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Based on the findings of Aguinis et al. (2018) that only a few executives are properly compensated, the purpose of this paper is to examine potential causes and consequences of CEO overpayment and underpayment. Ineffective compensation of the CEO represents a governance failure by the board of directors. Better understanding the reasons for such failures may help boards to correct their processes and to enact more effective governance. Boards must look beyond the normally constrained focus of agency theory to examine executive characteristics and motivation. Thus, tailoring compensation plans and governance to the executive and organizational context requires attention to a broader set of theoretical notions.

Using the Aguinis et al. (2018) work, this paper conceptually identifies and explains the causes and consequences of CEO overpayment and underpayment along with their implications for governance and future research.

This paper identifies potential reasons for CEO overpayment and underpayment. For example, in addition to poor hiring decisions and inadequately designed compensation plans, CEO overpayment can occur because of executive hubris and greed. Alternatively, CEO underpayment may occur because of a poorly designed plan, inadequate information about the external labor market and the executive’s interests in non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. socio-emotional wealth, altruism). Without proper monitoring and oversight by the board, firm performance commonly suffers.

This work extends our understanding of why CEOs may be overpaid (e.g. hubris, greed) and why some executives may accept underpayment (e.g. desire for non-pecuniary benefits from SEW or altruism). This paper explains the consequences of ineffective corporate governance practices that allow inefficient CEO compensation. Finally, this paper explores several contingencies that can affect the governance practices and research needed to enhance our knowledge of this important area.

Partiendo de los resultados de Aguinis et al (en prensa) de que solo unos pocos ejecutivos están retribuidos correctamente, examinamos las causas y las consecuencias potenciales del pago excesivo y pago insuficiente a los CEO. Una retribución inadecuada al CEO es un fallo de gobierno por parte del consejo de administración. Comprender mejor las razones de dichos fallos puede ayudar a los consejos a corregir sus propios procesos y desarrollar un gobierno corporativo más eficiente. Los consejos de administración deben mirar más allá de la teoría de agencia para examinar las características de los ejecutivos y su motivación. Por tanto, ajustar los planes de retribución y gobierno a los ejecutivos y al contexto organizativo requiere prestar atención a un conjunto más amplio de conceptos teóricos.

Utilizando el trabajo de Aguinis et al (en prensa), identificamos y explicamos las causas y consecuencia del pago excesivo y pago insuficiente a los CEO, junto con las implicaciones para el gobierno corporativo y la investigación futura.

Identificamos las posibles razones para el pago excesivo o insuficiente a los CEO. Por ejemplo, además de malas decisiones de contratación y planes de retribución mal diseñados, el pago excesivo puede deberse a la arrogancia y codicia de los ejecutivos. Alternativamente, el pago insuficiente puede generarse por un plan de retribución mal diseñado, por inadecuada información sobre el mercado laboral externo y el interés del ejecutivo en beneficios no pecuniarios (e.g., riqueza socio-emocional, altruismo). Sin una supervisión adecuada, los resultados de la empresa normalmente sufren.

Este trabajo amplia nuestra comprensión sobre porque los CEOs pueden recibir una retribución excesiva (e.g., arrogancia, codicia) mientras otros pueden aceptar un pago insuficiente (e.g., deseo de beneficios no pecuniarios o altruismo). Explicamos las consecuencias de un gobierno corporativo inadecuado que permiten una retribución ineficiente del CEO. Finalmente, exploramos varias contingencias que pueden afectar a las prácticas de gobierno y que la investigación deben considerar para mejorar nuestro conocimiento en esta importante área.

