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1 – 10 of over 111000The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of the increase in firms’ reporting of alternative pay measures in Pay for Performance disclosures and their role in…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of the increase in firms’ reporting of alternative pay measures in Pay for Performance disclosures and their role in subsequent Say on Pay approval.
Design/methodology/approach
This study explores the most common types of supplemental compensation disclosures used in Pay for Performance discussions using a hand-collected sample of S&P 500 proxy statements from 2012-2014. The sample compares key characteristics of firms reporting “pocketed” pay, “market-value” pay, and “peer comparison” percentile ranking pay compared to firms that do not use these alternatives.
Findings
Results suggest that firms use alternative pay measures in their Pay for Performance disclosures for different reasons. While “pocketed” pay reporters show characteristics of opportunistic disclosures and “peer comparison” reporters tend toward informative disclosure, there is often a significant positive impact of disclosing additional compensation information on Say on Pay approval when combating prior poor Say on Pay support. However, the effect seems most significant for peer comparisons, indicating the value of reporting comparative pay.
Originality/value
This study provides insights into the increasing use of alternative pay measures, and through these measures, identifies an additional mechanism of firms’ responses to Say on Pay votes. In addition, this study highlights the importance of standardized Pay for Performance disclosures to improve informativeness and comparability in financial reporting across firms. Finally, the study provides additional evidence of opportunistic disclosure by firms in order to preserve executive pay.
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Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis…
Abstract
Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.
Thomas A. Hemphill and Waheeda Lillevik
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issues surrounding “say‐on‐pay” legislation in the USA; evaluate the corporate governance alternatives to “say‐on‐pay” legislation;…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issues surrounding “say‐on‐pay” legislation in the USA; evaluate the corporate governance alternatives to “say‐on‐pay” legislation; recommend a policy encouraging enhanced executive accountability; and suggest research questions pertaining to “say‐on‐pay” proposals and executive compensation for scholars to pursue.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper takes an exploratory approach to discussing and analyzing the issues surrounding “say‐on‐pay” legislation in the USA and offering an alternative corporate governance approach to enhancing executive performance.
Findings
The paper finds that whether an annual non‐binding “say‐on‐pay” policy is instituted or not within a company is not the crux of the executive compensation issue. What is important is whether concerned shareholders have the ability to have proxy access and successfully pass such a resolution, thereby exercising shareholder pressure on the board of directors to implement a corporate policy of equating appropriate executive compensation with managerial performance. Moreover, this improvement in board‐shareowner engagement, along with expanded disclosure of executive compensation packages, will assist in obviating the need for the exercise of a draconian shareholder resolution to remove directors.
Originality/value
This paper offers an in‐depth review of the “say‐on‐pay” legislative and corporate governance controversy; places the issue in the context of effective corporate governance; recommends a reasoned approach to executive compensation accountability; and offers a list of research questions for corporate governance and human resource management scholars to pursue.
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In this chapter, we explore the legal framework of AGMs in seven Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) of shareholder…
Abstract
In this chapter, we explore the legal framework of AGMs in seven Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) of shareholder decision-making rights. We find that, since only a small part of the decision-making rights is harmonized at the European level, there are numerous differences in shareholder rights among national laws. These decision-making rights are usually about the topics director (re-)elections, pay matters, share capital, amendments to articles of association, annual accounts, etc. To be able to conduct empirical research in the remaining chapters, we develop a categorization framework of 15 voting items.
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Jörn Obermann and Patrick Velte
This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers…
Abstract
This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.
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Ayman Issa and Jalal Rajeh Hanaysha
This study aims to investigate the link between carbon emissions and market value for nonfinancial companies in the STOXX Europe 600 index, with a specific focus on the moderating…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to investigate the link between carbon emissions and market value for nonfinancial companies in the STOXX Europe 600 index, with a specific focus on the moderating effect of executive compensation.
Design/methodology/approach
To achieve the study’s purpose, this study uses data from the STOXX Europe 600 index between 2010 and 2021. The researchers use ordinary least squares regression analysis to examine the relationship between carbon emissions and market value while taking into account the moderating effect of executive compensation. The study also uses additional tests, such as the dynamic two-step system generalized method of moments regression and the difference in differences method.
