazilian network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), how advocacy on human rights issues is developed to defend causes before the legislative branch, identifying its contributions and effectiveness. For this, were observed, the strategies and tactics employed in the implementation of two advocacy campaigns promoted by a Brazilian NGOs network.

The research adopts the method of inductive investigation with a qualitative approach and uses the techniques of semi-structured in-depth interviews and documentary research. The paper is developed within the scientific field of public relations (PR), uses as reference the critical theory and the rhetorical theory of PR, and is based on the concept of advocacy.

Some results of the advocacy are observed, such as the greater awareness of political decision-makers, in addition to the influence on the definition of the political agenda and on the action of the political decision-makers.

Among the limitations of this study are the time span for analyzing the campaigns' actions, which could be extended to observe long-term results, as well as the dedication of the study exclusively to the legislative branch since the campaigns also sought to influence decision-making in the executive branch.

The results found encourage the strengthening of the democratic environment since it increases the power and influence of civil society in the political decision-making of the legislative branch.

The study showed that advocacy, as a PR activity, increases civil society participation in political decisions.

This paper aims to explore the implications of Aguinis and colleagues’ study, and in particular their claim that the inconsistency between chief executive officer (CEO) pay and CEO performance is reflective of a fundamental injustice. In doing so, the authors highlight issues regarding the meaning of fairness in the context of CEO pay, the extent to which CEOs can personally affect firm performance and the challenges in ascertaining whether CEOs are overpaid, underpaid or appropriately paid.

The authors use a conceptual approach, integrating research on executive compensation and managerial discretion to lend nuance to Aguinis and colleagues’ arguments and findings.

The main takeaway of the commentary is that CEO pay fairness is a complex and multifaceted matter that can be difficult to broadly characterize. The evidence offered by Aguinis and colleagues regarding power law distributions and the weak overlap between CEO pay and CEO performance is compelling, but questions about income inequality and pay fairness rarely lend themselves to straightforward answers. Some caution is thus warranted when evaluating Aguinis and colleagues’ conclusion that the US CEO labor market is pervasively unfair.

The authors urge scholars who build on the work of Aguinis and colleagues to pay heed to the challenges in reconciling the twin concepts of CEO pay and CEO performance.

Objetivo – Este comentario explora las implicaciones del estudio de Aguinis y colegas, y en particular su afirmación de que la inconsistencia entre la retribución del CEO y su rendimiento es el reflejo de una injusticia fundamental. Se señalan aspectos relativos al significado de justicia en el contexto de la retribución del CEO, a la influencia del CEO sobre el resultado empresarial, y a los retos de aseverar si la retribución de los CEOs es excesiva, insuficiente o justa.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Los autores utilizan una aproximación conceptual, integrando investigación en retribución y discrecionalidad de ejecutivos para matizar los argumentos y resultados de Agunis y colegas.

Resultados – La principal conclusión del comentario es que el grado de justicia del pago a CEOs es un tema difícil de caracterizar de forma global. La evidencia ofrecida por Aguinis y colegas en relación a la distribución de ley de poder y la poca superposición entre la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO es fascinante, pero las cuestiones sobre inequidad y justicia de los ingresos y la retribución raramente generan respuestas sencillas. Por tanto es necesaria cierta cautela a la hora de evaluar la conclusión de Aguinis y colegas de que el mercado laboral de CEOs en Estados Unidos es fundamentalmente injusto.

Originalidad/valor – Los autores urgen a los académicos a avanzar sobre el trabajo de Aguinis y colegas y prestar atención al reto de reconciliar los conceptos de retribución del CEO y resultados del CEO.

Objetivo – Este comentário explora as implicações do estudo de Aguinis et al., e em particular a sua afirmação de que a inconsistência entre a remuneração do CEO e seu desempenho é a reflexão de uma injustiça fundamental. Aspectos relacionados com o significado da justiça são apontados no contexto da remuneração do CEO, a influência do CEO sobre o resultado do negócio, e os desafios de afirmar se a remuneração dos CEOs é excessiva, insuficiente ou justa.

Design/metodologia/aproximação – Os autores utilizam uma abordagem conceitual, integrando a pesquisa na remuneração e discrição dos executivos para clarificar os argumentos e os resultados de Agunis et al.

Resultados – A principal conclusão do comentário é que o grau de equidade do pagamento aos CEOs é um assunto difícil de caracterizar de forma global. A evidência oferecida por Aguinis et al. em relação à distribuição da lei de poder e a pequena sobreposição entre a remuneração e o desempenho do CEO é fascinante, mas as questões de desigualdade e justiça de renda e retribuição raramente geram respostas simples. Portanto, é necessária alguma cautela ao avaliar a conclusão de Aguinis et al. que o mercado de trabalho dos CEOs nos Estados Unidos é fundamentalmente injusto.

