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The purpose of this paper is to analyse World Trade Organisation (WTO) remedies from a developing country perspective, with a view to suggest reforms in the system.

WTO members' proposals for reforming WTO remedies and WTO cases are reviewed in order to determine the need for reforms and the nature of reforms to be undertaken.

WTO remedies are unfavourable to developing countries, most of which are unable to utilise them due to their weaker economies as compared to their developed country counterparts. There is no consensus on the nature of reforms to be undertaken. This paper suggests the need to synthesise the current proposals and develop various workable models.

This paper provides proposals which may improve WTO remedies for the benefit of developing countries, thereby not only strengthening the WTO enforcement mechanism but the multilateral trading system as a whole.

The appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process have increasingly come under scrutiny in recent years. Several Members and commentators alike have recommended large-scale amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to provide alternatives to retaliatory measures, with the most notable including compensation, collective retaliation, and increased special and differential treatment for developing countries and/or widespread loss of privileges for non-conforming respondents.

Unfortunately, many of the proposals failed to first identify the aims and objectives of the retaliatory phase, or even of dispute settlement more generally. This chapter takes a more holistic approach in its analysis of whether any of the current proposals will improve (or harm) the system. In doing so, this chapter will first assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures by evaluating the goals and objectives in which it is designed to achieve. It will then evaluate some of the more prominent proposals for amending the DSU under the same framework. Taking such an approach will allow for a more comprehensive review and will reveal not only the problems with retaliatory trade measures, but also its positive aspects, and not only the positive aspects of the suggested alternatives but also where they may be detrimental to the system.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether negative emotions mediate the relationship between supervisor rudeness and subordinates' retaliatory reactions and how the reactions to supervisor rudeness differ between US Americans and Koreans and between in‐group and out‐group supervisors.

A survey involving 197 employees from USA and South Korea. MANCOVA was used to analyze the data.

Employees who were rudely (rather than politely) treated when receiving explanations for organizational decisions were more likely to engage in retaliation. The latter tendency was partially mediated by the negative emotions that the employees felt about their rude treatment. In addition, the rudeness‐retaliation effects became stronger when the supervisor was dissimilar (rather than similar) to them, and the latter two‐way interaction effect was even stronger to those who highly value vertical collectivism. Surprisingly, however, Koreans were more likely to retaliate against their supervisor rather than US Americans.

Previous scenario‐based studies contrasting Koreans and US Americans have yielded findings suggesting that Koreans and US American employees may differ in their responses to supervisory rudeness. Additionally, the tendency of people to be more attracted to similar rather than dissimilar others (consistent with the similarity‐attraction paradigm) suggests that the (dis)similarity of a supervisor is likely to influence the rudeness‐retaliation effect. Future research needs to examine when, how, and why employees retaliate against supervisory rudeness to better understand the retaliation dynamics in organizations.

This is the only study that has examined how, in the context of receiving rude treatment from a supervisor, retaliatory reactions by US American versus Korean employees may differ and why (i.e. via emotional mediating variables), and whether US American‐Korean differences in retaliation under these circumstances are influenced by the supervisor's perceived (dis)similarity.

The purpose of this paper is to show that, instead of replacing trade retaliation with alternatives that are equally problematic, such as monetary damages, mandatory trade compensation, or formal membership sanctions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) might gain from relying exclusively on informal remedies.

The paper critically reviews the main proposals brought forward in the literature and by WTO members on how to reform WTO remedies. It takes a fresh look at whether any viable, both economically and legally sensitive, alternatives exist.

First, the fact that WTO dispute settlement does not rely on monetary damages and on reparation for past losses is economically justified. Second, switching to an alternative remedy of mandatory trade compensation is not a viable alternative to proportional countermeasures. Third, introducing formal membership sanctions into the WTO would either remain ineffective or turn out to be counterproductive for progressive trade liberalization. Fourth, in order not to provoke an excessive increase of the total cost for WTO members to breach their obligations, any strengthening of the WTO's informal remedies should not be undertaken on top of existing remedies, but as part of a major paradigm shift built on the abrogation of trade retaliation.

The article contributes to the ongoing debate on how to reform the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.

This article joins an already vast body of literature dealing with potential reforms of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. It provides a holistic review of the main existing reform proposals under both legal and economic aspects and adds original insights in discussing the replacement of trade remedies by strengthened informal remedies.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the critical issue of legal interpretation on the “development question” as they arise before WTO panels and Appellate Body, in view of the benefits inherent in a more‐rounded consideration of the development needs and concerns of WTO developing country Member States.

The introduction sets out the background to the challenges of developing countries in utilising the dispute settlement process effectively and using existing support. By analysing relevant cases, Section 2 analyses the “development question” and how it has been so far considered in legal interpretation. Section 3 addresses WTO jurisprudence on development, examining situations wherein “development” arises in the course of WTO dispute settlement. An examination as to how this aspect of WTO jurisprudence may be revisited including the potential aid of trade policy review mechanisms, and procedures for enforcement is then undertaken. It concludes on the position that the WTO judicial review process can work better by providing the much‐needed balance between binding global trade rules and the domestic progress of its developing country membership at the level of dispute settlement.

This paper establishes the importance of recognising and addressing the fact that core challenges and concerns facing developing countries can and should be factored into the legal interpretation of issues in dispute settlement.