A partir dos resultados de Aguinis et al. (em imprensa) que apenas alguns executivos são pagos corretamente, examinamos as causas e as consequências potenciais do pagamento excessivo e do pagamento insuficiente ao CEO. Uma compensação inadequada ao CEO é uma decisão governamental do conselho de administração. Uma melhor compreensão das razões para tais falhas pode ajudar os conselhos a corrigir seus próprios processos e desenvolver uma governança corporativa mais eficiente. Os conselhos de administração devem olhar além da teoria da Agência para examinar as características dos executivos e sua motivação. Por conseguinte, ajustar a remuneração e os planos governamentais aos executivos e ao contexto organizacional requer atenção a um conjunto mais amplo de conceitos teóricos.

Usando o trabalho de Aguinis et al. (em imprensa), identificamos e explicamos as causas e consequências do pagamento excessivo e do pagamento insuficiente ao CEO, junto com as implicações para a governança corporativa e a pesquisa futura.

Identificamos as possíveis razões para pagamento excessivo ou insuficiente ao CEO. Por exemplo, além das pobres decisões de contratação e dos planos de compensação mal projetados, o excesso de pagamento pode ser devido à arrogância e ganância dos executivos. Alternativamente, o pagamento insuficiente pode ser gerado por um plano de compensação mal concebido, por informações inadequadas sobre o mercado de trabalho externo e o interesse do executivo em benefícios não-pecuniários (por exemplo, riqueza sócio emocional, altruísmo). Sem supervisão adequada, os resultados da empresa geralmente sofrem.

Este trabalho amplia o conhecimento sobre porque os CEOs podem receber a retribuição excessiva (por exemplo, arrogância, avidez) quando outros podem aceitar o pagamento insuficiente (por exemplo, o desejo por benefícios não-pecuniários ou altruísmo). Explicamos as consequências de uma governança corporativa inadequada que permite uma compensação ineficiente do CEO. Finalmente, exploramos várias contingências que podem afetar as práticas govern

The relationship between the role played by corporate governance (CG) mechanisms and shareholder wealth is an important and mature topic in some countries and regions. However, despite the considerable number of studies, the results are still inconclusive. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate around the theme in Latin America through a meta-analysis.

The study used meta-analytic procedures to review 42 articles produced by researchers from Latin American countries, whose samples were composed of Latin American firms.

The results suggest that CG best practices are associated with better Latin American firm performance. The evidence also suggests that results are moderated by the characteristics of boards of directors, the ownership, and control structure and various simultaneous CG mechanisms, through broad indices and special CG trading segments.

The relationship between GC and firm performance possesses certain peculiarities in the case of Latin American countries and the literature on the region is certainly not as abundant and mature. As most of the articles reviewed were written in Portuguese and Spanish and published in local journals, the consolidation produced should also be useful for researchers throughout the world by enabling them to access their ideas.

A relação entre o papel desempenhado pelos mecanismos de governança corporativa (GC) e a riqueza dos acionistas é um tópico importante e maduro em alguns países e regiões. No entanto, os resultados ainda se apresentam ambíguos, apesar do grande número de estudos. Este ensaio pretende contribuir para o debate do tema na região através de uma meta análise.

O trabalho fez uso de procedimentos meta-analíticos para revisar 42 artigos produzidos por pesquisadores da região e de outras localidades, cujas amostras são compostas por empresas de países da América Latina.

Os resultados sugerem que de forma geral melhores práticas de GC são associadas a um melhor desempenho das empresas latino-americanas. Este trabalho sugere também que os resultados encontrados são moderados pelas características dos conselhos de administração, da estrutura de propriedade e controle e de diversos mecanismos simultâneos de GC, como índices amplos e segmentos especiais de GC.

Esta relação possui peculiaridades quando se tratam de países latino-americanos e a literatura sobre a região certamente não se apresenta tão abundante e madura. Acredita-se que a consolidação produzida será útil para pesquisadores ao redor do mundo, uma vez que a maioria dos artigos revisados foi escrita em português ou espanhol e publicada em periódicos locais, o que não a torna acessível a todos.