Findings
The study reveals four key findings. First, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between carbon emissions and market value. Second, executive compensation has a negative moderating effect on the association between carbon emissions and market value. Third, Say-on-Pay regulations can encourage companies to adopt environmentally responsible practices, which can positively impact their market value. Finally, the study shows that the Paris Agreement motivates companies to prioritize sustainability, leading to potentially higher market values for those that are more environmentally responsible.
Practical implications
This study highlights the importance of considering environmental sustainability in corporate decision-making. It suggests that prioritizing sustainability can lead to financial benefits, as companies with lower carbon emissions tend to have higher market values. The findings also have important implications for regulators and investors.
Originality/value
This study provides novel insights into the link between carbon emissions and market value and the moderating effect of executive compensation. It also sheds light on the potential impact of Say-on-Pay regulations and the Paris Agreement on corporate sustainability practices and market values.
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Marilee Van Zyl and Nadia Mans-Kemp
Companies around the globe increasingly receive immense shareholder scrutiny due to perceivably excessive executive director remuneration. The debate in South Africa intensifies…
Abstract
Purpose
Companies around the globe increasingly receive immense shareholder scrutiny due to perceivably excessive executive director remuneration. The debate in South Africa intensifies due to severe pay inequality. The authors thus accounted for the perspectives of asset managers and listed financial services companies in South Africa pertaining to the impact of voting and engagement on director pay policies and practices.
Design/methodology/approach
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected asset managers, chief executive officers, chief financial officers and remuneration committee members of listed financial services companies to gauge their views on the impact of shareholder activism endeavours on remuneration governance. The qualitative data was analysed by conducting thematic analysis.
Findings
Most of the asset managers and financial services representatives preferred proactive, private engagement on pay concerns, given the impact thereof on voting outcomes, and ultimately director remuneration practices and policies. Independent remuneration committees have a prominent role in facilitating engagements with investors to ensure fair remuneration.
Research limitations/implications
The consequences should be clearer if organisations receive substantial votes against their pay policies and implementation reports. South African regulators can consider the “two-strikes” rule to ensure that action is taken in response to shareholder voting on director remuneration matters.
Originality/value
Representatives of asset managers and listed financial services investee companies offered valuable insights on remuneration governance deliberations in an emerging market. This in-depth analysis highlights the importance of proactive engagement to ensure that corporate leaders are paid fairly.
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James P. Walsh, B. Joseph White and Jeffrey R. Edwards
This paper contains a commentary on the paper by Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle and Joo published in this same issue. This paper aims to encourage the readers to examine…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper contains a commentary on the paper by Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle and Joo published in this same issue. This paper aims to encourage the readers to examine this novel insight in future research but sadly, to disregard the results of this particular investigation.
Design/methodology/approach
Google Scholar tells us that, over a quarter of a million studies examine the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Aguinis et al. (2018) take much of that work to task. Observing that the distribution of CEO compensation is skewed, they question any work that assumes a normal distribution. Correcting the flaw, Aguinis et al. (2018) conduct their own investigation of this important relationship. Contrary to previous work, they find no consistent empirical relationship between pay and performance. The authors review and discuss their work with a clear eye on its implications for improving our understanding of these relationships.
Findings
The authors cannot accept the results of the Aguinis et al. (2018) investigation as it stands. Saying why, they close their commentary with some ideas that should help one understand whether accounting for a skewed CEO pay distribution really does revolutionize one’s understanding of corporate governance.
Practical implications
The statistical insight provided by Aguinis et al. (2018) yields provocative, if not profound, practical implications. While the authors’ review is critical, they aim to foster continued inquiry, not shut it down.
Objetivo
El objetivo del presente comentario del articulo de Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle and Joo (publicado en este mismo número) es el de motivar a sus lectores a examinar la nueva intuición que proporciona en el futuro pero, tristemente, desestimar los resultados de este trabajo en concreto.
Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Google Scholar indica que hay más de un cuarto de millón de estudios que analizan la relación entre la retribución del CEO y los resultados empresariales. Aguinis et al., (2018) analizan gran parte de este trabajo. Tras observar que la distribución de la retribución del CEO es asimétrica, cuestionan cualquier trabajo que asuma una distribución normal. Corriendo este aspectos Aguinis et al. (2018) llevan a cabo su propio análisis en este importante tema. Contrariamente a otros trabajos previos estos autores no encuentran una relación consistente entre la retribución y los resultados. Revisamos y discutimos su trabajo con un ojo en las implicaciones para la comprensión de esta relación.
