Search results

This chapter is intended to elaborate on the existing academic literature addressing the migration of constitutional ideas. Through an examination of ongoing efforts to enshrine “defamation of religion” as a violation of international human rights, the author confirms that the phenomenon of migration is not restricted to positive constitutional norms, but rather also encompasses negative ideas that ultimately may serve to undermine international and domestic constitutionalism. More specifically, the case study demonstrates that the movement of anti-constitutional ideas is not restricted to the domain of “international security” law, and further, that the vertical axis linking international and domestic law is in fact a two-way channel that permits the transmission of domestic anti-constitutional ideas up to the international level.

In reaching the findings presented herein, the chapter also adds to the universalism–relativism debate by demonstrating that allowances for “plurality consciousness” on the international level may in certain instances undermine fundamental norms previously negotiated and accepted as authoritative by the international community. From this perspective, the movement in favor of prohibiting “defamation of religion” is not merely a case study that helps to expand our understanding of how anti-constitutional ideas migrate, but also indicative of a reenergized campaign to challenge the status, content, and stability of universal human rights norms.

This chapter proposes a sociological reconstruction of the emergence of citizenship as a source of legitimacy for political institutions, and it focuses on examining the historical processes that first gave rise to this concept. It explains how citizenship has its origins in the transformation of feudal law, a process that culminated in patterns of military organization that characterized the rise of the early modern state in Europe. On this basis, it describes how the growth of constitutional democracy was integrally marked by the militarization of society and explains that military pressures have remained palpable in constitutional constructions of citizenship. In particular, it argues that, through the early growth of democracy, national citizenship practices were closely linked to global conflicts, and they tended to replicate such conflicts in national contexts. It concludes by showing how more recent processes of constitutional norm formation, based largely in international human rights law, have acted to soften the military dimensions of citizenship.

This chapter examines the role of the person in modern constitutional law. Through a reading of two Canadian Supreme Court decisions – RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery and R. v. Malmo-Levine – it suggests that while the person is the subject of modern constitutional law’s protective gaze, it can also sometimes function as a scapegoat, taking the fall for harms engineered in part by the state (harms, in other words, that really ought to attract constitutional scrutiny given constitutional law’s orienting preoccupation with ‘state action’). Rather than dismissing these gestures as a result of defective legal reasoning in the cases examined, the chapter suggests that the selective erasure or forgetting of state action is in fact essential to the production of the suffering subject – the constitutional person – that modern constitutional law is supposed to protect, precisely, from the state. In effect, then, the chapter claims that modern constitutional law produces the person by ignoring or at least downplaying the role of the state in certain contexts and, hence, by reneging intermittently on its primary task: the application of legal scrutiny to coercive state action.

The object of this research is the reconstruction of the existing legal response by European Union states to the phenomenon of immigration. It seeks to analyse the process of conferral of protection.

One main dimension is selected and discussed: the case law of the national courts. The study focuses on the legal status of immigrants resulting from the intervention of these national courts.

The research shows that although the courts have conferred an increasing protection on immigrants, this has not challenged the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the states to decide, according to their discretionary prerogatives, which immigrants are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. Notwithstanding the differences in the general constitutional and legal structures, the research also shows that the courts of the three countries considered – France, Germany and Spain – have progressively moved towards converging solutions in protecting immigrants.

The research contributes to a better understanding of the different legal orders analysed.

This chapter generally concerns how elements of liberal democratic constitutional discourse have functioned to normalize emergency and possible state of exception governance during the COVID-19 pandemic. More specifically, the chapter focuses on the transference of legislative power to the executive under conditions of emergency rule and how it is possible for delegated emergency lawmaking to operate beyond the limits of what is constitutionally permissible; thus, triggering a state of exception. The chapter uses the deployment emergency rule during the pandemic in The Bahamas as a case study to show how ambivalence and legal uncertainty were the two principal drivers of the normalization process produced by elements of constitutional discourse, and then further explains how constitutionalism, generally, and in its dysfunctional application, can reinforce the processes normalizing emergency and possible state of exception governance.

This paper aims to analyse how constitutional law and corporate income tax (CIT) law, in the Iberian Peninsula, addresses the tax justice principle of generality. Also, it has as an intention to understand the dimension of tax exemptions predicted in the CIT law of both countries.

It analyses several data sources from Spain and Portugal, between them constitutions laws, CIT laws, general tax laws and some constitutional court cases. Furthermore, it uses the content analysis method to identify the level of exemptions and tax benefits present in the CIT law.

The results show that constitutional laws reserve a section to regulate tax issues, that it can present major or minor development. The Spanish article 31 explains the tax system and the Portuguese articles of 103 and 104 explain not only the tax system but also gives instructions about how must occur income, property and consumption taxation. Both jurisdictions, do not refer expressly to the generality principle, nevertheless, it has an implicit presence in the Supreme law and the same happen in the CIT law. They predict that all legal entities, public and private ones, have to contribute to financing the public expenditure. Furthermore, the respect to generality principle implies that tax income exemptions have to be justified, otherwise it can configure a break of the researched fundamental. In researched cases, the Spanish CIT have present more tax exemptions than Portugal, which can lead to consider a relation between the level of corporate contribution to income tax revenues collection and the tax exemptions predicted in the CIT law.

It allows understanding the difference between tax jurisdictions in the tax principles domain.

On two different occasions, the Jordanian Constitutional Court has ruled that Articles 51 and 54 of the Jordanian Arbitration Act no. 31 of the year 2001 are unconstitutional and null. In view of this, this paper aims to attempt to give the reader a brief preview of the Jordanian Arbitration Act, the Jordanian Constitution and the Jordanian Constitutional Court. It also highlights and critically analyzes the Jordanian Constitutional Court two decisions pertaining to the Arbitration Act and its special implications in this regard from the perspective of arbitration law and the distinct characteristics embedded in it.

To examine how effective is the approach followed by the Constitutional Court in ruling the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned Articles, this work makes use of the primary and secondary data available in this regard as the main method to complete such an examination. By critically analyzing and comparing the various data contained in these sources, this work identifies the problems associated with such decisions.

This work submits that while the Constitutional Court has rested its rulings largely on constitutional principles, concerns arising from the Arbitration Act perspective have not been dealt with adequately by the Court. Furthermore, it argues that while the principles of the constitution shall be respected, the distinct characteristics of the arbitration law warrant a more careful approach than actually followed by the Court.

Taking into consideration the importance of arbitration as an alternative mean for dispute resolution, the Jordanian legislator has addressed the application of arbitration as early as the year 1953. However, while the Constitutional Court’s questionable approach to the aforementioned articles would necessarily hinder the use of arbitration, no comprehensive scholarly work has either examined such approach or addressed its implications. Accordingly, this work derives its originality and value from being the first of its kind to examine and address such a matter.

A longstanding question of American constitutionalism emerges out of the fact that constitutions demand fidelity. By virtue of what is the American Constitution binding? Zevit contends that many of the explanations of constitutional fidelity offered today fail to reconcile Americans’ submission to a Constitution written and ratified by generations of long ago with their claim (or aspiration) to be self-governing as a People today. Zevit introduces one type of explanation (the aptness explanation) that does not contain this flaw, and, drawing on an expansive definition of culture as a notion that encompasses the legal-political, offers the concepts of legal-political culture and baseline community as a framework for assessing the Constitution’s aptness while maintaining the People’s self-rule. She argues that constitutional aptness secures the foundations of constitutional legitimacy.