We present a critical literature review debating Brazilian research on social and environmental accounting (SEA). The aim of this study is to understand the role of politics in the construction of hegemonies in SEA research in Brazil. In particular, we examine the role of hegemony in relation to the co-option of SEA literature and sustainability in the Brazilian context by the logic of development for economic growth in emerging economies. The methodological approach adopts a post-structural perspective that reflects Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. The study employs a hermeneutical, rhetorical approach to understand and classify 352 Brazilian research articles on SEA. We employ Brown and Fraser’s (2006) categorizations of SEA literature to help in our analysis: the business case, the stakeholder–accountability approach, and the critical case. We argue that the business case is prominent in Brazilian studies. Second-stage analysis suggests that the major themes under discussion include measurement, consulting, and descriptive approach. We argue that these themes illustrate the degree of influence of the hegemonic politics relevant to emerging economics, as these themes predominantly concern economic growth and a capitalist context. This paper discusses trends and practices in the Brazilian literature on SEA and argues that the focus means that SEA avoids critical debates of the role of capitalist logics in an emerging economy concerning sustainability. We urge the Brazilian academy to understand the implications of its reifying agenda and engage, counter-hegemonically, in a social and political agenda beyond the hegemonic support of a particular set of capitalist interests.

From the agency theory’s point of view, this paper aims to analyze corporate governance mechanisms about the characteristics of the companies quoted in the segments Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais 2 and their influence on the creation of value in preparation for the opening of the initial public offering (IPO).

A quantitative approach was adopted to achieve the proposed objective using the panel data with fixed effects and secondary data collected on the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários website, using statistical software Stata® 13.0 for statistical tests. The population comprises non-financial companies belonging to the Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais Level 2 groups, as the survey sample took into account the period of adhesion of the companies, totaled in 15 companies, which cover the period from 2008 to 2019. The selected variables correspond to the ownership structure’s characteristics, then the board’s composition and the fiscal council as the body responsible for supervising the administrators’ acts.

The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. However, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.

The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. Despite this, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.

This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. This paper finds that internal governance characteristics (founder-chief executive officer, executive incentives and board independence) and external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms.

While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally crucial strategic decision. This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market.

This situation generates value to shareholders and is perceived by the market and, ultimately, generates a direct relationship with the market performance of companies. While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally major strategic decision.

This paper contains a commentary on the paper by Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle and Joo published in this same issue. This paper aims to encourage the readers to examine this novel insight in future research but sadly, to disregard the results of this particular investigation.

Google Scholar tells us that, over a quarter of a million studies examine the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Aguinis et al. (2018) take much of that work to task. Observing that the distribution of CEO compensation is skewed, they question any work that assumes a normal distribution. Correcting the flaw, Aguinis et al. (2018) conduct their own investigation of this important relationship. Contrary to previous work, they find no consistent empirical relationship between pay and performance. The authors review and discuss their work with a clear eye on its implications for improving our understanding of these relationships.

The authors cannot accept the results of the Aguinis et al. (2018) investigation as it stands. Saying why, they close their commentary with some ideas that should help one understand whether accounting for a skewed CEO pay distribution really does revolutionize one’s understanding of corporate governance.

The statistical insight provided by Aguinis et al. (2018) yields provocative, if not profound, practical implications. While the authors’ review is critical, they aim to foster continued inquiry, not shut it down.

El objetivo del presente comentario del articulo de Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle and Joo (publicado en este mismo número) es el de motivar a sus lectores a examinar la nueva intuición que proporciona en el futuro pero, tristemente, desestimar los resultados de este trabajo en concreto.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Google Scholar indica que hay más de un cuarto de millón de estudios que analizan la relación entre la retribución del CEO y los resultados empresariales. Aguinis et al., (2018) analizan gran parte de este trabajo. Tras observar que la distribución de la retribución del CEO es asimétrica, cuestionan cualquier trabajo que asuma una distribución normal. Corriendo este aspectos Aguinis et al. (2018) llevan a cabo su propio análisis en este importante tema. Contrariamente a otros trabajos previos estos autores no encuentran una relación consistente entre la retribución y los resultados. Revisamos y discutimos su trabajo con un ojo en las implicaciones para la comprensión de esta relación.

