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Postmodernism is often held to be a novel viewpoint of the 20th (and 21st) century. In certain minor respects, it is. But in this chapter I will show that, fundamentally, it is a logical derivative of philosopher Immanuel Kant’s revolutionary views in epistemology. As such, postmodernism rises or falls with the cogency of Kant’s basic epistemological approach.

This chapter shows that Kant’s notion of human dignity can be understood as a novel ‘care of the self’ and an ‘art of not being governed’. Drawing on a Foucauldian approach, it demonstrates that Kant intends to shape an ethical subject that strives for freedom and self-mastery. It also argues Kant’s idea of dignity embodies a political and spiritual form of resistance against dominant relations of power and subjectivities. Thanks to this novel perspective, this chapter also offers novel insights on the political force of human dignity. With Kant, this notion becomes a ‘government of the self by oneself’.

This chapter presents two examples of misinterpretation of the philosophical term and historical concept of human dignity in contemporary legal theory and practice. Current legal theories (R. Alexy) still introduce Pico’s concept of dignity regarding the human personality and personal (volitional and rational) abilities. The term ‘dignity’ is marginal for Pico and shows the spiritual way to the status of the original Adam. Pico’s concept of dignity is located in the area of spirit (hyperphysics), not metaphysics (soul) or physics (materials). Günter Dürig in his commentary to Grundgesetz also used the Kantian concept of human dignity. Dürig exaggerated this value and used it also for the area of physics (to protect the human being as a personality). For Kant, the term ‘dignity’ was also marginal, and he used it in the area of metaphysics (soul – especially the moral and rational parts), regarding transcendence for homo noumenon, not for homo phaenomenon. In general, it seems to be problematic to use the ideal of the dignity for the law, which regulates the social relations between concrete phenomenal personalities. There are parallels to Pico. The Kantian starting point was different from Pico, because Kant stays in the area of metaphysics (especially the moral and rational parts). Both consider freedom as a condition of dignity. The concept of autonomy of will is significant for both, but each thinks of it in different ways. For both, human being can become master of oneself, but in a different context.

To elucidate issues involved in the problem of scale, in particular the relations, analytical and dialectical, among first-person experiences of theorist and theorist’s object-complex of individual actor, group, society, motives and causes, intended and unintended effects, and so forth, as these experiences are manifest in an aesthetics of the judicial moment of perception, and enunciated as first-person accounts directly or indirectly, of third-person accounts, sometimes via explicit but usually via virtual or even vicarious second-person accounting practices.

Discussion begins with some classical formulations by neo-Kantian theorists (Simmel, Durkheim, Weber) regarding relations of “individual and society.” Brief citations of various twentieth century responses to the problem of scale follow. Attention then becomes more intensively focused on the basic problem of first-person experience and accounts with respect to the problem of scale, using Coleman’s “foundations” work as guidepost for navigating issues of effects of cognition, consciousness, and action in still mostly obscure processes of aggregation. This leads to explication of the thesis of “impossible individuality,” in present-day theoretical contexts and in the context of post-Kantian romanticism, with special attention to Hölderlin and the feeling/knowing dialectic, Benjamin’s treatment of temporality with respect to metrics of history, and the question what it means to “theorize with intent.”

The discussion ends with some tentative resolutions and several lacunae and aporia which are integral to the current face of the problem of scale (i.e., processes of aggregation, etc.).

The discussion builds upon the work of many others, with first-person illustrations.

Critical Theory was, more than anything else, a determined effort to keep alive the notion that there were alternatives to the existing cognitive order, one that seemed to find necessity in the contingent (and irrational) order of mature capitalism. Herbert Marcuse famously paid tribute to the power of the Imagination to destroy the illusion of the absence of alternatives to the existent, developing both an esthetic social theory and a social theory of esthetics. Yet the founder of Critical Theory, Max Horkheimer, was always suspicious of the Imagination, seeing it as predominantly a reproductive and not productive faculty – something that strengthened the hold of the existent on us, not the reverse. I argue that some of Horkheimer's interpretation of the role of the Imagination is rooted in his early work on Kant's Third Critique, which was conducted under the imprimatur of Gestalt psychologist Hans Cornelius. Thus suggests that there may be more connection between Horkheimer's early Gestalt-influenced thinking and his later work, and may even suggest possible directions for a post-Freudian critical theory.

The modern social and political order is characterised by a range of disparate moralities which lead to a plethora of interpretations and competing perspectives as to what ought to be the appropriate ethical template for corporate social responsibility. The possibility of uniting these disparate threads into a unified whole is explored by addressing the complex philosophies of Immanuel Kant and his alleged successor, Hans Kelsen; paying particular attention to their contrasting views of the proper foundations of public consensus towards establishing an idealised moral community of corporate actors.

The research is library-based and suggests that philosophy (in this instance, Kant’s moral philosophy and Kelsen’s general theory of law and state, for example) is able to offer an alternative rational and morally grounded ethics of law and governance; pertinent to the effective governance of corporate behaviour and moral management practices.