A decisive enquiry into WTO development jurisprudence, this paper addresses developing country capacity to pursue the legal opportunities promised by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and how this can be redressed.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the performance of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of World Trade Organization (WTO) performance, between 1995 and 2007, as well as to discuss the main proposals for its improvement.

First, the paper presents the legal predictability of the system; compliance with its procedural stipulations in regard to its proposed timeframes; and the participation of different groups of States within this system. The timeframes are compared with those that really happened. Thus, there is an analysis of the effectiveness of its decisions and the necessity to induce compliance and retaliation. Finally, the main proposals to change the system are discussed.

It is concluded that most of legal procedures are accomplished as previewed by DSB, but the system itself is highly dependent of the action of States, who need time to negotiate. It is also possible to conclude that there is a high level of effectiveness and States prefer to respect the decisions of DSB and maintain the legitimacy of the system as a whole than keep advantages in specific matters.

When the WTO was founded, there was an effort to generate a system guided by legal rules. The DSB has made efforts to maintain a high level of legal preciosity. However, it is clear that this system is still very limited by the traditional method of negotiation among States. The implementation of a rule‐oriented system contributes to greater democratization of access to justice and, of course, in a limited way, the principle of sovereign equality of States. Finally, the majority of proposed changes attempt to apply the logic of domestic courts to an international body, assuming a level of organization of the international community as a whole that still does not exist. Others proposals suggest increasing the politicization of the system, which is also not appropriate.

Limited participation of least developed countries (LDCs) in the WTO's dispute settlement system has been the focus of intensive debate among WTO scholars, diplomats and, in particular, WTO lawyers. Central to this debate are the major hurdles (financial and political) that LDCs are generally perceived to face in using the existing system of remedies in the WTO system to enforce compliance. Of the two existing compliance enforcement mechanisms, the first – compensation – is often unrealistic because the WTO Member whose measures have been found to be WTO inconsistent has to agree with it; while the second – retaliation (i.e., the suspension of concessions with regard to the non-complying Member) – is a costly and in many ways counter-productive “shooting oneself in the foot” remedy that LDCs in particular can usually ill afford.

This chapter briefly discusses proposals for reform that have been proposed to alleviate these problems. The chapter then reviews two additional instruments that LDCs could pursue to improve their ability to enforce compliance and make the WTO dispute settlement system a more viable instrument: limited use of direct effect; and increased use of the instrument of publicity and public relations, including through civil society. These instruments, whether independently, or in combination with existing mechanisms and other new compliance enforcement measures, could provide useful tools for the WTO's poorest Members to increase the chances for pay-off from WTO litigation and for compliance with WTO law by larger and more powerful trading partners.

Purchasing behaviour across traditional retail and internet routes to market is becoming increasingly integrated. The positive and negative consequences of such behaviour for multi‐channel businesses have not been thoroughly examined – while an offline retail presence may reassure customers purchasing from an online channel, poor service online may negatively influence customer usage of an offline channel. This paper aims to address this issue.

A questionnaire survey of the online customers of four companies is employed and structural equation modelling used to investigate influences of demographic and behavioural variables (purchase involvement, loyalty, experience with the internet, company and product‐type) on positive and negative cross‐channel behaviour (CCB).

Strong evidence for both positive and negative customer CCB is found. Females, higher purchase involvement, higher loyalty and those with more experience of the company were more likely to display positive CCB; higher education, experience with the product type and online channel negatively influenced positive CCB. Increased age, education, occupation/class and purchase involvement lead to more negative CCB; product and company experience lead to reduced levels of negative CCB.

As a first step towards understanding of customer CCB the research generates many insights; however, more research is required to explore in more depth each of the constructs discussed and measured.

Understanding how different customer groups display different tendencies for CCB can help companies shape fulfilment and delivery strategies across different channels to market.

The study makes contributions to customer cross‐channel customer behaviour, developing implications for future research as well as management practice.

The purpose of this paper is to explain and conceptually analyse the origins and outcomes of the Brazil‐USA cotton dispute.

The analysis is conducted using a conceptual framework to show the effects of US policies on Brazil and the world cotton market. The historical context of the conflict is presented, to explain the motivations of both countries and the background of the dispute.

US cotton subsidies and related policies have the effect of harming international producers, including Brazil. This analysis, along with an explanation of Brazil's role in world cotton production, explains why Brazil had cause to complain to the WTO and why the WTO ruled in its favor.

The implications of these rulings are that the international dispute and its unique resolution could foreshadow similar conflicts in the future between different parties over different commodities, and the analysis presented in this paper will serve to explain them.

This is the only paper to present a complete history of the Brazil‐USA conflict, along with a conceptual analysis of the targeted US policies.

The purpose of this paper is to explain how a multi-market firm develops the motivation to forbear from competition.

A two-way fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors investigates the research question with panel data collected from the US scheduled passenger airline industry.

The results demonstrate that although the interaction of multi-market contact with strategic similarity impairs a firm’s forbearance from competition, the same interaction promotes it as firm performance deteriorates, supporting the hypotheses.

Performance explains not only how forbearance emerges out of coincidental multi-market contact but also reconciles the mixed evidence for the impact of the two-way interaction between multi-market contact and strategic similarity on forbearance.

Antitrust authorities should pay more attention to low performing firms than to high performing firms in their investigations. Also, managers of multi-market firms should identify multi-market rivals with low performance as targets for the initiation of forbearance.

This study revises the mutual forbearance theory to align it with the accumulating empirical evidence that otherwise refutes its assumption and thereby improves theory’s descriptive and predictive power.