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The purpose of this paper is to analyse World Trade Organisation (WTO) remedies from a developing country perspective, with a view to suggest reforms in the system.

WTO members' proposals for reforming WTO remedies and WTO cases are reviewed in order to determine the need for reforms and the nature of reforms to be undertaken.

WTO remedies are unfavourable to developing countries, most of which are unable to utilise them due to their weaker economies as compared to their developed country counterparts. There is no consensus on the nature of reforms to be undertaken. This paper suggests the need to synthesise the current proposals and develop various workable models.

This paper provides proposals which may improve WTO remedies for the benefit of developing countries, thereby not only strengthening the WTO enforcement mechanism but the multilateral trading system as a whole.

Limited participation of least developed countries (LDCs) in the WTO's dispute settlement system has been the focus of intensive debate among WTO scholars, diplomats and, in particular, WTO lawyers. Central to this debate are the major hurdles (financial and political) that LDCs are generally perceived to face in using the existing system of remedies in the WTO system to enforce compliance. Of the two existing compliance enforcement mechanisms, the first – compensation – is often unrealistic because the WTO Member whose measures have been found to be WTO inconsistent has to agree with it; while the second – retaliation (i.e., the suspension of concessions with regard to the non-complying Member) – is a costly and in many ways counter-productive “shooting oneself in the foot” remedy that LDCs in particular can usually ill afford.

This chapter briefly discusses proposals for reform that have been proposed to alleviate these problems. The chapter then reviews two additional instruments that LDCs could pursue to improve their ability to enforce compliance and make the WTO dispute settlement system a more viable instrument: limited use of direct effect; and increased use of the instrument of publicity and public relations, including through civil society. These instruments, whether independently, or in combination with existing mechanisms and other new compliance enforcement measures, could provide useful tools for the WTO's poorest Members to increase the chances for pay-off from WTO litigation and for compliance with WTO law by larger and more powerful trading partners.

The purpose of this paper is to show that, instead of replacing trade retaliation with alternatives that are equally problematic, such as monetary damages, mandatory trade compensation, or formal membership sanctions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) might gain from relying exclusively on informal remedies.

The paper critically reviews the main proposals brought forward in the literature and by WTO members on how to reform WTO remedies. It takes a fresh look at whether any viable, both economically and legally sensitive, alternatives exist.

First, the fact that WTO dispute settlement does not rely on monetary damages and on reparation for past losses is economically justified. Second, switching to an alternative remedy of mandatory trade compensation is not a viable alternative to proportional countermeasures. Third, introducing formal membership sanctions into the WTO would either remain ineffective or turn out to be counterproductive for progressive trade liberalization. Fourth, in order not to provoke an excessive increase of the total cost for WTO members to breach their obligations, any strengthening of the WTO's informal remedies should not be undertaken on top of existing remedies, but as part of a major paradigm shift built on the abrogation of trade retaliation.

The article contributes to the ongoing debate on how to reform the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.

This article joins an already vast body of literature dealing with potential reforms of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. It provides a holistic review of the main existing reform proposals under both legal and economic aspects and adds original insights in discussing the replacement of trade remedies by strengthened informal remedies.

Among the primary suggestions for reform of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO has been remedies for noncompliance. Prior literature has considered remedies in the context of deliberate breach of commitments. The WTO increasingly has, however, been negotiating commitments in subjective areas of policy. Thus, we provide a model of the DSU under which members' interpretations of concessions differ. This induces disputes regarding violation of commitments.

The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has promoted compliance primarily through authorization of retaliation (prospective punishment) after expiration of a reasonable period of time for the implementation of a verdict. As has been noted, this does not compensate a complainant for a violation of obligations and enables the respondent to circumvent punishment for imposing a cost upon a member of the WTO by reforming its offending policy reasonably promptly. We consider retrospective penalties (compensation for a loss) with and without reinforcement by retaliation as alternative enforcement mechanisms and find that a simple retaliatory punishment scheme is preferable. A penalty is unenforceable, as a member that is unwilling to reform its policy after an adverse judgment can decline to provide compensation. A penalty reinforced by retaliation can reduce compliance relative to a simple prospective punishment by raising the cost of abiding by the judgement.

Remedies also affect the negotiation of commitments. Members are more willing to make and less willing to accept unenforceable commitments. In this regard, the simple prospective punishment scheme is preferable.

The WTO dispute settlement process is an improvement to the original GATT dispute settlement mechanism. However, it fails to assure a timely implementation and enforcement of the dispute settlement body (DSB) recommendations. To this date, the issue of mandatory enforcement is still open to interpretation. The number of ‘matters’ that have been subject to WTO dispute settlement stands at 266 over the 1995–2006 period. The number of implementation disputes has increased since 1998 and stand at 34 as of January 1, 2007. This chapter reviews the process of dispute settlements and enforcements since 1995 and to argue for the interpretation of ‘WTO agreements’ as ‘binding contracts’ whose breach must be evaluated as either ‘efficient’ or ‘non-efficient’ when discussing enforcement. In this context the non-compliance issue may be viewed as an ‘efficient breach’ where the only efficient remedy is a ‘fine’ rather than the usual practice of ‘suspension of concessions or other obligations’ to the Respondent. What sets our approach apart from earlier discussion is that it does not view ‘suspension of concessions’ as a sufficiently burdensome and efficient sanction. A ‘fine’ on the other hand may serve as a ‘buy out’ of a Respondents WTO obligations, and can be transferred to the negatively affected domestic producers in the Complainant's market as compensation for losses.

