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This study aims to examine the association between forensic accounting services (FAS) and the risk of litigation within the context of industrial firms that are publicly traded on the Amman Stock Exchange by using the resource-based theory.

This study uses a data set consisting of 250 firm-year observations from 2017 to 2021, obtained from the annual reports of 50 selected firms. Logistic regression techniques are used to examine the specifics of the investigated relationship.

The findings strongly suggest that companies that use FAS are more likely to face increased litigation risks. This observation suggests that these firms are subject to a more thorough level of evaluation or scrutiny, which inherently increases their vulnerability to potential risks. The study incorporated several control variables such as firm age, size, profitability and working capital. However, it is noteworthy that the connection between FAS and litigation risk emerged as particularly prominent.

Findings highlight the need for practitioners to tread cautiously with FAS. Although they provide in-depth evaluations, they can also unveil vulnerabilities, leading to increased legal action. Companies should balance the depth of FAS scrutiny against potential legal repercussions, ensuring they harness its benefits without inadvertently raising legal risks.

While most studies have emphasized the impact of forensic accounting on fraud, this paper covers a gap in the literature regarding the impact of FAS on litigation risks. The paper also facilitates the understanding of the correlation between firm characteristics and the likelihood of litigation.

The practice of management having control over auditor appointment and compensation is believed to be a fundamental cause for the lack of auditor independence. While researchers propose alternative auditor appointment procedures to improve auditor independence, there are a few settings that allow researchers to examine alternative auditor appointment procedures such as regulator designation of auditors. This research aims to investigate the effects of regulator designation of auditors and litigation risk on auditor independence in a Chinese setting

This study adopts a 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. A total of 110 surveys were sent out and 81 were collected from eastern China.

The results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors indicate that regulator designation of auditors improves auditor independence. In particular, auditors designated by the regulator feel less pressure from the audited company, perceive themselves to be more independent and are more willing to challenge the audited company’s aggressive financial reporting compared with those directly hired by the company. In addition, litigation risk moderates the effect of regulator designation of auditors on auditor independence such that regulator designation of auditors has a stronger impact on auditor independence when the litigation risk is low.

This study is also subject to limitations. First, regulator designation of auditors in China was examined. While regulator designation of auditors seems to improve auditor independence in the Chinese context, it is unclear if the same results will be observed in other economies, as China is a unique setting. For example, the majority of listed companies in China are under the control of government-related agencies. Consequently, the government has significant power in influencing auditor appointment policy. In contrast, the majority of other economies are more market-oriented with less government influence. Future studies in other markets will further enrich the understanding on regulator designation of auditors. Second, only regulator designation of auditors for state-owned enterprises was examined. It is unclear how regulator designation of auditors would affect non-state-owned enterprises. Moreover, future research could investigate the designation of auditors in other forms such as the designation of auditors by investors. Third, auditor appointment procedure may affect perceived risk of loss of client which in turn influences auditor independence. Future research could further investigate the mechanism through which regulator designation of auditors affect auditor independence.

Results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors show that regulator designation of auditors can improve auditor independence. In a decision context where auditors must provide judgments relating to a proposed audit adjustment that is quantitatively material and will affect the client’s ability to meet debt covenants, auditors designated by the State-Owned Assets Management Bureaus are more resistant to management pressure and are less willing to accept the management’s aggressive financial reporting practice than those directly hired by the company.

In most financial institutions, chief risk officers (CROs) and their risk management (RM) staff fulfill a role in managing risk exposures, yet their lack of involvement in the governance has been cited as an influential factor that contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Various legislative and regulatory bodies have pressured financial firms to improve their risk governance structures to better weather potential future crises. Assuming that CROs and risk committees are given sufficient power to influence the corporate governance of financial institutions, can CROs and risk committees protect financial institutions from violating litigable securities law? Can they improve bank performance? The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors employ a principal component analysis to construct a single measure that captures various aspects of RM in a firm. The authors compare the risk governance characteristics of sued firms with their non-sued peers and consider one of the final outcomes of risky behavior: shareholder litigation. The authors compute ROA and buy-and-hold abnormal returns to capture operating and stock performance and examine whether risk governance improves bank performance by reducing litigation risk.

Proper risk governance reduces a firm’s litigation probability. The addition of the RM factor to models that have been previously proposed in the literature improves the accuracy of those models in identifying companies that are most susceptible to class action lawsuits. Better RM improves the financial and stock price performance of financial institutions.

The data collection is laborious as the information about CRO governance has to be hand-collected from the 10-K report. A broader sample employing, e.g., non-US banks may provide additional insights into the relationship between RM practices, shareholder litigation, and bank performance.

