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During 2003, compensation practices for the retail sale of mutual funds came under fire. Recent revelations about failures in the processing of mutual fund breakpoints had triggered a more in‐depth investigation into mutual fund marketing and compensation practice by securities regulators, Congress, and the states. This article focuses on the regulation of sales compensation practices primarily as it affects a broker‐dealer selling mutual funds in the retail market. It addresses the regulatory framework for three key compensation practices: (1) the use of non‐cash compensation in connection with mutual fund sales; (2) marketing and compensation arrangements providing enhanced compensation to a selling firm as well as to its sales representatives for the promotion of certain fund securities over others, such as proprietary funds over non‐proprietary funds, preferred funds over non‐preferred funds, and Class B shares over Class A shares; and (3) the use of commissions for mutual fund portfolio trades as an additional source of selling compensation for selling firms, a practice sometimes referred to as ”directed brokerage.“

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship among the compensation system (fixed or commission) applied to salespeople, the system by which they are controlled, and the effects of both on individual performance and sales organization effectiveness. Previous research has been extended in a different country/context, and from the field sales manager's points of view.

First, a cluster analysis was used to obtain a set of groups of salespeople characterized by their main compensation system (salary and/or commission). Also, ANOVA is used to analyze the significance of the differences due to the different compensation system.

The empirical data reflect the results of research involving 108 field sales managers and show that the compensation system used for the salespeople has significant effects on individual salesperson performance and sales organization effectiveness and is related to the control system used by the company. Companies with a compensation system based on a fixed salary use behavior control more than companies with a compensation system based on commission; salespeople who receive a greater proportion of compensation as a fixed salary give better individual performance than those who are paid by commission; salespeople who receive a greater proportion of their pay as a fixed salary are more effective than those paid largely by commission. Results do not show relevant differences among countries.

Any generalisation of results is limited by the characteristics of this study, in particular by the sample used and the particular situation of the country analysed (Spain). At the same time, and because the study relies on the subjective judgment of sales field managers' perceptions, the measurement of some concepts is subject to various cognitive biases.

Compensation for salespeople is one of the most important issues in saleforce management as it has a significant effect on motivation, which is critical, given the conditions of their working environment.

This paper analyzes the field sales manager's points of view and not that of the salesperson or the sales team. This provides a closer perspective because field sales managers operate between the salesperson and sales manager. This paper presents a framework based on Baldauf et al.'s and Piercy et al.'s previous research, with two main contributions. The first contribution is the proposed direct analysis of the relationships between various antecedents of effectiveness. The second contribution is the consideration of two dimensions of the effectiveness construct: financial efficacy and field sales manager satisfaction.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how sales compensation disclosure, salespeople’s perception of corporate social responsibility (CSR) toward customers (i.e. customer-focused CSR), regulatory knowledge and coworkers’ ethical behavior may influence life insurance salespeople’s moral intensity and intentions to engage in misleading sales behaviors.

The hypotheses are analyzed using partial least squares (PLS) regression with the data gathered from full-time life insurance salespeople in Taiwan.

The main findings indicate that disclosing sales compensations will alter the ethical decision-making process of life insurance salespeople. The findings further point out that customer-focused CSR is an important variable affecting moral intensity and ethical intentions.

There has not been any research on the effects of compensation disclosure on moral intensity and misleading sales behavior. The literature gap has led to a poor understanding of the relationship between the compensation disclosure policy and ethical sales behavior. Moreover, previous studies indicate that specific factors (such as moral intensity and ethical intention) are directly associated, while the research shows that as long as a regulatory policy (e.g. the policy of compensation disclosure) changes, the correlation between these variables may shift from significant to nonsignificant (or vice versa). The results are interesting enough to warrant more research, and they also show that the direct link between variables mentioned in previous research is not always stable or universal.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of disclosure of sales compensations on insurance brokers’ intention to make inappropriate product recommendations.

This research examines the insurance brokers’ intention to make inappropriate product recommendations through an application of the theory of planned behavior. Surveys are used as the research instrument, and the hypotheses are tested with a between-subjects experimental design. One case of mandatory disclosure and one case of non-mandatory disclosure are compared in the research.

The results indicate that the disclosure of sales compensations is significantly associated with the subjective norms from the official authority and perceived behavioral control (PBC). The results of this study also indicate that, when the disclosure is mandatory, the PBC has a stronger effect on the insurance brokers’ intention to make biased product recommendations than dose the attitude and subjective norms. When the disclosure is non-mandatory, however, the subjective norms have a stronger effect on the insurance brokers’ intention.

The impacts of compensation disclosures on the financial professionals’ product recommendations have been less examined. This study could make a contribution to the literature by providing some empirical observations from the views of Taiwan’s life insurance brokers.

