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Discussions about the dignity of human beings often focus on violations of a person’s dignity that are performed by other persons. However, human beings can also violate their own dignity or at least they can expose it to a violation by others thoughtlessly or intentionally. In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states that ‘[o]ne who makes himself a worm cannot complain afterwards if people step on him’. Kant presupposes that persons can infringe or even forfeit their own dignity – for instance through servile behaviour – and that violating one’s own dignity is a violation of a duty towards oneself. Starting from the tension between dignity in terms of honour and worth in current debates and in Kant’s own thinking, as well as between understanding dignity as absolute or relational, I develop a comprehensive account of dignity as a duty to oneself. The author argues for a twofold obligation towards oneself to respect one’s own dignity: (i) a duty (as the necessity of an action done out of respect for the moral law) to respect one’s authority as an autonomous person in the Kantian sense; and (ii) beyond the Kantian framework – an obligation arising from the practical necessity that follows from one’s self-understanding as a self-determined, self-expressive individual personality in a socio-cultural context. Finally, the author outlines the consequences of the idea of ‘making oneself a worm’ for the concept of dignity in the realm of rights by discussing why, even though persons can behave like worms, others ought not to step on them.

This chapter shows that Kant’s notion of human dignity can be understood as a novel ‘care of the self’ and an ‘art of not being governed’. Drawing on a Foucauldian approach, it demonstrates that Kant intends to shape an ethical subject that strives for freedom and self-mastery. It also argues Kant’s idea of dignity embodies a political and spiritual form of resistance against dominant relations of power and subjectivities. Thanks to this novel perspective, this chapter also offers novel insights on the political force of human dignity. With Kant, this notion becomes a ‘government of the self by oneself’.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse Charles Anthony Raven Crosland and Thomas Humphrey Marshall’s respective theories of equalisation and civic duty, and assesses the ethical criticisms made against these theories. Many of the ethical criticisms levelled against Crosland and Marshall argue that their theories focused exclusively on equalisation and social rights. In taking a morally neutral position, they neglected the duties that should be performed by citizens. This paper assesses the force of these ethical criticisms.

The paper begins by identifying the cardinal points of Crosland and Marshall’s theories of equalisation and the duties that should be performed by citizens. The author ask whether it is reasonable to conclude that they took morally neutral positions and neglected these duties. The author then explore and assess the critique levied against Crosland and Marshall.

Crosland took a passive stance on the intervention of the government in civic morality and did not develop a discussion of the duties that ought to be performed by citizens. Thus, in some respects, he cannot avoid the ethical criticism that he took a morally neutral position and neglected civic duty. Marshall did not discuss only equalisation and social rights, but also considered the duties that ought to be performed by citizens. Consequently, it is concluded that the ethical criticism of his theory is not valid.

The paper makes an original contribution in the understanding of three areas: Crosland’s moral neutrality, Marshall’s discussion on civic duty, and the ethical criticism of Keynesian social democracy.

This paper examines the duty to rescue and the duty to assist the needy. An explanation is offered regarding why common‐sense morality makes the duty to rescue feel more pressing than the duty to assist the needy.

This chapter presents two examples of misinterpretation of the philosophical term and historical concept of human dignity in contemporary legal theory and practice. Current legal theories (R. Alexy) still introduce Pico’s concept of dignity regarding the human personality and personal (volitional and rational) abilities. The term ‘dignity’ is marginal for Pico and shows the spiritual way to the status of the original Adam. Pico’s concept of dignity is located in the area of spirit (hyperphysics), not metaphysics (soul) or physics (materials). Günter Dürig in his commentary to Grundgesetz also used the Kantian concept of human dignity. Dürig exaggerated this value and used it also for the area of physics (to protect the human being as a personality). For Kant, the term ‘dignity’ was also marginal, and he used it in the area of metaphysics (soul – especially the moral and rational parts), regarding transcendence for homo noumenon, not for homo phaenomenon. In general, it seems to be problematic to use the ideal of the dignity for the law, which regulates the social relations between concrete phenomenal personalities. There are parallels to Pico. The Kantian starting point was different from Pico, because Kant stays in the area of metaphysics (especially the moral and rational parts). Both consider freedom as a condition of dignity. The concept of autonomy of will is significant for both, but each thinks of it in different ways. For both, human being can become master of oneself, but in a different context.