Resultados – No podemos aceptar los resultados de Aguinis et al. (2018) en su forma actual. Señalando porqué, cerramos nuestro comentario con algunas ideas que deben ayudarnos a entender si tomando en cuenta la asimetría de la distribución de la retribución del CEO realmente es una revolución para nuestra comprensión del gobierno corporativo de las empresas.

Implicaciones – La evidencia aportada por Aguinis et al. (2018) genera provocadoras, si no profundas, implicaciones prácticas. Si bien nuestro comentario es crítico, es nuestro deseo abrir – y no cerrar – el debate para considerar este importante tema.

Originalidad/valor – El comentario revisa de manera crítica las conclusiones del artículo publicado por Aguinis y colegas en este mismo número.

O objetivo do presente comentário do artigo de Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle e Joo (publicado neste mesmo número) é motivar aos seus leitores a examinar a nova intuição que proporciona no futuro mas, infelizmente, desestimar os resultados deste trabalho em concreto.

Metodologia – O Google Scholar diz-nos que mais de duzentos e cinquenta mil estudos examinam a relação entre compensação do CEO e performance da empresa. Aguinis et al. (2018) examinam uma boa parte desses estudos. Observando que a distribuição da compensação do CEO é enviesada, eles questionam os trabalhos que assumem uma distribuição normal. Corrigindo a falha, Aguinis et al. (2018) conduzem a sua própria investigação desta relação. Contrariamente a trabalho anterior, eles não encontram uma relação empírica consistente entre pagamento e performance. Revemos e discutimos o seu trabalho com enfoque especial nas suas implicações para a compreensão destas relações.

Resultados – Não podemos aceitar os resultados da investigação de Aguinis et al. (2018) tal como está. Dizendo porquê, terminamos o nosso comentário com algumas ideias que nos ajudam a perceber se dar conta duma distribuição enviesada de compensação do CEO realmente revoluciona a nossa compreensão da governança corporativa.

Implicações – A evidência estatística de Aguinis et al. (2018) levanta implicações práticas provocadoras, se não mesmo profundas. Sendo a nossa revisão crítica, pretendemos abrir – e não fechar – a continuação da consideração destes assuntos.

Originalidade/valor – O comentário faz uma revisão crítica das conclusões do artigo de Aguinis e colegas, neste número.

This paper aims to analyze the contribution of the external director to the governance of family businesses (FBs) in different generations. The authors aim to support the literature regarding the heterogeneity of these companies, showing that the generation of the primary decision-maker is an essential factor that differentiates the FBs from each other. These differences have numerous impacts in governance structures as boards' role and composition.

The authors hypothesized that the main contribution of external directors to FB controlled by family members of the first generation is to provide resources to the company's survival. As it evolves and the later generations begin to participate as owners and managers, dealing with specific agency problems associated with this type of organization becomes essential. Four activities found in literature were tested: control of parental altruism and intrafamily divergences and provision of resources and external relations. Quantile regression (QR) was applied based on the dependent variables' characteristics, which show a strongly asymmetric distribution for all the models proposed.

The QR techniques and ordinary least squares (OLS) showed statistically significant results for the agency's activities when comparing the first and the second generations. The contribution of the external director in this context is to overcome the challenges associated with the beginning of sharing ownership and management. The resource provision and the establishment of the relations proved to be more critical in third-generation FBs. At this stage, the directors provide the needed resources for these companies' survival in an increasingly dynamic and complex environment.

Among this work's limitations, the authors highlight the lack of a variable that captures the life cycle in which the company is. They believe that the inclusion of this control factor would bring more robust results to the analysis. Besides, they point to the condensation of the countless activities performed by external directors to just four. This generalization fails to capture the other duties and contributions of this director in the family organizational environment.