The theory of financial management suggests that the objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth. The valuation of the firm is its net operational cash flows discounted at the stock market's average required rate of return. A firm's risk class determines the rate of return required by investors. The operating objective for management is to maximise the difference between operational receipts and operational expenditures plus investment, whilst minimising risk. However, the separation of ownership by shareholders and control by professional managers enables directors to pursue objectives other than maximisation of shareholder wealth. Directors might attempt to maximise sales revenue, maximise growth in assets or employees, maximise value added or even their own well‐being. They may choose to pursue multiple objectives as described in corporate planning systems. Multiple objectives may include social goals as well as goals relating to marketing, production, personnel and finance. It has been suggested that levels of directors' remuneration might be associated with the extent to which directors achieve corporate objectives. Several research projects have tried to identify the major determinants of directors' remuneration. Some of these are summarised below.

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to design a proper incentive coordination mechanism to deal with the channel conflicts between the traditional sales and online direct sales.

With respect to the problems of channel conflicts between the traditional sales and online direct sales, to optimize the sale system and get more profits, considering the influences of consumer network acceptance, the authors establish demand and profit function based on consumer's utility, respectively. What's more, we exploit the game theory to analyze the optional decisions of the supply chain under the incentive coordination condition and no incentive coordination condition, and then we discuss the supply chain's optimal pricing, demand, profit and compensation incentive levels with the different effect of consumer network acceptance.

The level of compensation incentive provided by the manufacturer is influenced by consumer network acceptance and product cost. The lower the consumer network acceptance, the better the compensation incentive coordination effect of manufacturers. Manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers are all important players in real supply chain relationships. When a manufacturer exists as a dominant role, it should pay full attention to the impact of consumer behavior on supply chain decisions.

The research can clarify the influence and mechanism of consumer behavior on supply chain channel conflict coordination, and deal with channel conflicts.

The proposed incentive coordination can effectively realize supply chain channel conflict resolution, and provide decision-making ideas and methods for manufacturers to develop the supply chain management of online direct sales channels.

The area of salesman behaviour is characterized by a lack of theoretical and empirical research contrasting with the need for an understanding of salesman behaviour in the area of several sales management problems. For instance, when designing a new compensation scheme, a sales manager needs to know what to change, with what probable effect on sales, on salesmen's earnings and, consequently, on net profits. It has been shown that the compensation plan structure should be largely dependent on salesman behaviour patterns. In the same way, knowledge about salesman behaviour has managerial implications for recruiting salesmen displaying desirable behavioural patterns, whenever possible.

This case study aim to investigate the impacts of insurance agents’ positive attitude toward inappropriate product recommendations on the insurance agents’ intention to make the inappropriate product recommendations. This study further checks how the attitude and intention could be enhanced by the insurer’s manipulation of sales compensations, the agents’ perception of information asymmetry between customers and insurance agents and the insurer’s sales orientation.

Full-time insurance agents from the life insurance industry in Taiwan were surveyed. To test the hypotheses, hierarchical regression analyses were used in the study.

The main results showed that the respondents’ positive attitude toward inappropriate product recommendations was the influential predictor of the respondents’ behavioral intention. Nevertheless, the positive attitude was enhanced by the manipulation of sales compensations and the insurer’s sales orientation.

Very few studies have investigated the relationships among information asymmetry between customers and agents, management’s sales orientation, management’s manipulation of sales compensations and the problems of selling unsuitable insurance products to customers. This study may contribute to the relevant literature by discussing these issues.

The purpose of this article is to recognise the different types of compensation programmes for commissioned sales employees and to establish ways to manage these programmes in an ever changing business environment. This article will identify companies who use compensation programmes for their commissioned sales employees. This article will also compare and contrast the differences between the company’s different compensation plans. Compensation management is becoming increasingly more difficult for or ganisations to control because sales employees are wanting more and more. Managers need to find out what sales employees want and give it to them in a way that is fair and specific. Being specific in compensation and incentive plans is becoming the new method for managers to follow, while at the same time promoting a team atmosphere among sales employees. Results for compensation management of commissioned sales employees do not point to one best method, but managers are encouraging sales employees to work as a group and not against each other. This would create camaraderie among employees, thus enhancing the work environment and increasing quality and quantity of sales.

This paper aims to examine the roles of both aggregate and specific commission rates to control the sales force in relationship marketing with a customer portfolio.

Drawn on the concept of customer lifetime value and agency theory, the author calculated both specific and aggregate sales force commission rates in a relationship marketing perspective. Contrary to the prior researchers, the author assumes that, at any period, both the gross margins and retention rate of each customer are a stochastic function of the salesperson’s effort.

The results indicated that when there is symmetric information between a sales manager and salesperson, both aggregate and specific commissions can be used to monitor the sales force. Under asymmetric information, however, each type of commission rate can only be used under certain conditions. In addition, conditions in which the aggregate commission is equivalent to the specific commission for each customer were derived.

Hypothetical data were used to explain the model. It would be more appropriate to use real data to see its managerial relevance.

In the author’s knowledge, this study is the first that specifically links scholastic customer’s retention and salesperson commission rate to monitor salesperson effort in relationship marketing. It is also the first that shows in which conditions aggregate and specific commission rates are equal for a salesperson’s customer portfolio management.