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The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of disclosure of sales compensations on insurance brokers’ intention to make inappropriate product recommendations.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of disclosure of sales compensations on insurance brokers’ intention to make inappropriate product recommendations.
Design/methodology/approach
This research examines the insurance brokers’ intention to make inappropriate product recommendations through an application of the theory of planned behavior. Surveys are used as the research instrument, and the hypotheses are tested with a between-subjects experimental design. One case of mandatory disclosure and one case of non-mandatory disclosure are compared in the research.
Findings
The results indicate that the disclosure of sales compensations is significantly associated with the subjective norms from the official authority and perceived behavioral control (PBC). The results of this study also indicate that, when the disclosure is mandatory, the PBC has a stronger effect on the insurance brokers’ intention to make biased product recommendations than dose the attitude and subjective norms. When the disclosure is non-mandatory, however, the subjective norms have a stronger effect on the insurance brokers’ intention.
Originality/value
The impacts of compensation disclosures on the financial professionals’ product recommendations have been less examined. This study could make a contribution to the literature by providing some empirical observations from the views of Taiwan’s life insurance brokers.
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The purpose of this paper is to show that, instead of replacing trade retaliation with alternatives that are equally problematic, such as monetary damages, mandatory trade…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to show that, instead of replacing trade retaliation with alternatives that are equally problematic, such as monetary damages, mandatory trade compensation, or formal membership sanctions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) might gain from relying exclusively on informal remedies.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper critically reviews the main proposals brought forward in the literature and by WTO members on how to reform WTO remedies. It takes a fresh look at whether any viable, both economically and legally sensitive, alternatives exist.
Findings
First, the fact that WTO dispute settlement does not rely on monetary damages and on reparation for past losses is economically justified. Second, switching to an alternative remedy of mandatory trade compensation is not a viable alternative to proportional countermeasures. Third, introducing formal membership sanctions into the WTO would either remain ineffective or turn out to be counterproductive for progressive trade liberalization. Fourth, in order not to provoke an excessive increase of the total cost for WTO members to breach their obligations, any strengthening of the WTO's informal remedies should not be undertaken on top of existing remedies, but as part of a major paradigm shift built on the abrogation of trade retaliation.
Practical implications
The article contributes to the ongoing debate on how to reform the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.
Originality/value
This article joins an already vast body of literature dealing with potential reforms of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. It provides a holistic review of the main existing reform proposals under both legal and economic aspects and adds original insights in discussing the replacement of trade remedies by strengthened informal remedies.
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Siwen Song, Adrian (Wai Kong) Cheung, Aelee Jun and Shiguang Ma
This paper aims to empirically examine the impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on the CEO pay performance sensitivity.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to empirically examine the impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on the CEO pay performance sensitivity.
Design/methodology/approach
Using the mandatory requirement of CSR disclosure as an exogenous shock, the authors compare the changes in CEO pay performance sensitivity for treatment firms with control firms through a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach.
Findings
The authors find that mandatory CSR disclosure enhances CEO pay performance sensitivity. The results also show that monitoring CEO power is a conduit through which mandatory CSR disclosure affects CEO pay performance sensitivity. The positive impact is more profound in firms with a powerful CEO, i.e. one who is politically well-connected, holds dual roles as both CEO and Chairman, and/or has had a long tenure. Furthermore, the increased CEO pay performance sensitivity after the mandate is prominent among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) only.
Practical implications
The findings of this paper have implications for other economies with similar institutional backgrounds as China. Although the mandatory CSR disclosure does not require firms to spend on CSR investment, the mandatory CSR disclosure alters firm behaviour, and mitigates agency problems.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the studies on the impact of CSR disclosure on firms' behaviour. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effects of mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity using the quasi-natural experiment settings.
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The appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process have increasingly come under scrutiny in recent years. Several Members…
Abstract
The appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process have increasingly come under scrutiny in recent years. Several Members and commentators alike have recommended large-scale amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to provide alternatives to retaliatory measures, with the most notable including compensation, collective retaliation, and increased special and differential treatment for developing countries and/or widespread loss of privileges for non-conforming respondents.
Unfortunately, many of the proposals failed to first identify the aims and objectives of the retaliatory phase, or even of dispute settlement more generally. This chapter takes a more holistic approach in its analysis of whether any of the current proposals will improve (or harm) the system. In doing so, this chapter will first assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures by evaluating the goals and objectives in which it is designed to achieve. It will then evaluate some of the more prominent proposals for amending the DSU under the same framework. Taking such an approach will allow for a more comprehensive review and will reveal not only the problems with retaliatory trade measures, but also its positive aspects, and not only the positive aspects of the suggested alternatives but also where they may be detrimental to the system.
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Patrick Velte and Jörn Obermann
This paper aims to analyse whether and how different types of institutional investors influence shareholder proposal initiations, say-on-pay (SOP) votes and management compensation…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to analyse whether and how different types of institutional investors influence shareholder proposal initiations, say-on-pay (SOP) votes and management compensation from a sustainability perspective.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on the principal-agent theory, the authors conduct a structured literature review and evaluate 40 empirical-quantitative studies on that topic.
Findings
The traditional assumption of homogeneity within institutional investors, which is in line with the principal–agent theory, has to be questioned. Only special types of investors (e.g. with long-term and non-financial orientations and active institutions) run an intensive monitoring strategy, and thus initiate shareholder proposals, discipline managers by higher SOP dissents and prevent excessive management compensation.