This study aims to provide guidelines so that external directors of FBs understand more clearly the needs of the companies in which they operate, whether from the first, second or third generation onward. The contribution of this director may be different for each type of organization. By understanding the weaknesses and concerns inherent to each generational stage, the external director can focus his efforts on adopting actions that effectively contribute to organizational performance.

In Brazil, most studies focus on the effects of board's composition and structure on financial results. In these papers, the data is usually secondary, found on companies' websites. The authors step further in this paper by analyzing primary data from privately held companies, which in Brazil is challenging to access. So, they believe they are surpassing the analysis traditionally found in the literature on the composition of boards of directors in terms of scope and methodology.

This is a short commentary on Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment.”

Using insights from prior studies on executive compensation, the author’s commentary presents a critical evaluation of “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […].” In addition, the author offers potential avenues for further research.

The paper “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” is well executed and makes several significant contributions to the management and executive compensation literature. Particularly, noteworthy are the use of advanced quantitative methods, the use of power law distributions to explain chief executive officer (CEO) pay outcomes, the focus on pay-for-performance and the role of justice in CEO outcomes. The author’s commentary in the present paper discusses the measurement of CEO pay and performance, poses alternative estimation methods to explore the pay-for-performance link and offers thoughts on justice theory in the context of CEO pay.

The authors’ findings may be briefly stated as CEO pay is better described by a power law distribution than a normal distribution, CEO pay is not linked to firm performance and the patterns of CEO pay does not conform to patterns of distributive justice. Overall, the authors provide an important way to evaluate CEO pay outcomes. Thy set the stage for new avenues of research.

CEO pay is a highly controversial subject in the domain of corporate governance. This paper offers boards of directors and policymakers a method to better understand the success or failure of boardroom pay policies.

CEO pay is an important social measure.

The authors’ paper is original by offering a method for determining over and underpayment of CEOs. The author in the present paper makes suggestions on how one might extend the research.

Objetivo – Este es un comentario sobre el trabajo de Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle y Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Utilizando las ideas de la literatura previa sobre retribución de ejecutivos, mi comentario presenta una evaluación crítica del artículo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […]”. Además, esbozo algunas ideas para la investigación futura.

Resultados – El artículo “Dos lados de la injusticia de la retribución de los CEO” está bien desarrollado y realiza varias contribuciones significativas a las literaturas de gestión y retribución de ejecutivos. En particular, son de señalar: a) el uso de métodos cuantitativos avanzados, b) el uso de la distribución de ley de poder para explicar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO, c) el foco en el pago por resultados, d) el papel de la justicia en el rendimiento del CEO. Mi comentario a) discute las medidas de retribución y rendimiento del CEO, b) propone métodos de estimación alternativos para la relación entre retribución y rendimiento y c) ofrece ideas en torno a la teoría de la justicia en el contexto de la retribución del CEO.

Implicaciones – Los resultados de los autores pueden resumirse así: a) La retribución de los CEO se describe mejor como una distribución de ley de poder que como una distribución normal, b) la retribución del CEO y el rendimiento empresarial no están conectados, c) los patrones de retribución del CEO no concuerdan con los patrones de justicia distributiva. En general, los autores proporcionan un importante método para evaluar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO y fomentar la investigación futura.

Implicaciones prácticas – La retribución del CEO es un tema muy controvertido en el ámbito del gobierno corporativo. Este artículo proporciona a los consejos de administración y a los decisores públicos un método para entender mejor el éxito o fracaso de las prácticas retributivas en los consejos de administración.

Originalidad/valor – El trabajo de los autores es original al ofrecer un método para determinar la sobre o la infra retribución de los CEO. Yo apunto algunas sugerencias sobre cómo puede extenderse esta investigación.

Objetivo – Este é um breve comentário a Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Metodologia – Usando conhecimentos de estudos anteriores em compensação executiva, o meu comentário apresenta uma avaliação crítica de “Two sides of CEO pay injustice:….”. Adicionalmente, ofereço potenciais avenidas para investigação futura.

