Search results

The purpose of this paper is to show that, instead of replacing trade retaliation with alternatives that are equally problematic, such as monetary damages, mandatory trade compensation, or formal membership sanctions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) might gain from relying exclusively on informal remedies.

The paper critically reviews the main proposals brought forward in the literature and by WTO members on how to reform WTO remedies. It takes a fresh look at whether any viable, both economically and legally sensitive, alternatives exist.

First, the fact that WTO dispute settlement does not rely on monetary damages and on reparation for past losses is economically justified. Second, switching to an alternative remedy of mandatory trade compensation is not a viable alternative to proportional countermeasures. Third, introducing formal membership sanctions into the WTO would either remain ineffective or turn out to be counterproductive for progressive trade liberalization. Fourth, in order not to provoke an excessive increase of the total cost for WTO members to breach their obligations, any strengthening of the WTO's informal remedies should not be undertaken on top of existing remedies, but as part of a major paradigm shift built on the abrogation of trade retaliation.

The article contributes to the ongoing debate on how to reform the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.

This article joins an already vast body of literature dealing with potential reforms of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. It provides a holistic review of the main existing reform proposals under both legal and economic aspects and adds original insights in discussing the replacement of trade remedies by strengthened informal remedies.

Limited participation of least developed countries (LDCs) in the WTO's dispute settlement system has been the focus of intensive debate among WTO scholars, diplomats and, in particular, WTO lawyers. Central to this debate are the major hurdles (financial and political) that LDCs are generally perceived to face in using the existing system of remedies in the WTO system to enforce compliance. Of the two existing compliance enforcement mechanisms, the first – compensation – is often unrealistic because the WTO Member whose measures have been found to be WTO inconsistent has to agree with it; while the second – retaliation (i.e., the suspension of concessions with regard to the non-complying Member) – is a costly and in many ways counter-productive “shooting oneself in the foot” remedy that LDCs in particular can usually ill afford.

This chapter briefly discusses proposals for reform that have been proposed to alleviate these problems. The chapter then reviews two additional instruments that LDCs could pursue to improve their ability to enforce compliance and make the WTO dispute settlement system a more viable instrument: limited use of direct effect; and increased use of the instrument of publicity and public relations, including through civil society. These instruments, whether independently, or in combination with existing mechanisms and other new compliance enforcement measures, could provide useful tools for the WTO's poorest Members to increase the chances for pay-off from WTO litigation and for compliance with WTO law by larger and more powerful trading partners.

Many functionalist models of international cooperation rely on punishment by states to enforce cooperation. However, the empirical record suggests that such state-based accounts offer an incomplete explanation of international trade cooperation. We argue that when theoretical approaches are adjusted to incorporate aspects of domestic politics and institutions, two key insights emerge. First, political pressure from domestic industries can be key in creating demand for violations of trade agreements. Since such pressure is affected by stochastic shocks, the temptation of leaders to commit trade violations can vary over time. The presence of a dispute settlement procedure (DSP) provides flexibility that allows leaders to respond to such pressure by occasionally committing violations and then compensating their trading partners, if the DSP finds that the violation was not subject to exceptions in the trading agreement. This flexibility enhances the willingness of leaders to sign cooperative agreements in the first place. Second, domestic politics can function as an enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance with international trade agreements and DSP rulings. Voters can condition their electoral decisions on whether their leader complies with socially beneficial trade agreements. The DSP plays an important role in this account as an information-provider. For voters to hold their leaders accountable, they need information about what choices their leader has made and whether his actions constitute compliance with an international agreement. The DSP provides transparency and reduces uncertainty about these factors.

Applying a computable general equilibrium model to assess the impact of tariffs between the US and China, Taiwan stands to gain from trade diversion of the trade war between the two largest world economies in the short term.

Initially, Taiwan suffered a minor loss from the sector-specific tariff on steel and aluminum imposed by the US. However, its loss is mitigated after counting counter measures from foreign countries. The cumulated US tariffs and China's retaliations led to trade diversion effect. Taiwan's initial loss from the steel and aluminum tariffs was over compensated by a series of trade war between the US and China.

Under the scenario of the cumulated tariffs of $250 billion of US imports and China's retaliations of $110 billion on US goods, the social welfare, exports, import and trade balance in Taiwan increased. Its terms of trade improved as well. Real wage increases slightly more for unskilled labor than for skilled labor. The short-term effect of the trade war has positive effect on all macro indicators of Taiwan's economy.

On sectoral shift, Taiwan's export will gain the most in precision engineering products ($2,941.6 million), followed by electronics ($310.7 million) and agricultural products ($31.3 million). The negative effects are in sectors such as business services ($58.323 million), other services ($46.9 million), transportation service ($36.6 million), trade service ($25.3 million), and finance service ($24.5 million). Taiwan's total imports will increase by 0.59%, whereas its total export will increase by 0.33%. However, total trade balance still increases by $451.1 million.