The study shows that a bank’s RM functions play a critical role in improving bank and operating performance and in reducing shareholder litigation. Banks should emphasize the RM function.

This is the first study to examine the mechanism behind the positive association between RM and bank performance. The study shows that better RM improves overall bank performance by decreasing litigation risk.

The purpose of this paper is to study the relation between compensation clawbacks and lawsuits and analyze how these two corporate disciplinary forces interact. This paper hypothesizes that by allowing firms to recoup compensation from managers who breach their fiduciary duty, clawbacks provide a form of discipline that potentially reduces the likelihood of managerial wrongdoing, which, in turn, lowers the risk of corporate lawsuits.

This paper identifies whether or not a company in the S&P 1500 had a clawback policy between 2007 and 2014 by searching the company filings and press releases. The authors also construct different proxies for litigation risk and lawsuit outcomes using the Audit Analytics Database. They then perform a variety of empirical tests to examine the association between clawbacks and litigation risk and the association between clawbacks and litigation outcomes.

This paper finds that firms with higher litigation risk are more likely to adopt a clawback policy. In addition, after the adoption of clawback provisions, litigation risk significantly declines, suggesting that clawback policies are effective in reducing the likelihood of corporate lawsuits. Furthermore, firms with clawback policies are approximately 50 per cent more likely to have lawsuits against them dismissed or settled for lower amounts (approximately 12 per cent lower).

The findings of this paper provide insights to the efficacy of a current change in compensation regulation, the mandatory clawback adoption requirement by the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010.

This paper contributes to the literature on both clawbacks and litigation, as it is the first to analyze the relation between the two.

Accounting firms claim that the risk of costly litigation leads to resignations from high-risk clients, and that these resignations represent an economic inefficiency. This study examines the association between resignations, dismissals and litigation in the computer industry from 1988–1995. Resignations and dismissals appear to be similar, suggesting some dismissals are implicit resignations. Results support a relationship between risk and resignations. Since some characteristics of auditor litigation risk are also characteristic of unprofitable audit engagements, the analysis incorporates the actual litigation experience of sample companies to provide insights into claims of inefficiencies surrounding the switches.

This study aims to examine the impact of firm indicators on litigation risk in the Jordanian financial sector from 2017 to 2021, where the relationship between firm indicators and litigation risk in the Jordanian financial sector is a crucial area of research that can help financial institutions understand the factors that increase their probability of litigation risk.

The sample for this study comprised 92 publicly traded financial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. The study used a quantitative research approach to analyse the relationship between four firm indicators (profitability, firm size, leverage and age) and their impact on litigation risk in the Jordanian financial sector from 2017 to 2021.

Our findings reveal that firm size has a significant positive impact on litigation risk, whereas profitability was found to have no significant impact on litigation risk. Moreover, the authors found that financial leverage substantially positively impacts litigation risk levels. However, the firm age was found to have no significant impact on litigation risk.

The results provide valuable insights into factors contributing to litigation risk in the Jordanian financial sector and the findings can inform strategic decisions for financial firms as they seek to manage litigation risk and improve financial performance. The study contributes to the existing literature on litigation risk by examining the impact of multiple firm indicators on litigation risk in the context of the Jordanian financial sector.

This study aims to address the following four research questions: first, whether auditors report critical audit matters (CAMs) to shield themselves against possible litigation; second, whether reporting quality affects auditors’ propensity to report CAMs; third, whether auditors’ tenure length – reflecting familiarity with clients’ financial reporting – affects their likelihood to report CAMs; and fourth, whether auditors’ conservatism increases the likelihood of CAMs reporting.

Data are manually collected from audit reports including CAMs in 10-K, then financial data are collected from the Capital IQ database, and market data are collected from the CRSP database. Using propensity score matching, the initial sample of companies with CAMs is matched with companies without reported CAMs. Performance adjusted discretionary accruals, real earnings management proxy, Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-score, propensity to issue a going concern opinion, Dechow et al.’s (2011) F-Score, Rogers and Stocken’s (2005) model and Houston et al.’s (2010) model are used to measure reporting quality, auditor conservatism, misstatement risk and litigation risk, respectively.

The results do not show that auditors report CAMs opportunistically to shield themselves from litigation risk. However, the results do suggest that auditors have a greater tendency to report CAMs when reporting quality is low and when they are more conservative. On the other hand, they have less tendency to report CAMs in their first year of engagement.