Ethics is attracting increasing attention in management of both public‐ and private‐sector organisations. For managers within health‐care systems, ethical issues can be most acute, especially given the human rights issues involved in new legislation. This paper explores some of the ways in which philosophy may potentially offer guidelines to managers faced with the need to make decisions ethically. It draws on a small number of philosophical perspectives to demonstrate how they can assist in informing ethical decision making, and illustrates its arguments through one topic, suicide prevention, an area of relevance to health managers but one that is beset by some of the most profound ethical dilemmas. The ways in which philosophy may assist in decision making in this one example are, it is argued, generalisable to many other health issues where complicated decisions have to be made. The paper develops a philosophical framework consisting of the ethical considerations of “self‐love”, “humanity”, “the value of human life” and “duty to others” and demonstrates, through the use of two hypothetical case studies, how these can be applied to a decision‐making process so as to reduce inconsistencies in attitudes and practice.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to investigate how Information and Communications Technology (ICT) researchers in UK computing departments address ethics in their research. Whilst research and innovation in ICT has blossomed in the last two decades, the ethical, social and legal challenges they present have also increased. However, the increasing attention the technical development receives has not been replicated in the area of developing effective guidelines that can address the moral issues inherent in ICT research.

This research is qualitative and made use of interviews. The data analysis was done with dialectical hermeneutics. Through a dialectical hermeneutic process, this research unpacks different understandings of relevance attached to ethics reviews of ICT research in UK computing departments.

The findings include that ethics reviews are relevant because; it is a moral duty, it improves trust for researchers, it is part of risk assessment, it is in compliance with the law and it is a sustainable act.

These various understandings illustrate an important dialectic process on the current state of the art in ICT research.

It asks to what degree the currently dominant model of ethics review based on biomedical ethics is optimal to ICT.

It proposes a framework that can effectively help researchers and administrators to ensure responsible research and innovation in ICT. Finally, it identifies that ICT researchers would benefit from the developing repertoire of responsible research innovation.

This chapter treats the ethical consequences of the diffusion of political power and authority from state to nonstate actors. It claims that with the increased power of civil society or NGOs come more stringent political responsibilities. The sources of these responsibilities resemble those of classic political duties – ordinary moral obligations, Weber's ethic of responsibility, and responsibilities attaching to democratic relationships – but their form differs across roles, tracking the different forms of politician–citizen relationships. NGO politicians should adopt, and be held to, a stringent role ethic as the least bad substitute for the accountability mechanisms of classic, state-based politics.

This study aimed to gain an in-depth and contextualized understanding of what impacted Scheier's commitment to addressing the apparel challenges of people with disabilities (PWDs) and how moral duty may have played a role in developing the adaptive design innovations used in the first-of-its-kind adaptive children's wear line.

To achieve this goal, the study used the duty orientation (DO) theory and the social model of disability (SMD) theory to conduct a case study investigating Mindy Scheier's commitment to addressing the apparel challenges facing PWDs.

The result of the case study revealed three dominant themes that aligned with the DO theory: (a) duty to all PWDs, (b) duty to sacrifice and fight against all odds and (c) duty to solve the apparel challenges facing PWDs. Using the DO and the SMD theories, the themes illustrated how moral duty impacted Scheier's sacrifice and feeling of personal responsibility to address and solve the apparel challenges facing all PWDs.

This study demonstrated how the DO theory contextualized the launch of adaptive apparel into the mainstream fashion industry and how the apparel industry seems to have transitioned from a medical model of disability approach to an SMD to address the apparel needs of PWDs.

Work has historically been an important basis of identity, but the sharp decline in the availability of stable attachments to jobs, organizations, or occupations jeopardizes paid work’s capacity to sustain identity. If available work opportunities are increasingly precarious and short-term, can the same be said for identities? Analysis of the efforts of members of an unusual occupational group – stage actors – to support an identity based on unstable work provides insights into the variability and indeterminacy of responses to structural employment uncertainty. Despite manifold identity threats, actors struggle to maintain identity as actors both in others’ eyes and in their own.