Resultados – No podemos aceptar los resultados de Aguinis et al. (2018) en su forma actual. Señalando porqué, cerramos nuestro comentario con algunas ideas que deben ayudarnos a entender si tomando en cuenta la asimetría de la distribución de la retribución del CEO realmente es una revolución para nuestra comprensión del gobierno corporativo de las empresas.
Implicaciones – La evidencia aportada por Aguinis et al. (2018) genera provocadoras, si no profundas, implicaciones prácticas. Si bien nuestro comentario es crítico, es nuestro deseo abrir – y no cerrar – el debate para considerar este importante tema.
Originalidad/valor – El comentario revisa de manera crítica las conclusiones del artículo publicado por Aguinis y colegas en este mismo número.
Objetivo
O objetivo do presente comentário do artigo de Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle e Joo (publicado neste mesmo número) é motivar aos seus leitores a examinar a nova intuição que proporciona no futuro mas, infelizmente, desestimar os resultados deste trabalho em concreto.
Metodologia – O Google Scholar diz-nos que mais de duzentos e cinquenta mil estudos examinam a relação entre compensação do CEO e performance da empresa. Aguinis et al. (2018) examinam uma boa parte desses estudos. Observando que a distribuição da compensação do CEO é enviesada, eles questionam os trabalhos que assumem uma distribuição normal. Corrigindo a falha, Aguinis et al. (2018) conduzem a sua própria investigação desta relação. Contrariamente a trabalho anterior, eles não encontram uma relação empírica consistente entre pagamento e performance. Revemos e discutimos o seu trabalho com enfoque especial nas suas implicações para a compreensão destas relações.
Resultados – Não podemos aceitar os resultados da investigação de Aguinis et al. (2018) tal como está. Dizendo porquê, terminamos o nosso comentário com algumas ideias que nos ajudam a perceber se dar conta duma distribuição enviesada de compensação do CEO realmente revoluciona a nossa compreensão da governança corporativa.
Implicações – A evidência estatística de Aguinis et al. (2018) levanta implicações práticas provocadoras, se não mesmo profundas. Sendo a nossa revisão crítica, pretendemos abrir – e não fechar – a continuação da consideração destes assuntos.
Originalidade/valor – O comentário faz uma revisão crítica das conclusões do artigo de Aguinis e colegas, neste número.
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Keywords
- Corporate governance
- Research methods
- Firm performance
- Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation
- CEO pay
- Pay-for performance
- Retribución del consejero delegado (CEO)
- Rendimiento empresarial
- Retribución por resultados
- Gobierno corporativo
- Compensação do chief executive officer (CEO)
- Performance da empresa
- Pagamento pela performance
- Governação corporativa
Haiyan Jiang and Honghui Zhang
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether regulatory restriction on executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises is beneficial to firm performance. The…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether regulatory restriction on executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises is beneficial to firm performance. The authors also examine the role of monitoring mechanisms in offsetting the effect of compensation restriction.
Design/methodology/approach
Multivariate analysis is conducted using archival data from Chinese listed companies over the period of 2007-2014.
Findings
The findings show that the restriction on executive compensation is negatively associated with a firm’s accounting performance, and this negative effect is ameliorated in firms with good internal control and a high level of institutional shareholding. Additional analysis reveals that the negative effect of pay restriction on firm performance is more pronounced in central government-controlled listed SOEs than in those controlled by local government.
Originality/value
This study is the first to investigate a government’s say-on-pay policy. Specifically, the findings pinpoint the inefficacy of regulatory intervention in corporate executive compensation. The findings add to compensation literature using China’s unique institutional setting.
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The paper aims to examine the role of human greed in the determination of executive remuneration in the UK.
Abstract
Purpose
The paper aims to examine the role of human greed in the determination of executive remuneration in the UK.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper reviews the past and existing regulation and corporate governance recommendations on executive remuneration.
Findings
The paper demonstrates that the failure of regulatory mechanisms to curb excessive executive remuneration can be justified on the grounds of human greed. Greed is facilitated by the potential conflict of interest that exists as a result of the executives’ position in the company. The position of the law has given greed the opportunity to manifest, making it quite difficult for executive remuneration to be effectively regulated.
Originality/value
The paper adds to the existing debate on excessive executive remuneration by demonstrating that human greed is the basis of excessive executive remuneration on which limited literature exists.
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