The findings of this study have important implications for the auditor behavior literature as it shows that, when it comes to reporting CAMs, auditors actually behave objectively and do not report in a trite way. This study also provides early archival evidence on a standard that relates to the first major change to the auditor’s report in decades. To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the first to provide evidence on the association between auditor conservatism and auditors tendency to report CAMs and the first to triangulate prior research on auditor litigation risk by providing the first archival evidence on the auditors “litigation-shielding” concern.

This study examines whether auditors attempt to meet the stated objective of reporting CAMs by signaling information about reporting quality. This study demonstrates that reporting CAMs is not a “boilerplate” communication. This study has implications for standards setters, as it shows that CAMs are reported in a way consistent with the objectives of the new standard, namely, via signaling information in the audit report on the quality of the financial statements.

In terms of originality, this paper uses a manually collected sample and, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first to focus on auditor’s behavior rather than on investors or clients reactions to CAMs. Also, this paper addresses a recently issued standard using US data and archival approach, rather than experimental. This paper also provides relevant evidence related to concerns raised earlier but were not empirically examined, such as reporting CAMS as “boilerplate” expectations. This paper provides new evidence on the auditors’ behavior with regard to litigation risk.

The authors study how shareholder litigation risk impacts a firm’s decision of real earnings management (REM). This paper aims to shed light on how shareholder litigation risk impacts REM. The authors further explore how the intensifying effect varies systematically conditioning on the degree of information asymmetry and the strength of internal corporate governance.

In this study, the authors use the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court ruling as a quasi-experiment that reduces shareholder litigation risk to address endogeneity and establish a causal inference.

The difference-in-difference tests suggest lower shareholder litigation risk intensifies REM. In other words, higher litigation risk mitigates REM. Cross-sectional test results suggest the negative effect of decreased shareholder litigation is more pronounced when monitoring difficulty is higher, when information environment is more impoverished and when internal corporate governance is weaker. The negative effect is also stronger in firms with higher sensitivity to legal threats.

Protection of investors’ interest is the focus of corporate governance. Designed as an important corporate governance mechanism, shareholder litigation enables investors to pursue legal actions to recover their losses in the event of corporate misbehaviors. However, whether shareholder litigation is an effective corporate governance tool and beneficial to shareholders and firms is not without controversy. The authors contribute to the debate by providing evidence that supports the argument that shareholder litigation threat significantly disciplines REM, a form of costlier earnings management technique and myopic investment behavior.

The purpose of this research is to investigate how the negative effect of litigation risk on firm performance could be controlled through the channel of voluntary disclosure and under the condition of institutional ownership.

To get the objectives, the study analyzed an unbalanced panel of 918 non-financial listed Chinese firms from 2010 to 18. To capture any expected unobserved heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the unbalanced sample, the authors have applied fixed effect regression with robust standard errors clustered at the firms' levels as suggested by Newey and West (1987).

The research provides that the good disclosure practices and presence of institutional ownership in corporations raise the trust of the investors by making the corporate operation clear in the eyes of the stakeholders. This increases the corporate credibility and as consequence corporations are protected against litigation risk. Thus, in the light of the information asymmetry and signaling theories, voluntary disclosure practices, and financial institutions' ownership, bridges the information gap and transmit a positive signal in the market regarding the better financial performance of the corporations.

These findings are helpful for the corporate managers for effective strategic decisions, regulatory authorities for policy formulation, and individual investors for developing a diversified investment portfolio.

By applying the mediation and moderation effects, the research enhances the understanding of the underlying causes of the association between a firm's litigation risk and its performance. The current research contributes to the literature, that agency issues which create litigation risk could be settled internally with voluntary disclosure practices and externally with institutional ownership.

This chapter provides evidence that legislation affecting litigation risk has an influence on the financial reporting behavior of corporate management, we address the following research questions: (1) Do firms react to changes in litigation risk that result from the passage of new legislation at the federal level by adjusting their level of conservatism with regard to reporting earnings? (2) How do firms’ levels of conservatism react to changes in litigation risk over time? We analyze the level and trend in conditional conservatism to evaluate the efficacy of legislation in altering managerial reporting choice. Our examination takes place in the context of two distinct pieces of legislation intended to alter the legal environment faced by corporate managers: (1) the PSLRA (1995), and (2) Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Our findings indicate that the passage of legislation that increases litigation risk is associated with increased timeliness (conservatism) in financial reporting by managers. The increased timeliness, however, begins to subside shortly after the initial effect. While the initial effect of a reduction in litigation risk is negligible, subsequent periods exhibit declining timeliness (conservatism) in financial reporting. Our results indicate that legislative actions can be successful in altering management reporting choice through changes in legal regime. However, our results also demonstrate that the desired influence of these legislative policies may be transient.