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The purpose of this paper is to review research on litigation in corporate finance.

This paper surveys studies on the estimation of litigation risk, litigation costs, stock reaction to lawsuit announcement, and the effect of litigation on corporate financial policies and outcomes.

The first section presents a survey of studies that estimate litigation risk. The authors then discuss a set of studies that focus on the various costs associated with litigation. The third area of review is about studies which estimate the market reaction to a lawsuit announcement. The next section surveys studies that examine the relation between litigation and a variety of corporate policies, behaviors, and outcomes. The authors then discuss the emerging literature on how corporate political connections can influence the outcome of litigation. The survey concludes with a brief summary and a discussion of suggestions for future research involving corporate litigation.

By providing an extensive review of the literature on litigation in corporate finance, this survey can help researchers to identify recent trends in litigation research and select promising new avenues of investigation in the field.

This study aims to examine the effect of board gender diversity on corporate litigation in China’s listed firms. The key questions this study addresses are: what are the effect of board gender diversity on corporate litigation in terms of both the frequency and severity of consequence, is there any heterogeneous effects of the relationships across firm performance?

A sample consists of 25,668 firm-year observations from over 3,340 firms is examined using logistic regression analysis and negative binomial regression analysis. The authors also use event study method and ordinary least square (OLS) regression to explore female directors’ effects on reducing the negative consequences of litigation. The logistic regression and OLS regression are reestimated with interaction terms when examining the firm performance heterogeneity.

The authors document that firms with greater female representation on their boards experience fewer and less severe corporate litigations. Moreover, in high-performing firms, board gender diversity plays a more potent role in reducing the frequency and consequences of corporate litigation than low-performing firms.

This study is among the first to examine the relationship between board gender diversity and the comprehensive corporate litigations under Chinese context. It sheds new light on China’s boardroom dynamics, offering valuable empirical implication to Chinese corporate policymakers on the role of female directors.

The purpose of this research is to investigate how the negative effect of litigation risk on firm performance could be controlled through the channel of voluntary disclosure and under the condition of institutional ownership.

To get the objectives, the study analyzed an unbalanced panel of 918 non-financial listed Chinese firms from 2010 to 18. To capture any expected unobserved heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the unbalanced sample, the authors have applied fixed effect regression with robust standard errors clustered at the firms' levels as suggested by Newey and West (1987).

The research provides that the good disclosure practices and presence of institutional ownership in corporations raise the trust of the investors by making the corporate operation clear in the eyes of the stakeholders. This increases the corporate credibility and as consequence corporations are protected against litigation risk. Thus, in the light of the information asymmetry and signaling theories, voluntary disclosure practices, and financial institutions' ownership, bridges the information gap and transmit a positive signal in the market regarding the better financial performance of the corporations.

These findings are helpful for the corporate managers for effective strategic decisions, regulatory authorities for policy formulation, and individual investors for developing a diversified investment portfolio.

By applying the mediation and moderation effects, the research enhances the understanding of the underlying causes of the association between a firm's litigation risk and its performance. The current research contributes to the literature, that agency issues which create litigation risk could be settled internally with voluntary disclosure practices and externally with institutional ownership.

The purpose of this paper is to study the relation between compensation clawbacks and lawsuits and analyze how these two corporate disciplinary forces interact. This paper hypothesizes that by allowing firms to recoup compensation from managers who breach their fiduciary duty, clawbacks provide a form of discipline that potentially reduces the likelihood of managerial wrongdoing, which, in turn, lowers the risk of corporate lawsuits.

This paper identifies whether or not a company in the S&P 1500 had a clawback policy between 2007 and 2014 by searching the company filings and press releases. The authors also construct different proxies for litigation risk and lawsuit outcomes using the Audit Analytics Database. They then perform a variety of empirical tests to examine the association between clawbacks and litigation risk and the association between clawbacks and litigation outcomes.

This paper finds that firms with higher litigation risk are more likely to adopt a clawback policy. In addition, after the adoption of clawback provisions, litigation risk significantly declines, suggesting that clawback policies are effective in reducing the likelihood of corporate lawsuits. Furthermore, firms with clawback policies are approximately 50 per cent more likely to have lawsuits against them dismissed or settled for lower amounts (approximately 12 per cent lower).

The findings of this paper provide insights to the efficacy of a current change in compensation regulation, the mandatory clawback adoption requirement by the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010.

This paper contributes to the literature on both clawbacks and litigation, as it is the first to analyze the relation between the two.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the relationship between litigation risk and payout policy.

The authors employ various regression techniques including probit, logit and tobit regression methodologies to study the relationship between litigation risk (contemporaneous measures, litigation dummy) and payout policy (dividend payout likelihood and dividend yield). The authors also conduct several robustness tests.

The authors find that firms involved in a lawsuit have a lower propensity to distribute dividends to shareholders. In particular, the authors document a negative relationship between litigation risk and payout policy as measured by dividend payout likelihood and dividend yield. The results are robust to a series of robustness tests including using alternate regression specifications, alternate measures of litigation and payout policy, a propensity-score matched sample and using an instrumental variable.