Research limitations/implications
A detailed analysis of institutional investor types is needed in future empirical analyses. In view of the current debate on climate change policy, future research could analyse in more detail the impact of institutional investor types on proxy voting, SOP and (sustainable) management compensation.
Practical implications
With regard to the increased shareholder activism and regulations on SOP and management compensation since the 2007/2008 financial crisis, firms should be aware of the monitoring role of institutional investors and should analyse their specific ownership nature (time- and content-driven and as well as range of activity).
Originality/value
To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first literature review with a clear focus on institutional investor range and nature, shareholder proposal initiation, SOP and management compensation (reporting) from a sustainability viewpoint. The authors explain the main variables that have been included in research, stress the limitations of this work and offer useful recommendations for future research studies.
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Matteo P. Arena and Nga Q. Nguyen
The purpose of this paper is to study the relation between compensation clawbacks and lawsuits and analyze how these two corporate disciplinary forces interact. This paper…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to study the relation between compensation clawbacks and lawsuits and analyze how these two corporate disciplinary forces interact. This paper hypothesizes that by allowing firms to recoup compensation from managers who breach their fiduciary duty, clawbacks provide a form of discipline that potentially reduces the likelihood of managerial wrongdoing, which, in turn, lowers the risk of corporate lawsuits.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper identifies whether or not a company in the S&P 1500 had a clawback policy between 2007 and 2014 by searching the company filings and press releases. The authors also construct different proxies for litigation risk and lawsuit outcomes using the Audit Analytics Database. They then perform a variety of empirical tests to examine the association between clawbacks and litigation risk and the association between clawbacks and litigation outcomes.
Findings
This paper finds that firms with higher litigation risk are more likely to adopt a clawback policy. In addition, after the adoption of clawback provisions, litigation risk significantly declines, suggesting that clawback policies are effective in reducing the likelihood of corporate lawsuits. Furthermore, firms with clawback policies are approximately 50 per cent more likely to have lawsuits against them dismissed or settled for lower amounts (approximately 12 per cent lower).
Practical implications
The findings of this paper provide insights to the efficacy of a current change in compensation regulation, the mandatory clawback adoption requirement by the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the literature on both clawbacks and litigation, as it is the first to analyze the relation between the two.
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Limited participation of least developed countries (LDCs) in the WTO's dispute settlement system has been the focus of intensive debate among WTO scholars, diplomats and, in…
Abstract
Limited participation of least developed countries (LDCs) in the WTO's dispute settlement system has been the focus of intensive debate among WTO scholars, diplomats and, in particular, WTO lawyers. Central to this debate are the major hurdles (financial and political) that LDCs are generally perceived to face in using the existing system of remedies in the WTO system to enforce compliance. Of the two existing compliance enforcement mechanisms, the first – compensation – is often unrealistic because the WTO Member whose measures have been found to be WTO inconsistent has to agree with it; while the second – retaliation (i.e., the suspension of concessions with regard to the non-complying Member) – is a costly and in many ways counter-productive “shooting oneself in the foot” remedy that LDCs in particular can usually ill afford.
This chapter briefly discusses proposals for reform that have been proposed to alleviate these problems. The chapter then reviews two additional instruments that LDCs could pursue to improve their ability to enforce compliance and make the WTO dispute settlement system a more viable instrument: limited use of direct effect; and increased use of the instrument of publicity and public relations, including through civil society. These instruments, whether independently, or in combination with existing mechanisms and other new compliance enforcement measures, could provide useful tools for the WTO's poorest Members to increase the chances for pay-off from WTO litigation and for compliance with WTO law by larger and more powerful trading partners.
Details
Keywords
- Direct effect
- public opinion
- WTO
- enforcing compliance
- compensation
- collective retaliation
- suspension of voting rights
- tradable retaliation
- mandatory compensation
- retrospective damages
- least developed countries
- retroactive effect
- Appellate Body
- political realism
- dispute settlement
- state power
- rule oriented system
- verification
- monitoring
- cross retaliation
- remedies
- suspension of right to dispute
- financial compensation
Yixi Ning, Ke Zhong and Lihong Chen
This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.
Findings
Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.
Research limitations/implications
This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.
Practical implications
For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.
Social implications
The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. First, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk has a positive impact on the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. Second, this paper finds that the CEO pay for luck asymmetry has been mitigated after 2006 when various regulatory changes on executive compensation began to be implemented in the USA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the very few studies investigating these issues in the literature.
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Meriem Ghrab, Marjène Gana and Mejda Dakhlaoui
The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered.
Design/methodology/approach
The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies.
Findings
Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.
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FAYEZ A. ELAYAN, JAMMY S.C. LAU and THOMAS O. MEYER
Incentive‐based executive compensation is regarded as a mechanism for alleviating agency problems between executives and shareholders. Seventy‐three New Zealand (NZ) listed…
Abstract
Incentive‐based executive compensation is regarded as a mechanism for alleviating agency problems between executives and shareholders. Seventy‐three New Zealand (NZ) listed companies are used to examine the relationship between executive incentive compensation schemes (ICS) and firm performance. The results suggest that neither compensation level nor adoption of an ICS are significantly related to returns to shareholders or ROA. However, there is a statistically significant relationship between Tobin's q and both CEO compensation and executive share ownership. Further, the evidence suggests the recent compensation disclosure requirements in NZ are not yet stringent enough to allow adequate analysis of the link between ICSs and corporate performance.