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The appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process have increasingly come under scrutiny in recent years. Several Members and commentators alike have recommended large-scale amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to provide alternatives to retaliatory measures, with the most notable including compensation, collective retaliation, and increased special and differential treatment for developing countries and/or widespread loss of privileges for non-conforming respondents.

Unfortunately, many of the proposals failed to first identify the aims and objectives of the retaliatory phase, or even of dispute settlement more generally. This chapter takes a more holistic approach in its analysis of whether any of the current proposals will improve (or harm) the system. In doing so, this chapter will first assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures by evaluating the goals and objectives in which it is designed to achieve. It will then evaluate some of the more prominent proposals for amending the DSU under the same framework. Taking such an approach will allow for a more comprehensive review and will reveal not only the problems with retaliatory trade measures, but also its positive aspects, and not only the positive aspects of the suggested alternatives but also where they may be detrimental to the system.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

Modern employment legislation invests the employee with important rights resulting in a greater degree of job security and improved legal protection in his employment. These rights or entitlements which are all personal in nature are divisible, for the sake of convenience, into four parts. Firstly, individual rights. These include guarantee payments, medical suspension, maternity, time off for specified activities, and the employer's insolvency. These rights are by no means exhaustive. Other rights of an individual nature as for example the right not to belong to a trade union where a closed shop is in operation; rights in connection with trade union membership; written reasons for dismissal; and so on, will be treated in the context of the discussion which will take place under the appropriate heading. Secondly, it is proposed to examine the employees right not to be discriminated against in employment on grounds of race and sex, thirdly, his right not to be unfairly dismissed will be analysed, to be followed finally by his right to redundancy payments. In this monograph, it is proposed to examine the first of these personal rights, namely the employee's individual rights. Each of the others will be discussed in subsequent monographs. It should be noted that unlike the common law terms implied into the contract of employment which consist of duties imposed on both the employer and the employee and which can be contracted out of by an express term in the contact of employment the statutory conditions of employment cannot be dispensed with in that manner. Like the implied terms at common law, the statutory conditions of employment too form another source of contract of employment though of course they are independent in that they neither form part of the contract of employment nor of the common law rights.

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

Limited participation of least developed countries (LDCs) in the WTO's dispute settlement system has been the focus of intensive debate among WTO scholars, diplomats and, in particular, WTO lawyers. Central to this debate are the major hurdles (financial and political) that LDCs are generally perceived to face in using the existing system of remedies in the WTO system to enforce compliance. Of the two existing compliance enforcement mechanisms, the first – compensation – is often unrealistic because the WTO Member whose measures have been found to be WTO inconsistent has to agree with it; while the second – retaliation (i.e., the suspension of concessions with regard to the non-complying Member) – is a costly and in many ways counter-productive “shooting oneself in the foot” remedy that LDCs in particular can usually ill afford.

This chapter briefly discusses proposals for reform that have been proposed to alleviate these problems. The chapter then reviews two additional instruments that LDCs could pursue to improve their ability to enforce compliance and make the WTO dispute settlement system a more viable instrument: limited use of direct effect; and increased use of the instrument of publicity and public relations, including through civil society. These instruments, whether independently, or in combination with existing mechanisms and other new compliance enforcement measures, could provide useful tools for the WTO's poorest Members to increase the chances for pay-off from WTO litigation and for compliance with WTO law by larger and more powerful trading partners.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical background of the tomato dispute, review the USA trade law and its effect on the tomato trade, discuss the role of the North American Free Trade Agreement and other supply and demand factors on increased tomato imports from Mexico and present a conceptual analysis of the effects of a Suspension Agreement (a form of Voluntary Export Restraint) on the USA and Mexico. In 1996, the USA and Mexico signed the Suspension Agreement which sets a guaranteed minimum price for Mexican tomato imports.

Conceptual analysis graphically illustrates how the Suspension Agreement affects the tomato trade for the USA and Mexico and shows the benefits and losses of consumers and producers in these two countries.

There is no consensus regarding whether Mexico dumps tomatoes onto the US market. However, US trade law favors domestic producers, leading to the signing of the Suspension Agreement. It is shown here that this agreement has substantial welfare effects in both Mexico and the USA. While it was designed to protect US producers, it also aids Mexican consumers and may potentially improve Mexican producer surplus as well. Only US consumers unambiguously suffer a loss.

As the theoretical model indicates, the Suspension Agreement’s minimum price does help Floridian farmers but, if the rents are large enough, may also aid Mexican producers. If Mexican producers do gain, then quota rent is shifted from tomato consumers to Mexican producers. On the other hand, US consumers are hurt as well as tomato processing plants because they purchase fresh tomatoes for use as inputs. The higher price minimum after the 2013 agreement will likely intensify the welfare effects, and the addition of different categories with distinct prices is likely to have additional consequences for both welfare and trade distortions.

As the USA and Mexico recently signed a new Suspension Agreement, this paper deals with a very timely and contentious trade dispute and contributes to the area of research international trade war. The literature on Suspension Agreements is also expanded by providing welfare analysis of both producers and consumers.

April 17, 1973 Industrial Relations — “Industrial dispute” — New definition not covering dispute between workmen and workmen — Lighterman deliberately allowing trade union membership to lapse — Union endorsing fellow workers' refusal to work with lapsed member — Employers warned of withdrawal of all labour if non‐unionist kept in employment — Employers acquiescing in union policy by sending non‐unionist off work on full pay — Whether warnings to employers “in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute” where no dispute between employers and workers — Whether employers entitled to bring proceedings in tort in High Court if no industrial dispute giving immunity to alleged unlawful threats by union — Whether interlocutory injunction before trial of action appropriate on balance of convenience — Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (c.72), ss. 5(2), 33(3), 132(1), 167(1).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the critical issue of legal interpretation on the “development question” as they arise before WTO panels and Appellate Body, in view of the benefits inherent in a more‐rounded consideration of the development needs and concerns of WTO developing country Member States.

The introduction sets out the background to the challenges of developing countries in utilising the dispute settlement process effectively and using existing support. By analysing relevant cases, Section 2 analyses the “development question” and how it has been so far considered in legal interpretation. Section 3 addresses WTO jurisprudence on development, examining situations wherein “development” arises in the course of WTO dispute settlement. An examination as to how this aspect of WTO jurisprudence may be revisited including the potential aid of trade policy review mechanisms, and procedures for enforcement is then undertaken. It concludes on the position that the WTO judicial review process can work better by providing the much‐needed balance between binding global trade rules and the domestic progress of its developing country membership at the level of dispute settlement.

This paper establishes the importance of recognising and addressing the fact that core challenges and concerns facing developing countries can and should be factored into the legal interpretation of issues in dispute settlement.

A decisive enquiry into WTO development jurisprudence, this paper addresses developing country capacity to pursue the legal opportunities promised by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and how this can be redressed.