Resultados – O artigo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” está bem feito e apresenta diversas contribuições importantes à literature sobre compensação executiva e de gestores. Em particular, são de salientar: a) o uso de métodos quantitativos avançados b) o uso de distribuições da lei de potência para explicar os resultados do pagamento a CEOs c) O enfoque no pagamento pela performance d) o papel da justiça nos resultados para o CEO. O meu comentário a) discute a medida de pagamento ao CEO e do desempenho b) Propõe métodos alternativos de estimação para explorar a ligação pagamento ao desempenho e c) Apresenta argumentos da teoria da justiça no contexto da compensação do CEO.

Implicações – Os resultados dos autores podem resumir-se como: a) Compensação do CEO é mais bem descrita por uma distribuição da lei de potência que por uma distribuição normal b) Compensação do CEO não está ligada à performance da empresa c) Os padrões da compensação do CEO não se conformam com justiça distributiva. Em geral, os autores fornecem uma forma importante de avaliar a compensação do CEO. Apresentam por isso novas vias para investigação futura.

Implicações práticas – Compensação do CEO é um tópico controverso do domínio da governança corporativa. Este artigo oferece aos Conselhos de Administração e decisores politicos um método para melhor perceber o sucesso ou insucesso das políticas de pagamento aos membros das Administrações.

Originalidade/valor – O artigo é original e oferece um método para determinar sobre ou sub compensação do CEO. Faço sugestões de como se pode estender a investigação.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the reflection of corruption in Brazilian companies listed on Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3). The methodological design comprised a qualitative and descriptive approach in which documentary research was used to gather data. Content analysis was employed to treat data retrieved from Standard Financial Statements, Explanatory Notes, and Sustainability Reports, from 2013 to 2017. The findings reveal a low level of disclosure of the companies listed on B3 concerning the reflections of corruption. The disclosed reflections include the increase in the company's operating costs and the impact on the company's future cash flow which can be direct, such as through the reduction of revenues from canceled negotiations, or indirect, through transaction costs due to the misconduct of the company.

The study aimsto analyze the main elements associated with the evolution of Brazilian agtechs from the initial conception of the business model to becoming companies in the scale-up stage.

The exploratory research was conducted based on data collected through in-depth interviews. The answers were analyzed quantitatively using descending hierarchical classification (DHC) and correspondence factor analysis (CFA) and qualitatively using content analysis.

Five main elements were identified as responsible for the evolution of the companies up to their entering the scale-up phase: (1) governance, (2) decisions inherent to resource allocation, (3) monitoring of strategic, tactical and operational activities, (4) fostering human capital development and (5) business model validation. Each element presents a set of performance indicators that show the scalability of these companies.

The model developed can help companies that have not yet advanced from the conception of the business model to the scalability of different sectors, in addition to agribusiness.

Proposal of a model that presents the main elements that impact on scalability and respective indicators that contributed to the scalability process of Brazilian agtechs.

This study contributed to advancing the knowledge on the organizational life cycle (OLC) of agricultural startups, particularly regarding the factors responsible for their scalability.

The purpose of this paper is to critically reflect and offer insights on how to justify the use of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a research method for understanding the complexity of organizational phenomena, by applying the principles of the neo-configurational approach.

We present and critically examine three arguments regarding the use of QCA for management research. First, they discuss the need to assume configurational theories to build and empirically test a causal model of interest. Second, we explain how the three principles of causal complexity are assumed during the process of conducting QCA-based studies. Third, we elaborate on the importance of case knowledge when selecting the data for the analysis and when interpreting the results.

We argue that it is important to reflect on these arguments to have an appropriate research design. In the true spirit of the configurational approach, we contend that the three arguments presented are necessary; however, each argument is insufficient to warrant a QCA research design.

This paper contributes to management research by offering key arguments on how to justify the use of QCA-based studies in future research endeavors.