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The paper highlights what are currently the most relevant aspects in the debate surrounding the possible reform in the institutional setup of financial markets regulation and supervision, not least about the future role of Central Banks. As a preliminary question, the definition of financial stability is addressed. Then, the importance of stability for the economy and the specific role of regulators and supervisors and possible regulatory failure are discussed. On this basis, a possible evolving design for regulation and supervision on a national and a European level has to be checked against optimality, taking into account the different objectives of state intervention into the market. Finally the state of play in the institutional reform of European financial market legislation is described.

The purpose of this paper is to consider financial services sector macro‐prudential and micro‐prudential supervisory reforms in the European Union (EU). It aims to critically examine the new system, reviewing in particular the adequacy of the reform to address financial crises.

The paper is based on a qualitative analysis of the relevant academic and trade literature.

In considering the new EU supervisory system's constitutional and legal foundation and its organizational structure, the study highlights the revamped and complex architecture's strengths and limitations.

The paper makes a contribution to the understanding of the new financial services sector supervisory system in the EU; few studies have analyzed its constitutional legality and satisfactoriness for the prevention of new crises.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the plausibility of four different mid-term paths of development of the European Union (EU): first, a political union or a European state; second, a differentiated and flexible integration of the polity; third, a covert and deepening integration of the polity outside of the political arenas; fourth, the disintegration and/or dissolution of the EU through the exit of individual members or a joint decision to terminate the union.

The paper uses strategic interaction analysis to identify the plausibility of each of these four possible outcomes. By systematically varying the relevant actors’, i.e. European Council’s and member states’, the European Parliament’s, the Commission’s, preferences over outcomes while holding constant institutional rules of decision making on the one hand, and systematically varying institutional rules on the other while holdings actors’ preferences constant, the paper comes to the conclusion that differentiated and flexible integration and covert integration are the most plausible mid-term paths of development.

The paper finds that neither a European state or deep political union nor a disintegration or even dissolution of the EU is the most plausible path of development. Rather, it concludes that flexible and differentiated integration as well as covert integration outside the political arenas are the most likely developments. However, it also draws attention to the political costs of flexible and differentiated integration which does not allow for an overall view of political and policy issues negotiated at one political table, limiting the scope of compromise formation and even leading to a fragmented polity. Covert integration consisting of mechanisms of hidden integration “invisible” to the wider public may lead to a democratic backlash, once citizens realize that integration has considerably deepened without their being aware of it.

Most publications regarding the future development of the EU are normatively driven, either conjuring an imminent disintegration, or invoking the necessity of a deepening integration leading to a political union. This paper, by contrast, seeks to assess the likely further development based on empirically identified factors and a logical argument.

This study aims to analyze the impact and effectiveness of the regulation on the European sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) market. The European sovereign debt crisis has drawn considerable attention to the CDS market. CDS have the ability of a speculative instrument to bet against a sovereign default. Therefore, the Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 was introduced as the worldwide first uncovered CDS regulation. It prohibits buying uncovered sovereign CDS contracts in the European Union (EU).

First, this paper measures spread changes of sovereign CDS of the EU member states around regulation specific event dates to detect whether and when European sovereign CDS reacts to regulation announcements and the enforcement of regulation. Second, it compares the CDS long-term stability of the EU sample with a non-EU sample based on 44 non-EU sovereign CDS entities.

The results indicate widening CDS spreads prior to the regulation, and stable CDS spreads following the introduction of the regulation. In particular, sovereign CDS of European crisis-hit entities are stable since the regulation was introduced.

The results show that since the regulation of uncovered CDS in the EU has been enacted, the sovereign CDS market is stable and less volatile. Based on the theory about speculation on uncovered sovereign CDS by betting on the reference entity’s default, the introduction of Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 appears to be an appropriate measure to stabilize markets and reduce speculation on sovereign defaults.

Using a data set of Taiwanese listed firms from 2002 to 2015, this paper aims to examine the determinants to voluntarily appoint independent directors.

This study uses panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time-series nature of the data. Further, this paper uses Tobit regression, generalized linear model (GLM) in the additional analysis and the two-stage least squares to mitigate for a possible endogeneity issue.

The main findings show that Taiwanese firms with large board sizes tend to voluntarily appoint independent directors and firms that already have independent supervisors more willingly to accept additional independent directors onto the board. Furthermore, ownership concentration and institutional ownership are positively associated with the voluntary appointment of independent directors. On the contrary, firms controlled by family members are generally reluctant to voluntarily appoint independent directors.

The findings are important for managers, shareholders, creditors and policymakers. In particular, when considering the determinants of the voluntary appointment of independent directors, the results indicate that independent supervisors, outside shareholders and institutional investors are significant factors in influencing effective internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. This research work focuses on the voluntary appointment of independent directors. It would be interesting to compare the effectiveness of voluntary appointments with a mandatory appointment within Taiwan and with other jurisdictions.

