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The aim of this paper is to study the impact of equity returns volatility of reference entities on credit‐default swap rates using a new dataset from the Japanese market.

Using a copula approach, the paper models the different relationships that can exist in different ranges of behavior. It studies the bivariate distributions of credit‐default swap rates and equity return volatility estimated with GARCH (1,1) and focus on one parameter Archimedean copula.

First, the paper emphasizes the finding that pairs with higher rating present a weaker dependence coefficient and then, the impact of equity returns volatility on credit‐default swap rates is higher for the lowest rating class. Second, the dependence structure is positive and asymmetric indicating that protection sellers ask for higher credit‐default swap returns to compensate the higher credit risk incurred by low rating class.

The paper has several practical implications that are of value for financial hedgers and engineers, loan market participants, financial regulators, government regulators, central banks, and risk managers.

The paper also illustrates the potential benefits of equity returns volatility of reference entities as a proxy of default risk. These simplifications could be lifted in future research on this theme.

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the young, but rapidly growing sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market, describes the function, trading, history, market participants, key statistical and stylized facts about CDS prices, determinants, price discovery, and risk issues.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the rule recently published by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission that establishes a timetable for the mandatory clearing of interest rate and credit default swaps through a clearinghouse.

The paper discusses the structure of cleared trades in swaps, the classes of interest rate and credit default swaps that are subject to mandatory clearing under the CFTC's new rule and the affirmative and negative specifications for each class, the phased approach adopted by the CFTC for the mandatory clearing compliance schedule, and the end‐user and inter‐affiliate exemptions from the mandatory clearing requirement.

“Centralized clearing,” a process in which bilaterally negotiated trades of derivatives have to be given up to a centralized clearinghouse, is a cornerstone of the new global regulatory system for derivatives. Its proponents argue that centralized clearing will help to mitigate systemic risk by helping counterparties identify and net positions. The paper outlines the clearing rules in the USA for interest rate and credit default swaps.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the consequences of the “safe harbor” provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code that were enacted from 1984 through 2005 and that protect certain financial contracts from standard bankruptcy procedures.

Qualitative methods are used to evaluate whether these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code were successful in their stated goal of reducing systemic risk in the financial system. A model of systemic risk is presented verbally in order to frame the discussion.

Recent evidence indicates that the “safe harbor” provisions, in fact, destabilized the financial system by encouraging collateralized interbank lending, discouraging careful analysis of the credit risk of counterparties and increasing the risk that creditors will run on a financial firm.

This paper indicates that the rewriting of the Bankruptcy Code to favor financial firms has had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the financial system. To put the financial system on more secure foundations, the author proposes that large complex financial institutions be prohibited from posting collateral on over the counter derivative transactions and that the repo‐related bankruptcy amendments passed in 2005 be repealed.

This paper proposes an original framework for understanding systemic risk which drives the results in the paper.

The purpose of this article, which is based on a recent presentation by Paul Van der Maas, is to give the reader a brief overview of common credit derivatives, the size and scope of their markets and their role in structured credit products. The case study uses as a reference a current deal that Bank of America has structured using credit derivatives.

The credit derivatives market is both fast‐growing and increasingly complex. This brings problems for banks and the infrastructure needed to support such products. There are also sophisticated questions of regulation. The authors bring a wealth of experience to bear on the topic and suggest a variety of ways in which the problems and opportunities can be dealt with satisfactorily.

In fraudulent conveyance cases, plaintiffs allege that by entering into a complex leverage transaction, such as an LBO, a firm’s former owners ensured its subsequent collapse. Proving that the transaction rendered the firm insolvent may allow debtors (or their proxies) to claw back transfers made to former shareholders and others as part of the transaction.

Courts have recently questioned the robustness of the solvency evidence traditionally provided in such cases, claiming that traditional expert analyses (e.g., a discounted flow analysis) may suffer from hindsight (and other forms of) bias, and thus not reflect an accurate view of the firm’s insolvency prospects at the time of the challenged transfers. To address the issue, courts have recently suggested that experts should consider market evidence, such as the firm’s stock, bond, or credit default swap prices at the time of the challenged transaction. We review market-evidence-based approaches for determination of solvency in fraudulent conveyance cases.

We compare different methods of solvency determination that rely on market data. We discuss the pros and cons of these methods and illustrate the use of credit default swap spreads with a numerical example. Finally, we highlight the limitations of these methods.

If securities trade in efficient markets in which security prices quickly impound all available information, then such security prices provide an objective assessment of investors’ views of the firm’s future insolvency prospects at the time of challenged transfer, given contemporaneously available information. As we explain, using market data to analyze fraudulent conveyance claims or assess a firm’s solvency prospects is not as straightforward as some courts argue. To do so, an expert must first pick a particular credit risk model from a host of choices which links the market evidence (or security price) to the likelihood of future default. Then, to implement his chosen model, the expert must estimate various parameter input values at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer. In this connection, it is important to note that each credit risk model rests on particular assumptions, and there are typically several ways in which a model’s key parameters may be empirically estimated. Such choices critically affect any conclusion about a firm’s future default prospects as of the date of an alleged fraudulent conveyance.

Simply using market evidence does not necessarily eliminate the question of bias in any analysis. The reliability of a plaintiff’s claims regarding fraudulent conveyance will depend on the reasonableness of the analysis used to tie the observed market evidence at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer to default prospects of the firm.

There is a large body of literature in financial economics that examines the relationship between market data and the prospects of a firm’s future default. However, there is surprisingly little research tying that literature to the analysis of fraudulent conveyance claims. Our paper, in part, attempts to do so. We show that while market-based methods use the information contained in market prices, this information must be supplemented with assumptions and the conclusions of these methods critically depend on the assumption made.

The purpose of this paper is to answer a specific research question: How have EU and US regulators translated the idea of central clearing into law?

A meticulous legal research is carried out. First, the pre‐crisis regulatory regime for credit default swap (CDS) is reviewed, from a securities law angle as well as from a comparative Euro‐American perspective. Next, the regulatory processes leading to the adoption of the central clearing regulations are discussed. Thereafter, a material comparative analysis is made of the provisions related to central clearing in the EU and US regulatory initiatives. Finally, the paper is concluded with an evaluation of both legislations in the light of all previous analyses.

The research first shows that central clearing regulations rely on a series of presumptions, both concerning the gravity of counterparty risk threats and the necessity of central clearing. Additionally, the EU and US clearing regulations are similar with regard to the broad innovations they introduce, i.e. the mandatory central clearing of a variety of over‐the‐counter derivatives and counterparty risk management requirements for central clearing institutions and for non‐cleared swaps. However, the specific content of the provisions often differs. Furthermore, both legislations are limited to enouncing broad principles. This is also the case for the crucial provisions related to counterparty risk management. Therefore, these provisions in se do not guarantee the proper regulation of counterparty risk management practices. Consequently, much is to be expected from the implementing measures adopted by regulatory institutions.

The paper provides an overview of those provisions in the European and US regulations that specifically concern central clearing for CDS. It is one of the first papers which does this in a very well‐structured and clearly written manner. Also it is one of the first to provide a clear comparison between the provisions in the EU and the US regulations.