The paper identifies another determinant of payout policy and documents another avenue whereby legal institutions affect corporate payout policy. The link between litigation risk and payout policy is of interest to the business community, financial economists, management and the investing public.

Directors help determine the strategic direction of a corporation and are responsible for ensuring the institution has a good system of internal control. Banking institutions without a strategic direction emphasizing sound lending practices that promote the long-run financial health and viability of the institution will be sued more frequently than peer institutions. Institutions that do not have a good system of internal control will also be sued more frequently. Hence, legal expense is a bank corporate governance measure. We compare the performance of bank legal expense and a widely cited corporate governance index in a regression framework to determine which better predicts bank performance. The regressions indicate legal expense is a much better predictor, hence a better measure of bank corporate governance. Regulators should require legal expense reporting and rank institutions by the ratio of legal expense to assets to help identify institutions with weak governance. Seven case studies illustrate the role of legal expense in corporate governance.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the association between litigation risk and working capital management.

The authors employ four different regression techniques (OLS regressions, regressions with industry and time controls, median regressions, and Fama Macbeth regressions) to study the relation between litigation risk (contemporaneous and lagged measures) and working capital management (cash conversion cycle (CCC) and its components). The authors also conduct numerous robustness tests.

The authors find that high-litigation risk firms tend to have longer CCC. Decomposing CCC into days receivable outstanding, days inventory outstanding and days payable outstanding, the authors find that high-litigation risk firms have longer receivable periods, take a longer time to convert inventory to cash and do not pay their suppliers promptly. These results are robust to a series of robustness tests including using an alternate measure of working capital and accounting for firm type (high-tech vs labor intensive).

This paper contributes in several ways to the litigation and corporate finance literature. The authors identify another determinant of working capital management and document another avenue whereby legal institutions affect short-term financial decision making. The link between litigation risk and working capital management is of interest to the business community, financial economists, management and the investing public.

The authors study the relationship between CEO overconfidence and litigation risk by examining employee-level lawsuit data. The purpose of this paper is to better understand the executive characteristics that potentially affect the likelihood of employee litigations.

The authors employ a unique data set of employee lawsuits from the National Labor Relations Board – “Disposition of Unfair Labor Practice Charges” – which includes complaints, litigations and decisions. The data spans the years 2000–2014. The authors employ the option-based CEO overconfidence metric of Malmendier et al. (2011) as the primary explanatory variable.

The authors find that overconfident CEOs are less likely to be subjected to labor-related litigations. The authors document that firms with overconfident CEOs have fewer lawsuits opened by both labor unions and individuals. The authors then investigate the effect of employee litigations on firm performance to understand why overconfident CEOs are less prominent among lawsuits. The authors show that litigations lower corporate investment and value of capital expenditures for responsible firms, which may limit overconfident CEOs’ ability to invest. Therefore, the results may reveal the fact that overconfident CEOs may prefer to align with the interest of their employees to avoid reduced investment opportunities.

The paper makes three main contributions. First, it provides the first large-sample evidence on CEO overconfidence and labor relations. The authors employ data on firm-level labor litigation that contains both the case reason and case outcome. Second, this paper adds to the growing literature of CEO overconfidence and governance practices in the workplace. Finally, the study highlights the importance of employee treatment and explores the impact of labor lawsuits on firm value.

Class action litigation has the potential to severely damage the image customers have of a company (brand), often with calamitous consequences for its strategy. Such risks increase when plaintiff's attorneys use all of the instruments of influence to embarrass and persuade large corporations to settle large lawsuits before they ever reach a courtroom. The aim of this paper is to examine this issue.

The paper offers a five‐point plan that organizations can use to pro‐actively defend themselves from aggressive litigants and thus protect their brand.

The paper finds that companies that cede the litigation communication advantage to their adversaries commit a fundamental mistake. They fail to understand the threat they face.

Corporations facing class action litigation need to understand that: it is more than a legal fight; and plaintiffs' lawyers count on corporate defendants to act (and communicate) in predictable and often counterproductive ways. Litigation (and all supporting communication) is at its core a battle for the hearts and minds of the stakeholders. It is a simultaneous public relations and political war being waged against the defendant company.

The paper shows how organizations can defend their reputation in litigation by: understanding the context of the fight; identifying the likely assault; pre‐empting their adversary; and communicating forcefully.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether companies with female executives and directors are less likely to be involved in financial reporting fraud litigation.

The authors build a data set comprised of companies from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database that were involved in fraud litigation along with a control set of companies listed on the Compustat database for the time period 2007-2013. The authors use a logistic regression model to determine the likelihood of fraud when there is at least one woman in an executive position or on the board of directors.

The authors find that the presence of at least one female leader decreases the likelihood that the company will be involved in litigation for financial reporting fraud. The results are robust after controlling for sample selection bias by using a propensity score matched sample.

The findings add to the literature which indicates that women tend to be more risk averse and are more committed to ethics policies. The study also supports previous research that indicates large firms with inflated market value are more likely to be subject to fraud litigation.

The study combines the literature on the characteristics of women in leadership positions with the study of fraud litigation. The authors find evidence that the presence of either female executives or female directors lowers financial reporting fraud risk.