This study incrementally contributes to the corporate governance literature in several ways. First, this study extends the earlier research by using a more comprehensive data set of non-financial Taiwanese firms and using alternative methodologies to investigate the determinants of voluntary appointment of independent directors. Second, prior studies tend to neglect the possible issue of using a censored and fractional dependent variable, the proportion of independent directors, which might yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates when using ordinary least squares regression estimation. Finally, this study addresses the relevant econometric issues by using the Tobit, GLM and the two-stage least squares for a possible endogeneity concern.

Grahl (2006) has commented that current manifestations of institutional shareholder activism are limited by the rise of the shareholder value doctrine in EU member states and the absence of strong legal frameworks restraining corporate practice. Survey studies have pointed to a generally muted response to legislative encouragement that financial institutions engage in reformist activist practices. Several studies have attempted to measure the effect of legislation calling on financial institutions to disclose the extent of their involvement with companies in which they have invested. All such studies have concluded that strong shareholder activism policy would require adjustments to the manner of remuneration of investment managers and intermediaries. For example, a study of pension fund reporting immediately following the introduction of British legislation in 2000 found that most surveyed organisations had disclosed the use of ‘social considerations’ in investment processes (Mathieu, 2000), with little more added by way of elaboration. (The latter observation is also couched a high non-response rate (67 per cent).) More recent studies demonstrate the struggle of pension funds in this regard. Pension funds have tended to follow conservative ‘hands-off’ ownership strategies, whereas activist approaches typically require a very different ‘hands-on’ approach (Johnson & De Graaf, 2009; Eurosif, 2010).

This paper seeks to investigate the holding of non‐executive directorships by CEOs in a sample of 387 large UK companies. The main objective of the paper is to ascertain whether the holding of additional directorships by CEOs is influenced by the governance and ownership characteristics of their companies.

The approach takes the form of an empirical analysis of the holding of non‐executive directorships by 387 CEOs of large UK companies.

The study finds that 101 CEOs (26 per cent) hold at least one non‐executive directorship but the most any single CEO holds is three with the vast majority holding one other directorship. CEOs who also serve as chairman are more likely to hold non‐executive directorships while CEOs in companies with greater concentration of external ownership are less likely to hold other directorships. The study finds no evidence that either non‐executive representation or managerial ownership (including CEO ownership) influences the holding of additional directorships. The holding of additional directorships is positively related to company size, suggesting that the more complex environment in which CEOs of large companies operate leads to the offer of additional directorships.

The findings are important as they key into an ongoing debate on whether the holding of additional directorships by CEOs is consistent with good governance practice. The evidence presented here provides mixed information for governance regulators. While a significant majority of CEOs do not hold additional directorships, there is evidence that weaker board and external ownership monitoring is associated with a greater likelihood that CEOs will sit on other boards.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and evaluate the relationships among the flexibility enablers and to prepare a hierarchy of these enablers to know their influences over each other in global supply chain. The framework suggests that the priority of enablers in supply chain should be determined on the basis of their driving power and dependency.

Various enablers used by researchers and practitioners for flexibility management of global supply chain have been identified. These enablers have been classified as strategic, operational and performance‐based enablers. Interpretive structural modeling (ISM) is used to establish mutual relationships among the flexibility enablers and to prepare a hierarchy‐based model.

It has been observed that some enablers having high‐driving power and low dependency are of strategic importance. These enablers require more attention while other enablers based on operations and performances are dependents of strategic enablers.

The index of enablers based on driving power and dependency provide an insight for supply chain managers to make the entire supply chain highly flexible, that would help them to respond to global uncertainties.

Presentation of enablers in the form of hierarchy using ISM and ranking them into various driving power and dependent categories is a good effort to make flexible global supply chain.

Questions whether the planned European Monetary Union is capable of solving the social economic challenges of our time. Examines the economic and financial history of modern times; explains the formulation of the impossibility theorem in practice, suggesting the equation of unified knowledge as a solution to the problem of economic calculation; and constructs a plan for a free and stable European Monetary and Economic Union. Looks at the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) questioning its ability to solve the basic problems of the member states of the European Union. Addresses a number of issues contained within the Treaty: acceptable socially beneficial goals; unacceptable socially harmful, adverse anti‐equilibrium means, policies, reforms and regulations; and the phenomenon of physics’ ‘chain reaction’ within economics. Gives a synopsis of anti‐equilibrium elements and forces in the Treaty of Maastricht, debating what needs to be done to ensure that European Monetary and Economic Union can become an immediate and lasting success.