The study also finds that Taiwan has a high degree of overlapping export commodities with China in the US market, much higher than most major trading partners for the US, yet its market share for those products in the US is ranged from 1% to 5% only. Moreover, more than 60% of Taiwan's export to the US is in intermediate goods which have less product differentiation than those in final consumption goods. These two factors will provide an opportunity for Taiwan to exploit the US market.

Though the short-term effect of trade war is positive, Taiwan needs to have a long-range planning amid the external shocks. Policy implications for Taiwan are to map out a cosmopolitan view of its geo-strategy by diversifying outward foreign direct investment and trade destinations. It needs to reduce the “systemic risk” of relying on single market in China which is vulnerable to the uncertainty in the US–China relations. If the trade war lasts too long, Taiwan would need to reevaluate its triangular trade-investment nexus with China and the US as well as its role in the global supply chain.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse World Trade Organisation (WTO) remedies from a developing country perspective, with a view to suggest reforms in the system.

WTO members' proposals for reforming WTO remedies and WTO cases are reviewed in order to determine the need for reforms and the nature of reforms to be undertaken.

WTO remedies are unfavourable to developing countries, most of which are unable to utilise them due to their weaker economies as compared to their developed country counterparts. There is no consensus on the nature of reforms to be undertaken. This paper suggests the need to synthesise the current proposals and develop various workable models.

This paper provides proposals which may improve WTO remedies for the benefit of developing countries, thereby not only strengthening the WTO enforcement mechanism but the multilateral trading system as a whole.

On 15 December 1993, the most ambitious trade liberalisation package in history was concluded, marking the end of multilateral trade negotiations under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Among the landmark achievements of that round was the addressing of the services sector for the first time in such a setting. This paper analyses the key provisions of the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) in the context of the construction industry. Despite the fact that GATS is presently a framework which requires further negotiation, there are already certain matters that corporate strategists should be conversant with in preparation for the time when full trade surveillance is imposed on the industry. Specific reference is also made to the Government Procurement Agreement towards the end of this paper because of its galvanising force on future GATS negotiations.

The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that the U‐shaped relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) observed in the past literature using a panel of data is not a consequence of longitudinal forces, as has been previously postulated, but instead a consequence of cross‐sectional influences.

Differences in the longitudinal and cross‐sectional relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP are analyzed through a variety of methods, including pooled regression analysis that isolates the regional differences that are critical in making an accurate longitudinal analysis from the panel data.

Analyzing the country data reveals that a longitudinal U‐shaped relationship is counterfactual, as countries generally do not weaken their IPRs once they are in place, barring a regime change or other alteration in their political economy. The significant U‐shape link between IPRs and per capita GDP empirically observed in preliminary analysis of the panel data is instead a result of cross‐sectional influences.

Making the distinction between the cross‐sectional and longitudinal relationship between IPRs and per capita GDP provides a more accurate insight about how IPRs change in a country as it develops.

Antitrust legislation in the United States was originally enacted in 1890. This legislation and subsequent amendments established the historic precedent of government controlling the power of business by limiting its influence over markets. This paper reflects on why this unique set of laws was originally enacted, reviews these laws in the United States compared to other global competitors, and recommends revisions in the present legislation to more accurately reflect the competitive arena that United States based companies face in the global economy.

The appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process have increasingly come under scrutiny in recent years. Several Members and commentators alike have recommended large-scale amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to provide alternatives to retaliatory measures, with the most notable including compensation, collective retaliation, and increased special and differential treatment for developing countries and/or widespread loss of privileges for non-conforming respondents.

Unfortunately, many of the proposals failed to first identify the aims and objectives of the retaliatory phase, or even of dispute settlement more generally. This chapter takes a more holistic approach in its analysis of whether any of the current proposals will improve (or harm) the system. In doing so, this chapter will first assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures by evaluating the goals and objectives in which it is designed to achieve. It will then evaluate some of the more prominent proposals for amending the DSU under the same framework. Taking such an approach will allow for a more comprehensive review and will reveal not only the problems with retaliatory trade measures, but also its positive aspects, and not only the positive aspects of the suggested alternatives but also where they may be detrimental to the system.

The usage of the WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) is dominated by high-income countries. Since the ultimate enforcement threat of the system is based on retaliation, countries may take their economic size as well as their specific bilateral retaliatory capacity into account when deciding whether or not to respond to a detrimental infringement of a trade agreement by filing a costly complaint. Hence, various scholars conjecture that lawsuits surfacing in the record of the WTO constitute only the biased tip of an iceberg of trade disputes. In order to investigate such a potential bias, this chapter sets up a sequential game of the DSS. Subsequently, a binary choice model is employed to empirically explain a country's decision whether or not to litigate against a trading partner. The results suggest that a country is more likely to file a complaint if (i) it is large, (ii) its trading partner is small, (iii) the trade value of the commodity at stake is large, and (iv) its retaliatory capacity is large.