The paper is prompted by the US–China trade war and its implications for the sustenance of the multilateral trading system. The two rivals resorted to “self-help” without recourse to the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system, flouting the WTO as an adjudicator in trade disputes. This paper aims to analyze the drawbacks in the settlement system and examines the urgent need for a retroactive remedy.

This paper adopts desk-review and jurisprudential analysis of the relevant rulings of the WTO dispute settlement body. Using desk-review, primary sources such as the relevant domestic legislations invoked by the USA and China to trigger the trade war were discussed and critically analyzed.

This paper finds that the unilateral and protectionist actions that characterize the trade war can be linked to the loss of confidence in WTO remedies to redress members’ retroactive economic losses. This finding is useful in arguing for the incorporation of a retrospective monetary remedy to forestall the reoccurrence of a similar trade war and save the WTO from being dysfunctional.

Although, whether there should be retroactive remedies in the settlement system has been long debated, this paper makes a significant contribution by highlighting why the drawbacks in the settlement system have become so prominent in the context of this trade war. This paper strengthens the urgent need for WTO dispute settlement reform to prevent a reoccurrence of another global distortion of trade.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the cross-fertilization between environmental concerns and trade law, through an analysis of their primary texts and case law, and seek to what extent the concept of sustainable development is, or can be, embodied in such field of law. The question posed is whether the international trade law paradigm is well suited to implement the goals embodied in the concept of sustainable development.

In giving a tentative answer to the said question, also through the analysis of some trade law reform proposals, the author advocates that international trade law and sustainable development not only can have compatible goals but that they are (if not, they shall be) inseparably related to one another, from both an economic policy perspective and a legal standpoint.

The author concludes that the paradigms can be complementary to the extent that international trade law, while preserving a formal legal identity deriving from the current shape of its body of rules, has seen its application supporting and, eventually, giving sustainable development a normative force that it could not have achieved otherwise – and this, on a global and uniform scale. Although it may be contended that, after a preliminary survey of relevant international trade case law, this interaction is still a seed in its infancy and some changes must necessarily occur to make the trade paradigm keener and more effective in supporting environmental protection goals, the author argues that, given the difficulties in obtaining such changes, the existing trade paradigm structure has served (and will serve) sustainable development better than other paradigms, as a vehicle through which such concept can drive nations’ economic development more forcefully.

The paper contains a reasoned survey of the most important case law, outlining the main legal hurdles that the implementation of sustainable development encounters in the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism.

The value of this paper stands in the reasoned approach to the legal issues underlying the matters involved, specifically with respect to the analysis of Article XX GATT. Moreover, it remarks the effects that a developed system like the WTO can have in promoting sustainable development, addressing some of the most recent reform proposals.

The appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process have increasingly come under scrutiny in recent years. Several Members and commentators alike have recommended large-scale amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to provide alternatives to retaliatory measures, with the most notable including compensation, collective retaliation, and increased special and differential treatment for developing countries and/or widespread loss of privileges for non-conforming respondents.

Unfortunately, many of the proposals failed to first identify the aims and objectives of the retaliatory phase, or even of dispute settlement more generally. This chapter takes a more holistic approach in its analysis of whether any of the current proposals will improve (or harm) the system. In doing so, this chapter will first assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures by evaluating the goals and objectives in which it is designed to achieve. It will then evaluate some of the more prominent proposals for amending the DSU under the same framework. Taking such an approach will allow for a more comprehensive review and will reveal not only the problems with retaliatory trade measures, but also its positive aspects, and not only the positive aspects of the suggested alternatives but also where they may be detrimental to the system.

To review the relationship between the nature of telecommunications sector reform and the commitments under the WTO, and determine the impact on sector performance.

A model is developed which links sector reforms and WTO commitments. Publicly available, data are then used to populate the model and explore the correlations between sector reform, WTO commitments and sector performance.

The empirical analysis suggests a strong and positive correlation between positive changes in sector performance and sector reform supported by WTO commitments.

The sequencing of the reform agenda and the use of WTO commitments as part within the political economy of a particular country are important issues which future research may consider. The lack of consistent cross‐sectional data prevented the adoption of more formal econometric analysis.

The paper highlights the close integration of a number of policy measures if sector reform within a country is to be successful. The role of the WTO commitments may be significant not only in shaping the details of internal policy measures, but also as a credibility signal to investors.

In light of the Doha round of negotiations within the WTO, in particular the “Singapore Agenda”, this paper makes a significant contribution to understanding the relationship between WTO commitments and reform of the telecommunications sector.

World Trade Organisation grants rights to its members, and WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides a rule-oriented consultative and judicial mechanism to protect these rights in cases of WTO-incompatible trade infringements. However, the DSU participation benefits come at a cost. These costs are acutely formidable for least developing countries (LDCs) which have small market size and trading stakes. No LDC has ever filed a WTO compliant, with the only exception of India-Battery dispute filed by Bangladesh against India. This paper aims to look at the experience of how Bangladesh – so far the only LDC member that has filed a formal WTO complaint – persuaded India to withdraw anti-dumping duties India had imposed on the import of acid battery from Bangladesh.

The investigation is grounded on practically informed findings gathered through authors’ work experience and several semi-structured interviews and discussions which the authors have conducted with government representatives from Bangladesh, government and industry representatives from other developing countries, trade lawyers and officials based in Geneva and Brussels, and civil society organisations.

The discussion provides a sound indication of the participation impediments that LDCs can face at WTO DSU and the ways in which such challenges can be overcome with the help of resources available at the domestic level. It also exemplifies how domestic laws and practices can respond to international legal instruments and impact the performance of an LDC at an international adjudicatory forum.

Except one book chapter and a working paper, there is no literature available on this matter. This investigation is grounded on practically informed findings gathered with the help of original empirical research conducted by the authors.