Originalidade/valor – Os autores instam aos investigadores a avançar sobre o trabalho de Aguinis et al. e prestar atenção ao desafio de conciliar os conceitos de remuneração do CEO e os seus respectivos resultados.

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment.

Rather than using the traditional normal distribution view in which CEO performance clusters around the mean with relatively little variance, the authors adopt a novel power law approach. They studied 22 industries and N = 4,158 CEO-firm combinations for analyses based on Tobin’s Q and N = 5,091 for analyses based on return on assets. Regarding compensation, they measured the CEO distribution based on total compensation and three components of CEO total pay: salary, bonus, and value of options exercised.

In total, 86 percent of CEO performance and 91 percent of CEO pay distributions fit a power law better than a normal distribution, indicating that a minority of CEOs are producing top value for their firms (i.e. CEO performance) and a minority of CEOs are appropriating top value for themselves (i.e. CEO pay). But, the authors also found little overlap between CEOs who are the top performers and CEOs who are the top earners.

The findings shed new light on CEO pay deservingness by using a novel conceptual and methodological lens that highlights systematic over and underpayment. Results suggest a violation of distributive justice and offer little support for agency theory’s efficient contracting hypothesis, which have important implications for agency theory, equity theory, justice theory, and agent risk sharing and agent risk bearing theories.

Results highlight erroneous practices when trying to benchmark CEO pay based on average levels of performance in an industry because the typical approach to CEO compensation based on averages significantly underpays stars and overpays average performers.

Results offer new insights on the extent of over and underpayment. The findings uncover an extremely large non-overlap between the top earning and top performing CEOs and to an extent far greater in magnitude than previously suggested.

Objetivo – El objetivo de nuestro estudio fue examinar si los directores ejecutivos (CEOs) merecen la remuneración monetaria que reciben.

Metodología – En lugar de utilizar el enfoque tradicional que asume que la distribución del rendimiento de CEOs sigue la curva normal (con la mayoría de CEOs agrupados en torno a la media y relativamente poca variación), adoptamos un enfoque diferente basado en la ley de potencia. Incluimos 22 industrias y N = 4.158 combinaciones de CEO-firma para análisis basados en Tobin’s Q y N = 5.091 para análisis basado en la rentabilidad de los activos. En cuanto a la remuneracion, medimos distribuciones basadas en la remuneración total y tres componentes del pago completo a los CEOs: salario, bonos, y el valor de las opciones ejercitadas.

Resultados – 86% de las distribuciones de rendimiento de CEOs y el 91% de las distribuciones de pago de los CEO se aproximan mejor a una distribución de ley de potencia que a una distribución normal. Esto indica que una minoría de los CEOs produce un valor muy superior para sus empresas (es decir, el rendimiento CEO) y una minoría de los CEOs apropia valor superior para sí mismos (es decir, pago de los CEO). Sin embargo, encontramos muy poco solapamiento entre aquellos CEOs que se desempeñan mejor y los CEOs que ganan más.

Implicaciones – Nuestros hallazgos usando una conceptualización y metodología novedosas ponen en relieve que a muchos CEOs se les paga demasiado y que a muchos no se les paga suficiente (en comparación con su desempeño). Los resultados sugieren una violación de los principios de justicia distributiva y no apoyan la hipótesis de “contratación eficiente,” y tienen implicaciones para para la teoría de la agencia, de la equidad, de la justicia, y de la distribución de riesgos.

Implicaciones prácticas – Los resultados destacan las prácticas erróneas con respecto a la distribución de compensación a CEOs que se basan en los niveles medios de rendimiento en una industria. Estas prácticas llevan a no pagar suficiente a los directivos “estrella” y pagar demasiado a los directivos con desempeño medio.

Originalidad/valor – Los resultados ofrecen nuevas perspectivas sobre la relación entre desempeño y compensación de CEOs y que los que se desempeñan mejor no son los que reciben más pago, y viceversa. Estas diferencias son mucho más grandes de que lo que se creía anteriormente.

Objetivo – O objetivo do nosso estudo foi examinar se os CEOs merecem a compensação monetária que recebem.

Metodologia – Em vez de utilizar a abordagem tradicional que assume que a distribuição do desempenho do CEO segue a curva normal (com a maioria dos CEOs agrupados em torno da média e relativamente pouca variação), adotamos uma abordagem diferente com base num enfoque inovador da lei de potência. Incluímos 22 indústrias e N = 4.158 combinações de CEO-empresa para análise baseada no Q de Tobin e N = 5091 para análise baseado na rentabilidade dos ativos. Em relação à compensação, medimos as distribuições de CEO com base no total de compensação e três componentes do pagamento total dos CEOs: salário, bônus e o valor das opções exercidas.