Central concepts, characteristic of both the Kantian and Kelsenian philosophical methodologies, have the capacity to act as a positive influence on the development of effective CSR mechanisms for assuring greater accountability. In addition, it is suggested that by prescribing ethically appropriate corporate behaviour as a first consideration, such philosophical frameworks are capable of providing a powerful disincentive against corporate crime.

The paper is interdisciplinary and (in an era of mistrust, global financial impropriety and other corporate misdemeanours) explores the utility of a philosophical approach towards articulating the conditions for imposing a moral duty incumbent upon all corporate actors in addressing the practical and conceptual needs of their shareholders and wider society.

Discussions about the dignity of human beings often focus on violations of a person’s dignity that are performed by other persons. However, human beings can also violate their own dignity or at least they can expose it to a violation by others thoughtlessly or intentionally. In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states that ‘[o]ne who makes himself a worm cannot complain afterwards if people step on him’. Kant presupposes that persons can infringe or even forfeit their own dignity – for instance through servile behaviour – and that violating one’s own dignity is a violation of a duty towards oneself. Starting from the tension between dignity in terms of honour and worth in current debates and in Kant’s own thinking, as well as between understanding dignity as absolute or relational, I develop a comprehensive account of dignity as a duty to oneself. The author argues for a twofold obligation towards oneself to respect one’s own dignity: (i) a duty (as the necessity of an action done out of respect for the moral law) to respect one’s authority as an autonomous person in the Kantian sense; and (ii) beyond the Kantian framework – an obligation arising from the practical necessity that follows from one’s self-understanding as a self-determined, self-expressive individual personality in a socio-cultural context. Finally, the author outlines the consequences of the idea of ‘making oneself a worm’ for the concept of dignity in the realm of rights by discussing why, even though persons can behave like worms, others ought not to step on them.

The purpose of this study is to consider the complementarity of ethics and law with regard to the problem of their common existence in society through the identification of common and different characteristics in the philosophy of I. Kant.

This study is based on the observation that in modern society ethics and law remain the main social regulators and their co-existence requires the definition of their interaction and complementarity. Also, as this problem is closely related to issues of freedom and obligation, it is necessary to show their role in ethics and law.

The results show that the complementarity of ethics and law is due to the obligation that unites them, and the categorical imperative is the only postulate of ethics and the rights to execute, which allows a person to always remain worthy of his name. Ethics also has the meaning of legal capacity, and law means the recognition of people moral independence by public authorities. Thus, the law must protect a person not only from arbitrariness on the part of other people but also from the state power.

This paper uses a philosophical approach, the utility of which is that ethics and law are studied as elements of normative regulation system of the society in terms of the phenomenal and noumenal nature of a man. It is proposed to consider ethics and law not only as different social regulators, which have their own specifics but also as complementary elements of a single social being, which should exist together and not attempt to substitute one another.

Studies Ghazzali’s and Kant’s metaphysical epistemologies in comparative perspectives to bring out their consequences on the central issue of unification of knowledge. Addresses the problem posed by either of these epistemologies towards unifying knowledge. Shows the central issue of reality as a universal is to be premissed in unification, which is in turn explained to be the direct function of interaction and creative evolution from lower to higher levels of certainty. Shows the unification epistemology to be uniquely premissed in the Qur’anic roots of Oneness of God. Explains this concept substantively in analytical terms. Thus the concept of unification of knowledge means the circular continuity by evolution of the interactions and integration that occur by linkages between the purely a priori and the purely a posteriori domains. This is also meant to convey the phenomenon of epistemic‐ontic continuity of the process towards comprehension and the resulting materiality of forms that subsequently reinforce newer levels of comprehensions. Unification takes place in the plane of such interlinkages, complementarity and convergence or integration. Invokes the problem of unification of knowledge in the contrasting modes of all the three cases, namely Ghazzali, Kant and the unification epistemology, to address the issues of moral market transformation taken up in the midst of human sustainability. Discusses some contemporary issues relating to globalization, economic interlinkages and evolution for world development, in light of the topic of moral market transformation and sustainability. Studies both of these analytically in the unification epistemology paradigm in contrast to the consequences implicative of Ghazzali’s and Kant’s epistemologies.

Robert Hauptman first raised awareness about the ethical issues of reference service in 1976. Hauptman, a library school student at the time, did a study on the culpability, or lack thereof, in reference service provided by librarians. In his study, Hauptman posed as a library patron seeking potentially dangerous information. The behavior examined was how librarians respond to the request for material on how to build a bomb that would be powerful enough to blow up a house. Hauptman tried to present himself as a person of questionable character. He used six public and seven academic libraries in this study. Hauptman first made sure that he was speaking to the reference librarian. He then requested information for the construction of a small explosive, requesting specifically the chemical properties of cordite. He then asked for information on the potency of such an explosive, whether or not it could blow up a suburban house (Hauptman, Wilson Library Bulletin, 1976, p. 626).