Resultados – 86% do desempenho do CEO e 91% das distribuições de pagamento do CEO correspondem a uma lei de potência melhor do que uma distribuição normal, indicando que uma minoria de CEOs está produzindo valor superior para suas empresas (ou seja, desempenho do CEO) e uma minoria de CEOs se apropriando do valor superior para si próprios (isto é, o salário do CEO). Mas, também encontramos pouca sobreposição entre CEOs que tem os melhores desempenhos e os CEOs que tem as maiores ganancias.

Implicações – Nossas descobertas lançam nova luz sobre o merecimento do pagamento do CEO, usando uma nova lente conceitual e metodológica que destaca o excessivo e o baixo pagamento sistemático. Os resultados sugerem uma violação da justiça distributiva e não apoiam a hipótese da contratação eficiente, e tem implicações para a teoria da agência, teoria da igualdade, teoria da justiça e distribuição de riscos.

Implicações práticas – Os resultados destacam práticas errôneas quando se tenta benchmark de remuneração do CEO baseado em níveis médios de desempenho em uma indústria, porque essas práticas levam a não pagar o suficiente aos CEOs “estrela” e pagar em excesso CEOs com desempenho médio.

Originalidade/valor – Os resultados oferecem novas perspectivas sobre a relação entre desempenho e retribuição dos CEOs e que os que desempenham melhor não são os que recebem um pagamento maior, e vice-versa. Estas diferenças são muito maiores do que se pensava anteriormente.

Over the past two decades, there has been an increasing interest on corporate social responsibility by a number of constituencies – corporate managers, research scholars, policymakers and investors. In this context, corporate sustainability performance (CSP) has been a central focus of attention. This paper aims to analyze CSP determinants in Brazil, an important emerging market. Firm CSP is proxied by the membership to the Corporate Sustainability Index (ISE) which comprises environmental, social, economic and governance issues.

Logit panel data models are estimated for a sample of 2,685 firm-year observations in the period of 2006-2015.

Results show that firms operating in environmental risky industries tend to be leading CSP firms in Brazil which might be a positive consequence of the Brazilian environmental legislation that could be forcing such firms to be more committed to environmental issues. High ownership concentration reduces the probability of a firm’s membership to the ISE index signaling that large controlling blockholders may not see sustainability and governance concerns as relevant. Larger Brazilian firms and the ones with more growth opportunities tend to be CSP leaders. Additionally, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 had a negative effect on CSP in Brazil.

The implications of the present findings may be of interest to academics and firms’ stakeholders. The fact that firms from environmental risky industries exhibit higher concerns with CSP, probably because of the Brazilian environmental rules that has advanced in the past decades, show the prominence of policymakers in the critical scenario of environmental issues. When designing regulation, policymakers should be conscious of the importance of social issues and pay attention to all ways available to foster firm sustainability concerns. The additional evidence that dominant shareholders do not appear to see CSP as a relevant concern in Brazil points out an agency conflict in which large blockholders’ interests may be prevailing over other stakeholders’ interests. That is important to academics who study the role played by ownership structure on firm’s policies. Furthermore, larger firms, as well as the ones with more growth opportunities, seem to invest in CSP, possibly for seeing it as a way to generate competitive advantage.

As per the authors’ knowledge this is the first paper to point out the relevance of industry environmental sensitivity over firm’s commitment to sustainability issues in Brazil. Additional evidence is provided on the negative effect of ownership concentration on the probability of firm’s membership to the ISE sustainability index using a longer period as well as robust logit panel data model estimates compared to previous studies. Unlike previous works, the paper analyzes the complexity of a sustainability index in the Brazilian market. Such index comprises corporate social responsibility, sustainability and corporate governance concerns. This set of concerns makes it a complex index and requires a deeper rationale for the determinants of CSP as proxied by the membership to it, under the stakeholder and agency theoretical frameworks.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the correlation among health outcomes, and civil and political rights (CPR) and also economic, social and cultural rights.

The study uses cross-sectional data from 161 countries. The authors use health outcomes and human rights variables in the model. In order to combine dimensions of human rights, this paper uses factor analysis and obtains proxy variables that measure economic, social and cultural rights and CPR. The two proxy variables are used as independent variables to explain variations in health in a regression model. The paper then classifies countries by cluster analysis and explores the patterns of different components of human rights and health outcomes across country clusters.

The regression model demonstrates that the economic, social and cultural rights variables explain variations in all health outcomes. The relationship between CPR and health is weaker than that of the economic, social and cultural rights. Cluster analysis further reveals that despite the country’s commitment to CPR, those that highly respect economic, social and cultural rights lead to superior health outcomes. The more respect a country has for economic, social and cultural rights, the better the health outcomes for the citizens of that country.

National policies should consider equal emphasis on all dimensions of human rights for further improvements in health.

The sole promotion of CPR such as democracy and empowerment, absence of adequate support of economic, social and cultural rights such as rights to housing, education, food and work can only contribute partially to health.